Multiple
Working Hypotheses
A
Scientific Method for Marxism
unpublished ms
July 1992
by
Eugene
E. Ruyle
Department of Anthropology
California State
University, Long Beach
Long Beach, CA 90840
(310) 985-5364
Abstract:
The
crisis in socialism requires a reexamination of Marxist science as well as
Marxist practice. For many, Marxism became a Òruling theoryÓ which possessed
truth, rather than a method for understanding reality and guiding class
struggle. If Marxism is to retain its ability to both understand and change the
world, we must correct our tendencies toward dogmatism and sectarianism. The
Òmethod of multiple working hypothesesÓ can contribute toward this goal.
Originally proposed by the geologist T.C. Chamberlain in 1897, the method of
multiple working hypotheses requires an investigator to pursue all reasonable
explanations for any phenomenon. This approach provides a fuller, more complex
view of reality. It also fosters the distinctive mental habits of complex
thinking and toleration .
The
collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have forced a
reexamination of nearly every aspect of Marxism. Marxists who formerly saw the
triumph of socialism as a scientific certainty are now questioning not only the
concept of socialism but the reliability of science itself.
Such
questioning is healthy. It was, after all, Marx who called for a ruthless
criticism of everything existing, ruthless in the sense that it does not fear
its own conclusions nor conflict with the status quo. We follow Marx in this,
irrespective of whether the status quo we criticize is represented by George
Bush or Gus Hall.
We
welcome particularly the questioning of the reliability of science, for science
has never provided certainty. The findings of science are always tentative and
provisional, always subject to criticism, questioning, reexamination, and
reformulation. Science does not provide Truth, merely the best version of truth
possible at a particular time.
This
is a good time to reexamine our methods. While it may have been possible to
suspend our skepticism during the period when socialism did indeed appear to be
inevitable, no such illusions are possible now. The tasks before us demand that
we make use of the best intellectual tools available in our attempts to understand
the changing world. One such tool is the method of multiple working hypotheses.
This method was originally proposed by T.C. Chamberlain in 1897 in the Journal
of Geology
Chamberlain, 1897. ChamberlainÕs article has been widely
reprinted, but has not received the attention it deserves from social
scientists. The purpose of my article is draw attention to ChamberlainÕs
contribution and show how it can aid us in our attempt to understand
contemporary reality.
Chamberlain
begins his article by distinguishing between two Òfundamental modes of study:Ó
The
one is an attempt to follow by close imitation the processes of previous
thinkers and to acquire the results of their investigations by memorizing. It
is study of merely secondary, imitative, or acquisitive nature. In the other
mode the effort is to think independently, or at least individually. It is
primary or creative study. The endeavor is to discover new truth or to make a
new combination of truth or at least to develop by oneÕs own effort an
individualized assemblage of truth. The endeavor is to think for oneÕs self,
whether the thinking lies wholly in the fields of previous thought or not. Chamberlain, 1897, 395
Attempts
to simply acquire the results of previous thinkers are all too common. Students
too frequently simply memorize what they need to pass their courses without
allowing anything disturb the tranquillity of their preconceptions. Even on the
left, the stress has all too frequently been on spreading the ÒlineÓ of a
particular sect rather than on developing the ability to think critically,
independently, and creatively on social and political questions. Of course,
some memorization and rote learning is necessary. One needs to know who Marx was
and what he said before one can use MarxÕs ideas to analyze social reality on
oneÕs own. But the stress needs to on the latter, on developing the
individualÕs critical faculties. This is the purpose of a liberal education and
it should be the purpose of Marxist educational efforts.
Chamberlain
notes that there have been three phases of mental procedure in intellectual
development so far, which he styles Òthe method of the ruling theory,Ó the
method of the working hypothesis,Ó and Òthe method of multiple working
hypotheses.Ó Chamberlain describes the method of the ruling theory as follows:
In
the earlier days of intellectual development the sphere of knowledge was
limited and could be brought much more nearly than now within the compass of a
single individual. As a natural result those who then assumed to be wise men,
or aspired to be thought so, felt the need of knowing, or at least seeming to
know, all that was known, as a justification of their claims. So also as a
natural counterpart there grew up an expectancy on the part of the multitude
that the wise and the learned would explain whatever new thing presented
itself. Thus pride and ambition on the one side and expectancy on the other
joined hands in developing the putative all-wise man whose knowledge boxed the
compass and whose acumen found an explanation for every new puzzle which
presented itself. Although the pretended compassing of the entire horizon of
knowledge has long since become an abandoned affectation, it has left its
representatives in certain intellectual predilections. Chamberlain, 1897, 395
What
is here described remains an all too common mindset. We can see it expressed by
bourgeois pundits explaining to us why socialism did not work and can not work
and by Party Chairmen explaining to us that there were no faults in socialism,
only human error. It is, unfortunately, all too easy to engage in such
intellectual posturing. We must be continually be on our guards against
indulging in it ourselves. Equally importantly, we must be on our guard against
viewing the Party as a fountainhead of correct knowledge and correct practice.
Such thinking leads inevitably to dogmatism and sectarianism.
