The Proper Role of Know How in Epistemology

From its beginnings western epistemology has concentrated fundamentally, if not exclusively, upon knowledge as conscious or consciously accessible belief.  Similarly, contemporary philosophy of cognitive science emphasizes the role of explicitly represented information in computational explanations in cognitive science. I argue that cynosural role of propositional models of knowledge in western epistemology constitutes a significant misapprehension. Research in cognitive psychology, computer science, and neuroscience strongly support the notion that a large percentage of know how is neither consciously represented nor propositional in nature. Furthermore, current theories of neuroevolution demonstrate that non-propositional know how has a roughly equal evolutionary vintage in human brain development. Finally, computational considerations not only establish that non-propositional/conscious know how proves an equally viable form of knowledge for cognitive tasks, but establish the necessity of non-propositional know how for knowledge in the form of belief.  Knowledge how clearly has an equal or greater role to play in our understanding of mind and knowledge.

Gilbert Ryle is famous for advocating a dispositional theory of know how.  The above results might tempt one into employing a disjunctive dilemma to conclude that some non-propositional/non-conscious notion of know how, like Ryle's, must  be the exclusive and correct theory of know how.  Nevertheless, I argue that the above results neither render irrelevant the traditional philosophic theory of know how as conscious or consciously accessible belief, nor do they establish non-propositional/non-conscious theories of know how, like Ryle's, as the exclusive and correct theory of know how.  Neither philosophical view of the largely neglected notion of know how withstand scientifically informed scrutiny.  I conclude philosophers fail to understand know how because implementational commitments drive philosophical theorizing. What distinguishes know how from knowledge that is the function know how plays in cognition. One must understand know how functionally, not in terms specific implementations.  I offer an alternative conception of knowledge how which, by understanding know how functionally and not in terms of its computational/representational implementation, captures the valid insights of traditional views of know how without falling victim to their shortcomings.