American Association for the Advancement of Science
Washington, DC, 17-22 February 2000.
This paper presents a case study of a recent technological risk controversy: the use of plutonium dioxide radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) on board the Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn, in light of its gravity-assist swing by Earth in August 1999. The data consist of Internet dialogues on the topic, specifically, UseNet postings from 1 April 1995 through 31 March 1999. They illustrate the exponential impact of a very small and well-organized opposition movement, which utilized the Internet to exert pressure to abort the launch and flyby. Though Cassini went on to Saturn, the resulting political pressure on NASA has created an atmosphere of public controversy in which new missions may be very difficult to authorize if their goals and design require RTGs.
The success of the anti-Cassini activists raises questions about the nature of technological risk decision-making in a democratic but unevenly informed society. It underscores the empowerment of small but well-organized groups in the realm of natural and technological hazard policy and the potential of the Internet in heightening individual empowerment in such debates, particularly when science itself is under critical interrogation. It also raises less heartening issues of demagoguery in cyberspace.
The Cassini-Huygens mission to the Saturn planetary system is physically the largest, scientifically the most ambitious, and organizationally the most international project ever undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or by its partners, the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI).
Contested Decisions:
NASA dismissed solar power for mission instrumentation and temperature maintenance needs because of:
Instead, NASA decided on the compact radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) and radioisotope thermal unit (RHU) design, which generate heat and, in the case of the RTGs, electrical power through the alpha radiation emitted by ceramicized plutonium-238 dioxide.
NASA further opted for a Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter Gravity Assist (VVEJGA) trajectory:
Risk assessment performed for NASA as part of the Environmental Impact Statement for the mission characterized the risk of plutonium release on launch or a swingby accident as negligible and acceptable. Probabilities and their consequences in additional cancer deaths were estimated at:
The opposition:
The plutonium and the Earth swingby and the risk assessment performed for NASA erupted into controversy by 1996, resulting in sustained efforts:
People often make up their minds about an issue before seeking facts about it, often taking the position of a reference group they trust, and then become very confident in their opinions. Once the pattern gels one way or the other, new facts and arguments are fit into the framework in a way that further solidifies it, to avoid the cognitive dissonance of holding two conflicting interpretations.
The public is often characterized, perhaps unfairly, as irrational and ignorant: It may be that laypeople judge hazards along multiple axes, not just the quantifiable probability of mortality/ morbidity. This implies that experts may have narrow, faulty perceptions of their own.
From this population, I created a sample, by confining my examination to a maximum of 250 messages per month. I chose to scan up to the first 250 messages turned up by the search engine, because Deja.com sorts message by "confidence," basically the number of times the keyword turns up in a message. From this maximum of 250 messages per month, I extracted only those on the subject of the spacecraft, saving their authors' names and e-mail addresses and an abstract of their messages in a word processor. Furthermore, I saved only the most recent posting by a given author and then categorized the author's stance on the basis of this comment as proponent, opponent, or neutral. If their stances were not decipherable from these comments, I would search on these authors' names and read their other messages on the subject, until I could classify their stances. Additionally, I did searches on author names and Cassini to identify numbers of postings per author as an indicator of interest level.
This method yielded comments by 937 authors. These individuals posted a total of 8,020 messages or forty percent of the Cassini messages dating from the four year study period.
Later, this text database became the basis of a spreadsheet database including fields for author name, login name, e-mail, gender, basic stance, central concerns raised in their messages, and number of postings an author had made on the subject. I also noted whether the message had been originally composed by the author or was basically a forward of someone else's writing. This database was sorted on various of these fields to yield the results summarized in the following tables.