The
method of the ruling theory, however, does have its attractions, and we must recognize
its strengths. Foremost among these is its ability to make sense of reality by
organizing a vast amount of data within a single conceptual framework. Reality,
unfortunately, is very confusing and disorienting. The ruling theory provides
us with a comforting way of orienting ourselves by making reality
understandable. The world-view of the medieval Church was a significant
intellectual achievement which integrated the Ptolemaic view of the universe,
the biological notion of the Great Chain of Being, the social ideas of
Aristotle and the spirituality of the Bible into a single framework. By placing
man at the center of existence, physically, biologically, and spiritually (with
woman right there under him), this world view provided people with a sense of
certainty and security. Unfortunately, it also justified oppression and, by its
very power, tended to block the development of scientific knowledge. Similarly,
the world-view of the Party, dialectical materialism, provided an equally
comprehensive framework that placed man as the highest level of development
(with woman still right there under him). It provided a sense of purpose and
certainty which helped people struggle against oppression. It became, however,
a ruling theory which did not tolerate alternative interpretations such as
feminism, spirituality, ecology, and non-Eurocentric world views. While we
criticize the shortcomings of these ruling theories, we also need to recognize
their strengths.
One of
the major problems with ruling theories is what Chamberlain calls Òthe habit of
precipitate explanation:Ó
it is
a too frequent habit to hastily conjure up an explanation for every new
phenomenon that presents itself. Interpretation leaves its proper place at the
end of the intellectual procession and rushes to the forefront. Too often a
theory is promptly born and evidence hunted up to fit in afterward. Laudable as
the effort at explanation is in its proper place, it is an almost certain
source of confusion and error when it runs before a serious inquiry into the
phenomenon itself. Chamberlain, 1897, 395-396
Explanations,
in other words, should follow inquiry, not precede it. The ruling theory, by
providing immediate answers to all questions, effectively blocks any
independent inquiry into social and political phenomena. One need merely
consult the proper oracle and memorize the answers. This, unfortunately, has
been a too frequent failing of the left. As soon as we learn the correct party
line on an issue, our efforts are devoted to defending that line, rather than
treating it as one of a number of hypotheses to guide our research into the
topic.
The
shortcomings of the ruling theory approach led to the development of the method
of the working hypothesis. The working hypothesis provides a tentative
explanation which serves to guide inquiry. Rather than seeking evidence to
support what one already knows, ones seeks to gather all the facts bearing on
the question and only then attempts to ascertain whether the facts support or disprove
the hypothesis. The hypothesis here is a mode rather than an end in itself.
Because of its tentative nature, the working hypothesis stimulates further and
deeper investigation into the phenomena in question. It therefore represents,
as Chamberlain observes, Òan incalculable advanceÓ upon the method of the
ruling theory. Some even see it as the scientific method.
But,
Chamberlain points out, Òit is rash to assume that any method is the method.Ó The method of
the working hypothesis has some serious defects.
One
defect is the tendency, when a hypothesis seems to be substantiated in one
case, to apply it more widely. There is little Òto prevent a working hypothesis
from gliding with the utmost ease into a ruling theory.Ó Chamberlain, 1897, 398
Further,
while the working hypothesis does serve to guide the investigation along a
certain line, it also limits the investigation to that line. ÒIn following a
single hypothesis, the mind is biased by the presumptions of its method toward
a single explanatory conception.Ó Chamberlain, 1897, 399 The method of the working hypothesis leads us to seek single
explanations for phenomena.
To
overcome such defects, Chamberlain offers the method of multiple working
hypotheses:
In
developing the multiple hypotheses, the effort is to bring up into view every
rational explanation of the phenomenon in hand and to develop every tenable
hypothesis relative to its nature, cause, or origin, and to give to all of
these as impartially as possible a working form and a due place in the
investigation. The investigator thus becomes the parent of a family of
hypotheses; and by his parental relations to all is morally forbidden to fasten
his affections unduly upon any one. Chamberlain, 1897, 399
But
while a single working hypothesis may lead investigation very effectively along
a given line, it may in that very fact invite the neglect of other lines
equally important.É In the use of the multiple method, the reaction of one
hypothesis upon another tends to amplify the recognized scope of each. Every
hypothesis is quite sure to call forth into clear recognition new or neglected
aspects of the phenomena in its own interests, but ofttimes these are found to
be important contributions to the full deployment of other hypotheses.É So also
the mutual conflicts of hypothesis whet the discriminative edge of each. The
keenness of the analytic process advocates the closeness of differentiating
criteria, and the sharpness of discrimination is promoted by the co-ordinate
working of several competitive hypotheses. Chamberlain, 1897, 400-401
The
illustration Chamberlain gives is the Òmooted question of the origin of the
Great Lake basinsÓ:
Several
hypotheses have been urged by as many different students of the problem as the
cause of these great excavations. All of these have been pressed with great
force and with an admirable array of facts. Up to a certain point were are
compelled to go with each advocate. It is practically demonstrable that these
basins were river valleys antecedent to the glacial incursion. It is equally
demonstrable that there was a blocking-up of outlets. We must conclude then
that the present basins owe their origin in part to the pre-existence of river
valleys and to the blocking up of their outlets by drift. But on the other
hand, it is demonstrable that these basins were occupied by great lobes of ice
and were important channels of glacial movement. The leeward drift shows much
material derived from their bottoms. We cannot therefore refuse assent to the
doctrine that the basins owe something to glacial excavation. Still again it
has been urged that the earthÕs crust beneath these basins was flexed downward
by the weight of the ice load and contracted by its low temperature and that
the basins owe something to crustal deformation. This third cause tallies with
certain features not readily explained by the others. And still it is doubtful
whether all these combined constitute an adequate explanation of the phenomena.
