Towards A Developmental Account of Ethical Know-How

Jennifer Cole Wright

University of Wyoming

narvik@uwyo.edu

Principle-based moral theories (typically deontological and consequentialist) conceive of moral maturity in terms of conformity with moral principles. In an attempt to undermine this view, Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (hereafter ‘Dreyfus’) have outlined an account of ethical expertise in which they liken the development of moral maturity to the development of other forms of expertise. Dreyfus discusses five developmental stages of expertise, suggesting that, if we assume that moral maturity is akin to other forms of expertise, we find that contrary to what most accounts of ethics suppose, the development of moral maturity is a movement away from,rather than towards, conformity with moral principles.

In this paper, I will explore the idea that moral maturity should be conceived of not in terms of conformity to moral principles, but rather in terms of the development of a bodily and cognitive skill – what Francisco Varela has called "ethical know-how". To this end, I introduce Dreyfus’ general account of expertise, examining the crucial role that know-how must play in any account of skillful engagement. I argue that if we conceive of ethics as a particular form of skillful engagement (what I will call a ‘life practice’), then moral maturity follows the developmental trajectory of other forms of expertise. But, there are objections to this account that must be considered: that such an account of ethics neglects the crucial role that propositional knowledge plays in moral discourse and that moral development does not have the kinds of standards-driven feedback loops that are necessary for skill development. After addressing these objections, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications this account has for principle-based conceptions of moral maturity and the role of moral principles in mature moral judgments and actions.