Epistemological Norms and Resource Constraints

Robert Cummins

University of California at Davis

Abstract

A cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment is constrained by capacities: no normative epistemology can require what the agent cannot do. We show at some length that different architectures, goals and resources imply substantial differences in capacity, and that some of these differences are ineliminable. It follows that some of these differences matter at the normative level: they constrain what Rules of Right Reason can be used to describe and prescribe the behavior of systems. It thus is our contention that the Rules of Right Reason are diverse. This contention stems not from cultural or semantic relativism, but from a recognition of the vast diversity to be found in cognitive systems. All of these differences confront us with a kind of pluralism in the study of rationality and cognitive systems undreamt of by the relativists.