Certain it is, at least, that the measure of participation of each must be
determined before a satisfactory elucidation can be reached. The full solution
therefore involves not only the recognition of multiple participation but an
estimate of the measure and mode of each participation. For this the
simultaneous use of a full staff of working hypotheses is demanded. The method
of the single working hypothesis or the predominant working hypothesis is
incompetent. Chamberlain, 1897, 400
As a
geologist, Chamberlain is primarily concerned with the importance of this
method to the student of geology, a field he considers to be Òpeculiarly
complex.Ó It is rare that a geological formation will be Òa simple unitary
phenomenon explicable by a single simple cause.Ó Chamberlain, 1897, 402
What
Chamberlain says of the geological sciences is even more true of the social
sciences. The phenomena we seek to understand are equally if not more complex.
But
the social sciences face additional problems which are not found in geology. As
Marx observed,
In
the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the
same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it
deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and
malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The
English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of
its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Now-a-days atheism itself is culpa
levis, as
compared with criticism of existing property relations. [Marx, 1867:10]
Clearly,
one cannot expect bourgeois society to sit quietly by while we develop our
criticism of existing property relations. We must understand that Òthe Furies
of private interestÓ will intrude into the scientific process, making social
science an arena of class struggle. While it is also true that the physical and
biological sciences have been influenced by social, economic, and political
factors Merchant, 1983, this influence has been less direct than
in the social sciences. Few people worry overmuch about the critical analysis
of glacial action.
Suppose,
however, the Great Lakes did not want to be studied. Suppose, whenever a
geologist went to study them, they covered themselves with fog to prevent
anyone from gaining a clear picture of them. Suppose, whenever geologists
lectured their students about the action of glaciers, their classrooms were
invaded by mosquitoes and gnats to prevent any kind of reasonable discourse.
Suppose the Great Lakes published their own journals and funded their own
research centers. Suppose it was darkly hinted in those journals that those who
had the temerity to suggest that glaciers might be at work in the formation of
the Great Lakes were themselves agents of glaciers who were seeking to bring a
new Ice Age on the world. What chance would we have for a science of geology
under such conditions?
These
are precisely the conditions under which social science operates and our
scientific methodology must recognize this situation.
Geologists
may disagree on the relative weight of different forces in the formation of the
Great Lakes, but they do not disagree on the nature of the Great Lakes
themselves. Nor do they disagree on the facts about the Great Lakes—their
number, size, location, and so on. This basic consensus about fundamental
theory and basic empirical facts permits geologists to operate effectively at a
middle level of theory and fact, what T.S. Kuhn calls ÒnormalÓ science Kuhn, 1962.
Social
scientists, by contrast, disagree at almost every level. While we Marxists see
society as composed of classes locked in dialectical opposition to one anther,
bourgeois social scientists see things quite differently. Some see society as
an arena where individuals more or less rationally pursue their enlightened
self-interest. Others see society as an organism that functions to maintain
harmony and order. Still others see society as composed of ideas and values.
And some decry all theory and proclaim themselves only interested in the
ÒfactsÓ—just the facts, maÕam, as Sgt. Friday used to say. What are we to
make of this situation?
Our
traditional approach has been to argue as forcefully and effectively for our
own view and dismiss the rest as bourgeois apologetics. Such an approach is a
holdover from the days of the ruling theory and is no longer useful. It is more
fruitful to apply the method of multiple working hypotheses and try to
understand what each of these theoretical approaches can tell us about the
nature of social reality.
Even
something as simple as a can of soup will look quite different depending upon
the perspective from which it is viewed. From the top, it looks circular, from
the side rectangular. Which is correct? Both are. In order to understand the
soup can, we must turn it around and view it from different perspectives. We
must look at it from afar and close up. We must read the label and open the can
and eat the soup. Only then can we begin to understand the reality that is a
can of soup.
The
same is true of societies and social phenomena, they look different depending
upon the perspective from which they are viewed. For the warden, a prison is a
necessary although unpleasant institution, essential to the smooth functioning
of society since it keeps the criminals inside, away from decent folk. For the
inmate, by contrast, a prison is an oppressive institution, designed for the
poor and minorities while the real criminals are on the outside running our
corporations and government. Which is the correct view? Both are. For a
Marxist, the economy is the arena where surplus value is extracted from the
workers and divided up among various sectors of the ruling class. For a
neoclassical economist, the economy is the arena where rational actors meet to
pursue their enlightened self-interest. Which is the correct view? Both are,
depending upon the perspective one chooses to analyze reality.
At the
same time, we cannot simply see these different views of society as alternative
views of reality and let it go at that. We must understand that they reflect
different class interests and inquire into how they are conditioned by these
class interests. A Marxist views society from the standpoint of the working
class and seeks to understand how it is that those who produce societyÕs wealth
are not able to themselves enjoy that wealth. The technical apparatus of
Marxism—class analysis, the labor theory of value, measures of the
organic composition of capital, and so forth—are designed to understand
laws of motion of the capitalist order and how the social relations of
production, distribution, and consumption generate poverty, inequality, crises,
and war. Such questions are not really of much interest to neoclassical
economics which needs to tell firms how to set prices to maximize profits. The
technical apparatus of neoclassical economics—marginal costs, marginal
utility, supply and demand, etc.—are designed to serve the interests of
individual capitalists in their quest for profits. Keynsian economics, by
contrast, serves the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, by showing
how the government can intervene in the economy to prevent crises and social unrest
and preserve the social structure of capital accumulation.