STANCE Gender Individuals Posts # % # % ========================================================= Neutral female 7 3.9 10 0.9 male 139 78.1 930 87.5 organization 4 2.2 14 1.3 unknown 28 15.7 109 10.3 19.0% of authors 178 100.0 1063 100.0 13.3% of posts --------------------------------------------------------- Opponent female 16 8.2 103 4.1 male 132 68.0 2067 82.4 organization 6 3.1 121 4.8 unknown 40 20.6 217 8.7 20.7% of authors 194 100.0 2508 100.0 31.3% of posts --------------------------------------------------------- Proponent female 19 3.4 154 3.5 male 468 82.8 3946 88.7 organization 3 0.5 24 0.5 unknown 75 13.3 325 7.3 60.3% of authors 565 100.0 4449 100.0 55.5% of posts ========================================================= 937 = n (authors) 8020 = n (posts made by these authors) |
GENDER Stance Individuals Posts # % # % ========================================================= Female neutral 7 16.7 10 3.7 opponent 16 38.1 103 38.6 proponent 19 45.2 154 57.7 4.5% of authors 42 100.0 267 100.0 3.3% of posts --------------------------------------------------------- Male neutral 139 18.8 930 13.4 opponent 132 17.9 2067 29.8 proponent 468 63.3 3946 56.8 78.0% of authors 739 100.0 6943 100.0 86.6% of posts --------------------------------------------------------- Organization neutral 4 30.8 14 8.8 opponent 6 46.2 121 76.1 proponent 3 23.1 24 15.1 1.5% of authors 13 100.0 159 100.0 2.0% of posts --------------------------------------------------------- Unknown neutral 28 19.6 109 16.7 opponent 40 28.0 217 33.3 proponent 75 52.4 325 49.9 16.0% of authors 143 100.0 651 100.0 8.1% of posts ========================================================= 937 = n (authors) 8020 = n (posts made by these authors) |
=============================================================== NEUTRAL ISSUES # % --------------------------------------------------------------- Technical questions/answers 72 40.4 Asking/providing basic information 20 11.2 Passing on others' messages 14 7.9 Nostradamus fan asking basic question 13 7.3 Risk question 12 6.7 Flames 7 3.9 Costs, taxes 6 3.4 Politics/bureaucratization 5 2.8 Privatization of space 4 2.2 Vulnerabilty of big mission 2 1.1 Other 23 12.9 sum 178 100.0 =============================================================== OPPONENT ISSUES # % --------------------------------------------------------------- Passing on others' msgs 46 23.7 Risk 46 23.7 Nostradamus/astrology/666 fears 41 21.1 Calls to action 11 5.7 Costs, scale, opportunity costs 9 4.6 Censorship by media 7 3.6 Conspiracy/militarization of space 6 3.1 Flames 4 2.1 Privatization of space better than NASA 3 1.5 Other 21 10.8 sum 194 100.0 =============================================================== PROPONENT ISSUES # % --------------------------------------------------------------- Opponents a small # unqualified Luddites 95 16.8 Risk overstated, disproproportionate 91 16.1 Enthusiasm for the mission and space 73 12.9 Flames 59 10.4 Orbit/trajectory aimed to be safe 36 6.4 Passing on others's messages 36 6.4 Past nuke/RTG failures didn't kill life on Earth 27 4.8 Solar not feasible 22 3.9 Big missions=big results 20 3.5 Nostradamus critiques 23 4.1 Cass budget doesn't allow for cruise science 16 2.8 Opportunity costs of opponent activism 11 1.9 Media censorship/bias against science 9 1.6 Calls to action 8 1.4 Privatization critique for large-scale missions 4 0.7 Other 35 6.2 sum 565 100.0 =============================================================== 937 = n (authors) |
Balance of opinions:
Originality of messages versus forwarding of others' messages:
Opinions by gender:
Distribution of opinions if sample had been gender-balanced (hypothetical scenario):
Concerns of the opponents:
Concerns of the proponents:
The Internet offers empowerment to political activists. A few people can alert others to gravely concerning issues and enlist them to spread the news. The population notified of the issue expands geometrically and, even if a small number of those exposed to the idea respond politically, the result can be tremendous political pressure. The "Battle in Seattle" over the World Trade Organization illustrates the potential of Internet organizing.
Examination of the forwarded messages among the 24 percent of opponents who simply passed on others' messages revealed that these overwhelmingly came from about 5 individuals. Similarly, among the 7 percent of proponents passing on others' messages, these emanated from about 5 individuals, mainly publicity employees of NASA. While they did not win their battles to cancel the launch or abort the gravity-assist around Earth, opponents may have won the war, as NASA and Congress are now more concerned about approving new missions that must depend on RTGs.
Potentially very empowering to ordinary citizens, the Internet offers a counterweight to the political power of great corporations and wealthy individuals. The demagogic use of the Internet, however, remains the shadow of empowerment. Appeals to conspiracies, ad hominem attacks, exaggeration, and other emotionally-manipulative devices are the hallmark of demagoguery, and they are abundant in this debate, particularly among the opponents but also among flame-prone proponents. The nature of the technology embodied in Cassini and similar missions makes it inaccessible to the average citizen, who yet must decide whether to act politically for or against this and other technological applications or, worse, for a democratic society, remain uninformed and apathetic.
Risk management decision-makers, particularly politicians, would be well-reminded that they may be hearing from an unrepresentative selection of their voting and contributing constituents in technological risk debates, as in many other issues. This sample may be responding to demagoguery, self- interest, or the rational consideration of risks and benefits: The source of political pressure may not be too apparent when decision-makers consider policy to manage a technological hazard. While one would hope they rely on risk assessment science in framing their responses, they must do so in an atmosphere of political risk and uncertainty, with its own Type I and Type II hazards to their own careers! The next phase of this project will query those decision-makers about the volume of constituent communications on this subject and their own quandaries in responding to them.
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