This
difference between bourgeois and Marxian economics has long been recognized in
Marxian theory and was an important part of HilferdingÕs 1904 counter-critique
of Bšhm-BawerkÕs attack on Marx. As Howard and King describe this exchange:
The
labour theory of value was not simply, or even primarily, an analysis of price
determination. ÔIt is therefore because labour is the social bond uniting an
atomized society, and not because labour is the matter most technically
relevant, that labour is the principle of value and the law of value is endowed
with reality.Õ This fundamental difference between Marxian and subjective value
theory amounted to very much more than two (conceivably complementary) methods,
as Bšhm-Bawerk supposed. It was rather a question of Ôcontrasted and mutually
exclusive outlooks upon the whole of social lifeÕ. The individualism of
bourgeois economics entailed nothing less than its suicide as political
economy. Ten years later Bukharin eloquently restated these methodological
criticism of neoclassical theory and sought to show that its perspective
reflected that of a new Ôleisure classÕ, which had emerged with the rise of
finance capital. Howard, 1985, 53, see also www; Sweezy,
1942, 128-130
However
much we may wish to believe that our theory is more ÒobjectiveÓ and ÒscientificÓ than
the others, we must recognize that there are definite values and class
interests behind any scientific theory. We must incorporate this recognition into
our methodology and make our values, our objectives, and our class perspective
clear and explicit.
This
is not a new situation. Lenski has pointed out that the history of social
thought from its very origins in Greek social philosophy and the Old Testament
has been divided into two opposing traditions: a mainstream tradition that
supports and is supported by the status quo and a radical tradition that
criticizes and is criticized by the status quo Lenski, 1966, 1-23. This bifurcation of social science
reflects the division of society into opposing classes and may be expected to
continue as long as class society exists. And as long as class society exists,
class struggle will continue. The class struggle is economic, political, and
ideological. Social science is inevitably part of the ideological class
struggle.
The
mainstream tradition has produced Aristotle, medieval social thought, and
Social Darwinism. Its contemporary representatives include neoclassical
economics, functionalism, structuralism, sociobiology, and a bewildering
variety of other theoretical frameworks which, taken collectively, may be
termed bourgeois eclecticism. Bourgeois, because they reflect the interests of
the bourgeoisie by legitimating existing property and gender relations and
providing necessary knowledge and skills for manipulating society. Eclectic,
because these theories lack any unifying conceptual framework comparable to
that in physics, geology, or biology. They are united only in the common
opposition to Marxism and other radical theories.
The
radical tradition produced the Old Testament prophets, Socrates, Jesus, and
Marx. Within the radical tradition, the hegemony that Marxism-Leninism held
after the October Revolution was eroded, even before the fall of the Soviet
Union, by the emergence of a variety of alternative radical viewpoints:
nonviolent pacifism, feminism, and various Third World perspectives such as
liberation theology and Afrocentricity. Thus, even critics disagree on how to
criticize the status quo. What are we to make of this situation?
Our
traditional approach has been that of the ruling theory: ours is right,
therefore anything different from ours must be wrong. This approach, however,
has generated more heat than light. A more fruitful approach is that suggested
by the method of multiple working hypotheses. We can view these alternative
perspectives as so many working hypotheses about the nature of the reality we
are seeking to change. Each of these perspectives offers valuable insights
which must be considered before a satisfactory understanding of that reality
can be reached.
While
we tend to identify more strongly with theories in the radical tradition, we
must also recognize that mainstream theories also have useful insights to
offer. Socialist managers (if there are any left) can benefit from the tools of
bourgeois economics in managing their firms, and in pricing and marketing their
goods. This does not mean abandonment of Marxian economics, merely understanding
the relative contributions of the various available perspectives.
In
applying the method of multiple working hypotheses to social reality, then, we
must not only consider the various alternative hypotheses proposed to explain
social phenomena but also that these alternatives usually reflect different
class interests. The fact that a particular theory may represent class
interests antagonistic to our own, however, does not mean that it is false. The
truth or falsity of any theory, or its relative usefulness in explaining
reality, must be evaluated through scientific means.
In the
scientific evaluation of different theories and hypotheses, it is important to
distinguish three levels in the scientific enterprise: theory, analysis, and
empirical data. The method of multiple working hypotheses must be employed at
each level.
The
level of pure theory includes our assumptions about the nature of reality, our
concepts for describing and analyzing reality, and well as our value
orientation and our views about what are the proper purposes of scientific
activity. The physical and biological sciences enjoy a high degree of consensus
in terms of the nature of what they are studying, what Kuhn might call
paradigmatic consensus Kuhn, 1962. The method of multiple working hypotheses
is not really applicable for the physical and biological sciences at this
level, but for the social sciences it is essential. How else can we deal with
the various Ò-ismsÓ of the social sciences—Marxism, feminism,
structuralism, functionalism, postmodernism, etc.
ChamberlainÕs
illustration of the method of multiple working hypotheses lies at the middle
level of analysis. The various theories of the formation of the Great Lakes all
discuss the role of natural agencies. No one suggests that the Great Lakes are
the result of the logical working out of the idea of ÒlakenessÓ in the mind of
God, nor that these lakes are simply the product of rational choice on the part
of individual drops of water. The alternative explanations discussed by
Chamberlain share common assumptions about the nature of geological formations.
Geologists simply assume that the lakes are the product of natural agencies and
develop alternative hypotheses about the relative weight of these natural agencies.
When
we turn to the social sciences, we find a much more complex situation. Behind
the alternative explanations for social phenomena such as poverty lie
fundamentally different conceptions about human nature and the nature of human
society. Is poverty the result of individual failings or shortsighted social
policies or is it rooted in the structure of capitalism. Do the causes lie in
our values or the property system? The use of method of multiple working
hypotheses requires that we operate in both levels—theory and analysis.
Finally,
we must consider the level of empirical data. In the physical and biological
sciences the facts themselves are rarely in dispute. Where they are, there are
generally accepted scientific canons for the acceptance or rejection of data.
Experimental data must be replicable by other investigators; scientific
observations must be confirmed by other observers. The data of the social
sciences only rarely meets the criteria of such canons.
The
fateful bifurcation of social science into mainstream and radical traditions
with the multiplicity of theories within each, together with what Marx called
Òthe furies of private interest,Ó has not only led to confusion about how to
interpret the facts, we are not even sure what the facts are.
For example, those who supported the
former Soviet Union tended to discuss the achievements of socialism in health
care, education, etc. while data suggesting political repression was ignored as
either unimportant or falsified. On the other hand, those who criticized the
former Soviet Union tended to dismiss the achievements of socialism as either
unimportant, unimpressive, or falsified. At issue is not only theory, but fact.
How do we know what we think we know?
There
is, unfortunately, no easy answer to such questions. The absence of easy
answers to such question does not mean they shouldnÕt be asked. Such issues
must be addressed, however uncomfortable they make us feel, and however much
they may cloud our theories. Our data are simply not as reliable as those of
biologists who study fruit flies. It would be better if they were, but they are
not. No amount of pretending will change this.
We
must, however, attempt to make our own data as reliable as possible. To do this
we must deal explicitly with the full range of ambiguity and uncertainty in our
data. Outright falsification and deliberate distortions are only part of the
problem. Equally important are the ways in which data is marshaled by advocates
of various theories to support their views, while nonconforming data is ignored
or trivialized.
Here
again, the method of multiple working hypotheses is important in helping us
deal with this situation so that we may have some assurance that our facts are
reasonably reliable. We must read the opposing sides on any issue, not just to
understand the different opinions, but also to gather the facts as fully as
possible. Sometimes, both sides will agree on the facts but merely disagree on
how these facts are to be interpreted. Everyone agrees that Soviet troops entered
Czechoslovakia in 1968, but there are disagreements as to why. More frequently,
each side with have a different set of facts, but the facts themselves will not
contradict each other. It is quite possible for a society to have both an
excellent health care system and a repressive political system. Finally, there
are cases where the facts themselves are in dispute. Just how many people did
die in the Soviet purges of the 1930Õs?
Finally,
in the social sciences, it is not enough to simply consider multiple hypotheses
as if they were abstract arguments put forth by disinterested observers. We
must also understand that these alternative hypotheses may be proposed by
people with definite interests in the subject matter at hand. Thus, when we
read that some marine biologists believe that marine life actually flourished
near offshore oil wells, it helps to know that these marine biologists are
employed by oil companies. The source of data is itself an important item of
data that must be used in evaluating the reliability of the original data.
The
application of the method of multiple working hypotheses to problems in the
social sciences, then, is much more complex than in the physical sciences. We
need to consider not only alternative hypotheses but also the class interests
of those proposing these hypotheses. While evaluating these hypotheses in terms
of the available data, we must also evaluate the data themselves. To illustrate
this, let us examine some of the complexities involved in applying the method to
one of the most problematic events of our time, the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
The
first problem arises in simply trying to list the hypotheses. Chamberlain
advises us Òto bring up into view every rational explanation of the phenomenon
in hand and to develop every tenable hypothesis relative to its nature, cause,
or origin.Ó This is no small task. Just listing the major lines of
disagreement, let alone the nuances within each, is complex enough. We need to
consider the various perspectives of bourgeois Sovietologists who tend to see
the Soviet system as a basically unnatural and totalitarian system that
collapsed of its own weight, of neo-Stalinists who see the Soviet system as a
basically sound system that was overthrown by imperialist pressure and opportunism
within, of social democrats who tend to share the conception of bourgeois
Sovietologists and argue that, whatever the reasons for the collapse, they have
nothing to do with socialism because the Soviet Union never was socialist, of
Troskyists who see the overthrow of the bureaucratic caste as an opportunity
for the emergence of a regenerated workersÕ state, and of variety of other
people such as Maoists who see state capitalism being transformed (I will add
here my own theory of protosocialism www Ruyle, 1988.
As we
examine such viewpoints, we find it difficult to disentangle explanation from
ideology. Take, for example, Irvin KristolÕs ÒMafiaÓ theory that Òthe Soviet
system since Stalin may be usefully regarded as a regime of Mafioso types who,
incredibly, have become the political Establishment.Ó Such a view is clearly
ideological, as is evident in the following:
At
the time, the virulent anti-communism of Kristol and his fellow
neoconservatives was widely considered excessive, inordinate. Ten years later,
the animating proposition of neoconservatism—that Soviet communism
represented unmitigated evil, resistance to which was the overriding more
imperative of Ôthe Free WorldÓ (a term neocons refused to drop)—has been
entirely vindicated by history.Ó LA Times 8/9/92, p. M5
It is
not clear how this explains anything unless one believes that history operates
according to a neoconservative moral law. On the other side, we have Gus HallÕs
view that there was nothing wrong with socialism in the Soviet Union and that
its collapse was due to human error, more specifically, opportunism:
The
ultimate cause of the full-blown crisis in the socialist world can be traced
directly to the germination and mushrooming of the age-old virus of opportunism
in many Communist Parties of the world, including our Party.É The virus of
opportunism spread and eventually became a full-blown epidemic. This is because
the ideological immune system, based on the science of Marxism-Leninism, broke
down. Hall, 1992, 1-2
HallÕs
analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union is tied into his criticism of
ÒfactionalistsÓ who are attempting to split the CPUSA. This does not disprove
his hypothesis, but it does allow us to place it a better perspective. The
truth or falsity of any hypothesis (or the degree to which any factor has
contributed to the final result) can only be determined by objective empirical
analysis, not our value judgments about what ought to have happened or how what
happened affects our own political agenda.
The
data for objective empirical analysis are hard to come by, however. Many would
subscribe to the view that the vast, bloated Soviet bureaucracy collapsed from
its own weight. But just how bloated was that bureaucracy? I recall reading
somewhere that the Soviet bureaucracy was about the same size as our own
federal government, which is pretty bloated to be sure. But the Soviet Union
was larger, and its bureaucracy also had direct control over the economy which
in the U.S. is controlled by the separate bureaucracies of corporations.
Impressionistic data, however effective for ideological and polemical purposes,
is inadequate for scientific analysis. If we treat bureaucratic bloat as a
hypothesis, then we must obtain objective data on the size and function of the
Soviet bureaucracy in comparison with the bureaucracies of other nations.
Similarly
with economic inefficiency. We are properly horrified when we learn that as
much as a quarter of Soviet crops are left to rot in the fields. But I recall
hearing an agricultural economist say that a 25% loss isnÕt that
bad—about comparable to losses in the San Joaquin Valley.
The
point is, we need to be very careful about our data. Everyone knows that
bureaucracies are bloated and that socialist economies are inefficient. But
what everyone knows and what can be empirically verified are two quite
different things. And understanding the significance of data requires
comparative data from other societies. Such data are not easy to acquire, but
we must make the effort.
In the
old days we could at least rely on official Soviet data for a view different
than that give by the U.S. State Department, the CIA, and Western
Sovietologists. Granted, one could not simply accept such a view at face value,
but at least it forced some evaluation of data. (And, it should be noted, the
actual data developed by these Western sources did not support the more extreme
ideological views of the nature of Soviet society.)
Now,
however, it almost seems as though leading political figures in the former
Soviet Union (many of whom were formerly members of the CPSU) are competing
with the West in painting a negative picture of the Soviet Union. We seem to be
in a situation where any charge against the former Soviet Union is accepted as
true, especially when it is made by presently leading circles in the former
Soviet Union. We should keep in mind that such figures have an interest in
discrediting the achievements of the Soviet Union, just as earlier Western
sources did. Alexander Cockburn quotes a knowledgeable observer of Soviet
society, Lynn Turgeon, on this process:
There's
a real symbiosis of interest between what I term the socialist bourgeoisie in
Moscow and the Western reporters. The socialist bourgeoisie are hellbent on
getting convertible rubles so they can pick up their VCRs and porno cassettes
when they travel abroad. They are anxious for the yuppie life, and you can't
have that without a convertible ruble. Most Russians don't travel and couldn't
care less about convertibility. The Muscovite intelligentsia has a dreadful
tendency to hysteria, leaping from one extreme to another. The Western
journalists are eager to snap up anything negative about the Soviet economy, so
then it becomes self-perpetuating. The Russian socialist bourgeoisie produce
stories of disaster; the Western journalists enlarge their significance, and
then the Russians quote these Western stories in their debates in Moscow as
evidence of the need for crisis action. [Cockburn, 1990:370]
In a
similar view, Sovietologist Jerry F. Hough urges Americans Òto stop relying so
heavily on the wishful thinking and anxiety of the Moscow radicalsÓ [Hough,
1991 #:B7].
In
attempting to understand the collapse of the Soviet Union, we need to
understand the Soviet Union itself, and what actually happened during its seven
decades of existence. This is by no means easy to discover. Estimates of the
numbers of those killed in the Great Purges of the 1930s, for example, range
from thousands, to tens of thousands, to hundreds of thousands, to millions Conquest, 1990; Getty, 1985:1-9, 211-220;
Hough, 1979:176-177; Kennan, 1960, 484-489; Medvedev, 1989, 454-455; Szymanski,
1984, 241-248. Clearly the accuracy of measurement
enjoyed by the physical and biological sciences is unattainable here. Our only
defense is to employ the method of multiple working hypotheses at the level of
data collection itself and to understand that our political ideology has a
significant impact on our acceptance or rejection of data. This is not a
desirable state of things, but it is the actual state of things and we must
make the best of it.
We
cannot, therefore, simply accept the latest revelations from the former Soviet
Union at face value (though we must consider them seriously). We must also go
back and re-read the work of scholars who have tried to understand Soviet
reality as objectively as possibly, while acknowledging their own political
orientations www e.g. Cameron, 1987 Cereseto, 1982 Deutscher, 1966 Hough, 1979 Mandel, 1985 Marquit, 1978 Szymanski, 1979; Szymanski, 198442.
This
is not to claim that any of this data needs to be accepted uncritically as
ÒGodÕs TruthÓ about the glories of socialism in the Soviet Union. It is
important data that needs to be used in a critical manner to develop a more
realistic picture about what was actually going on during the years of Soviet
power.
As we
consider such data, we will perhaps not be willing to admit we havenÕt the
foggiest idea as to why the Soviet Union collapsed, but perhaps we will gain
some humility and some toleration for others whose confusion is expressed in
different ways.
This
is one of the major advantages of the method of multiple working hypotheses.
Not only does it provides us with a fuller and more reliable view of reality,
it also tends to foster distinctive mental attitudes and habits . As
Chamberlain observes:
The loyal pursuit
of the method for a period of years leads to certain distinctive habits of mind
which deserve more than the passing notice which along can be given them here.
As a factor in education, the disciplinary value of the method is one of prime
importance. When faithfully followed for a sufficient time, it develops a mode
of thought of its own kind which may be designated Òthe habit of parallel
thought.Ó or Òof complex thought.Ó It is contradistinguished from the linear
order of thought which is necessarily cultivated in language and mathematics
because their modes are linear and successive. The procedure is complex and
largely simultaneously complex. The mind appears to become possessed of the
power of simultaneous vision from different points of view. The power of
viewing phenomena analytically and synthetically at the same time appears to be
gained. It is not altogether unlike the intellectual procedure in the study of
a landscape. From every quarter of the broad area of the landscape there come
into the mind myriads of lines of potential intelligence which are received and
co-ordinated simultaneously, producing a complex impression which is recorded
and studied directly in its complexity. If the landscape is to be delineated in
language, it must be taken part by part in linear succession.
Over against the
great value of this power of thinking in complexes there is an obvious
disadvantage. No good thing is without its drawbacks. It is obvious, upon
studious consideration, that a complex or parallel method of thought cannot be
rendered into verbal expression directly and immediately as it takes place. We
cannot put into words more than a single line of thought at the same time, and
even in that the order of expression must be conformed to the idiosyncrasies of
the language. Moreover, the rate must be incalculably slower than the mental
process. When the habit of complex or parallel thought is not highly developed,
there is usually a leading line of thought to which the others are subordinate.
Following this leading line the difficulty of expression does not rise to
serious proportions. But when the method of simultaneous mental action along
different lines is so highly developed that the thoughts running in different
channels are nearly equivalent, there is an obvious embarrassment in making a
selection for verbal expression, that there arises a disinclination to make the
attempt. Furthermore, the impossibility of expressing the mental operation in
words leads to their disuse in the silent processes of thought; and hence words
and thoughts lose that close association which they are accustomed to maintain
with those whose silent as well as spoken thoughts predominantly run in linear
verbal courses. There is therefore a certain predisposition on the part of the
practitioner of this method to taciturnity. Chamberlain, 1897, 401-401
Fostering
taciturnity on the left is itself a worthwhile goal, but the real benefits of
this method are that it provides a truer and more complex view of reality and
that it fosters mental habits that are conducive to openness and toleration.
The
method of multiple working hypotheses is thus a valuable addition to Marxist
pedagogy, and it must be placed in context within that pedagogy. Marxist
pedagogy is an important component of the ideological class struggle, but that
class struggle has various levels. In Russian Social Democracy a distinction
was made between propaganda and agitation. In the words of Plekhanov, ÒA
propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents
only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people.Ó After
quoting this with approval, Lenin elaborates:
the
propagandist, dealing with, say, the question of unemployment, must explain the
capitalistic nature of crises, the cause of their inevitability in modern
society, the necessity for the transformation of this society into a socialist
society, etc. In a word, he must present Òmany ideasÓ, so many, indeed, that
they will be understood as an integral whole only by a (comparatively) few
persons. The agitator, however, speaking on the same subject, will take as an
illustration a fact that is most glaring and most widely known to his audience,
day, the death of an unemployed workerÕs family from starvation, the growing
impoverishment, etc., and, utilising this fact, known to all, will direct his
efforts to presenting a single idea to the ÒmassesÓ, e.g., the senselessness of
the contradiction between the increase of wealth and the increase of poverty;
he will strive to rouse discontent and indignation among the masses against
this crying injustice, leaving a more complete explanation to the propagandist.
Consequently, the propagandist operates chiefly by means of the printed word;
the agitator by means of the spoken word. The propagandist requires qualities
different from those of the agitator. Kautsky and Lafargue, for example, we
term propagandists; Bebel and Guesde we term agitators. Lenin, 1902, 66-67
Both
agitation and propaganda, in these senses, are important aspects of the
pedagogical work of Marxists, but there is another level, that of education. It
is not enough to agitate people with examples of the evils of capitalism, or to
propagandize (or indoctrinate) them with a Marxist world view, it is also
important to educate them by cultivating their powers of critical and
independent thinking. While the method of multiple working hypotheses may be
little direct use by the agitator or propagandist, it is vital to the educator.
An agitator or propagandist may ridicule bourgeois ideology as self-serving
apologetics. An educator must understand the strengths of bourgeois ideology
from within, so to speak. Only then is it possible to ÒdeconstructÓ (to use a
fashionable phrase) that ideology and absorb its strengths. This is a crucial
component of the ideological class struggle. Marxists must be educated to think
analytically and synthetically at the same time in what Chamberlain calls Òthe
habit of complex thought.Ó Without such education the efforts of agitators and
propagandists may easily degenerate into mere polemics and dogmatism.
At the
same time, we must recognize that the method of multiple working hypotheses is
not an easy one and is not particularly attractive to those who seek quick and
simple solutions to social problems. As Chamberlain notes:
An infelicity
also seems to attend the use of the method with young students. It is far
easier, and apparently in general more interesting, for those of limited
training and maturity to accept a single interpretation or a single theory and
to give it wide application, than to recognize several concurrent factors and
to evaluate these as the true elucidation often requires. Recalling again for illustration
the problems of the Great Lake basins, it is more to the immature taste to be
taught that these were scooped out by the mighty power of the great glaciers
than to be urged to conceive of three or more great agencies working
successively in part and simultaneously in part and to endeavor to estimate the
fraction of the total results which was accomplished by each of these agencies.
The complex and quantitative do not fascinate the young student as they do the
veteran investigator. Chamberlain, 1897, 402
This
failing is not so serious for the physical and biological sciences. Student
immaturity is only a phase in the development of mature scholars. For Marxism,
however, this aspect of the method of multiple working hypotheses requires
further consideration.
As
scholars, it is all very well for us to look at the soup can from different
perspectives, and understand how it embodies the contradictory characteristics
of roundness and squareness and so on, but all this may be quite irrelevant for
people with a more practical interest. For a starving child, the most important
fact is that the soup can contains food which can be obtained with a can
opener.
As
Marxists, our objective is not simply to interpret the world in richer, more
complex ways; our objective is to change the world. Whatever the defects in the
scientific methodology of Marxism-Leninism, we must acknowledge that the
vanguard parties of the Third International did change the world. Whatever the
defects in the social orders that emerged from the historic revolutions of the
twentieth century, these revolutions did contribute to the progressive
development of our species. In seeking to reform Marxism, we must be careful
not to reform out its revolutionary content.
This revolutionary
content is the very essence of Marxism, for Marxism is not just a science, it
is also a philosophical outlook and a moral stance. Our moral stance does not
make Marxism any less scientific, however. As Weigert has noted in a somewhat
different context:
Johan
Galtung has drawn the parallel between peace research É and medical science,
noting that both have a value bias: peace in the former, health in the latter.É
Or as Nigel Young has stated, "Peace studies starts from the premise that
war and destructive violence is pathological not normal—in much the same
way that Medicine views disease, and that the patient can be saved." Weigert, 1989:40
The
Marxist position is, of course, more complex. Marxism views war and destructive
violence, together with exploitation, poverty, oppression, and alienation, as
part of the normal operation of capitalism and capitalism as part of the
progressive development of humanity. But capitalism must and will be
transcended by a newer and more humane social system, socialism, from which the
negative features of capitalism will be gradually eliminated. For Marxism, the
elimination of war, destructive violence, and other forms of human oppression
will necessarily take time and struggle.
Our
moral stance as partisans of the socialist future and the class that will build
socialism does not make us unscientific, any more than medicineÕs value bias in
favor of health prevents medicine from utilizing science and scientific methods
in pursuit of its goals. Indeed, our partisanship gives us a focus that helps
us make sense of what is otherwise a very confusing and distressing reality. As
Georg Lukacs observed after WWII:
There
is, of course, plenty of darkness around us now, just as there was between the
two wars. Those who wish to despair can find cause enough and more in our
everyday life. Marxism does not console anyone by playing down difficulties, or
minimizing the material and moral darkness which surrounds us human beings
today. The difference is only—but in this "only" lies a whole
world—that Marxism has a grasp of the main lines of human development and
recognizes its laws. Those who have arrived at such knowledge know, in spite of
all temporary darkness, both whence we have come and where we are going. And
those who know this find the world changed in their eyes: they see purposeful
development where formerly only a blind, senseless confusion surrounded them.
Where the philosophy of despair weeps for the collapse of a world and the
destruction of culture, there Marxists watch the birth-pangs of a new world and
assist in mitigating the pains of labor.Lukacs, 1948, 2
As we
seek to Òassist in mitigating the pains of laborÓ of our new world, Marxists
have often been accused of making the situation worse, of increasing human
suffering in the name of eliminating it. Such criticisms must be taken
seriously and, in many cases, may be well-founded. In such cases we must learn
from our mistakes. But, at the same time, we cannot let these criticisms
immobilize us. As Machovec observes,
Éyet
in practical life, we cannot content ourselves with piling up motives and
noting the inextricably complex interrelationships of things; we have to decide
and act, and in our action we have to depend on other people, to cooperate with
them at least temporarily, even if what they do is not always in accord with
our ideals. This is usually where tragedy enters our existence, and everyone
has to suffer from it, and the more determined a man is to act honestly,
vigorously, fruitfully and with love, the more he will suffer, even if not to
the extent that Jesus did on Calvary. But the opaqueness, the impossibility of
knowing all the consequences of our actions and desires, is what makes us
human: it demands from us the strength to hope again, even though hope has been
pushed aside or disappointed or destroyed dozens of times, not to give up, not
to fall into cynicism and despair, but to believe, to hope even when one is
rejected, misunderstood and unloved. 'Then Peter came up and said, "Lord,
how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven
times?" Jesus said to him, "I do not say to you seven times, but
seventy times seven"'. Machovec, 1972, 196-197
As Marxists
we must acknowledge our common humanity with our fellow humans, be they
Buddhists, Christians, or Muslims. Like all humans, we make mistakes and do not
always act according to our ideals. Our science has not enabled us to rise
above our humanity, nor should it. We must acknowledge our common humanity not
only with the oppressed but, alas, with the oppressors.
The
solution to the crisis in Marxism does not lie in abandoning our science but in
improving it. The method of multiple working hypotheses can contribute towards
this goal.
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