Certainty

Author(s):

Hodson , Gordon ; Sorrentino , Richard M.

Affiliation: U Western Ontario, Dept of Psychology, London, ON, Canada

Title:

Just who favors in in -group? Personality differences in reactions to

uncertainty in the minimal group paradigm.

Source:

Group Dynamics Special Issue: Vol 5(2), Jun 2001, 92-101.

Additional Info: US : Educational Publishing Foundation

Researchers have proposed that people identify with and discriminate in favor of their groups to

reduce subjective uncertainty (e.g., M. A. Hogg & D. Abrams, 1993). The authors examined

whether individual differences in uncertainty orientation (R. M. Sorrentino & J. C. Short, 1986) are

relevant to this process. Following B. A. Mullin and M. A. Hogg (1998), participants (N = 147)

were either categorized or not categorized under conditions of low or high task uncertainty when

allocating resources using a matrix task. As expected, only certainty-oriented people (who

gravitate toward certainty, are biased by group processes, and use heuristics under uncertainty)

showed in-group bias under conditions of high uncertainty. This was unaccompanied by

increased identification, certainty ratings, or self-esteem. The authors suggest that personality

variables directly relevant to uncertainty resolution be considered in these processes.

Author(s):

Windschitl , Paul D. ; Young, Michael E. Affiliation: U Iowa, Dept of Psychology, Iowa City, IA, US

Title: The influence of alternative outcomes on gut-level perceptions of certainty.

Source: Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes Special Issue: Vol 85(1), May 2001,

109-134. Additional Info: US : Academic Press Inc

Abstract:

Recent research has demonstrated that the perceived certainty of a focal outcome depends not only on the overall amount of evidence supporting the alternatives to the focal outcome, but also on how that evidence is distributed across those alternatives (e.g., P. D. Windschitl and G. L. Wells, 1998). Three experiments replicated this alternative-outcomes effect across a variety of evidence distributions and investigated a heuristic comparison account for the effect. Participants provided gut-level certainty estimates for winning hypothetical raffles in which they and several other players held specified numbers of tickets. Results revealed that alternative-outcomes effects are not dependent on variations in the rank-order status of the focal outcome (Exp 1 with 96 students) and are reliable but reduced in magnitude when the focal outcome is the least likely outcome (Exp 2 with 72 students). Also, consistent with a core premise of the heuristic

comparison account, evidence supporting the strongest alternative outcome was shown to play

the primary role in producing alternative-outcomes effects (Exp 3 with 72 students).

Author(s):

Rottenstreich , Yuval ; Hsee , Christopher K.

Affiliation: U Chicago, Graduate School of Business, Chicago, IL, US E-mail:

yuval.rottenstreich @ gsb.uchicago.edu

Title:

Money, kisses, and electric shocks: On the affective psychology of

risk.

Source:

Psychological Science Special Issue: Vol 12(3), May 2001, 185-190.

Additional Info: US : Blackwell Publishers

Abstract:

Prospect theory's S -shaped weighting function is often said to reflect the psychophysics of chance. The authors propose an affective rather than psychophysical deconstruction of the weighting function resting on 2 assumptions, using a sample of college students. First, preferences depend on the affective reactions associated with potential outcomes of a risky choice. Second, even with monetary values controlled, some outcomes are relatively affect-rich and others relatively affect-poor. Although the psychophysical and affective approaches are complementary, the affective approach has 1 novel implication: Weighting functions will be more S-shaped for lotteries involving affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes. That is, people will be more sensitive to departures from impossibility and certainty but less sensitive to intermediate probability variations for affect-rich outcomes. The authors corroborated this prediction by observing probability-outcome interactions: An affect-poor prize was preferred over an prize under certainty, but the direction of preference reversed under low probability. The suggest that assumption of probability-outcome independence may hold across outcomes of different monetary values, but not different affective values.

Author(s):

Volkmann , J.

Title:

The relation of the time of judgment to the certainty of judgment.

Source:

Psychological Bulletin 31, 1934, 672-673.

Additional Info: US : American Psychological Assn.

Cognitive biases.

Author(s): Harvey, Nigel Affiliation: U Coll, Dept of Psychology, London, England

Title: Overconfidence in self-assessment of motor skill performance.

Source: In: Caverni , Jean-Paul; Ed; Fabre , Jean-Marc; et al; Ed; Cognitive biases.; p. 499-509

Publisher: Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1990, 575

Abstract:

chapter: subjects used a joystick to move a point on a screen to intercept a moving target as fast as possible / on each trial, they assessed whether interception had been faster than on the previous trial and estimated the probability that this assessment was correct / these estimates showed that subjects were overconfident in their self-assessments/as interception performance improved, self-assessment performance declined and overconfidence in self-assessment increased

Author(s): McClelland, Alastair G. R. ; Coulson , Andrew S. ; Icke , Sarah E. Affiliation: National Hosps Coll

of Speech Sciences, London, England

Title: Bias in meta-memory performance and its implications for models of memory structure.

Source: In: Caverni , Jean-Paul; Ed; Fabre , Jean-Marc; et al; Ed; Cognitive biases.; p. 511-519

Publisher: Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1990, 575

Abstract:

chapter: this paper is concerned with the effect of memory task on meta-memory performance, as assessed by calibration accuracy / in the first experiment overconfidence was evident in the general knowledge (semantic memory) task, but was virtually absent in a recognition (episodic memory) task / in the second experiment subjects showed slight overconfidence on a vocabulary test, but marked underconfidence when later asked to make recognition judgements about the vocabulary test items /// the results are discussed with reference to the episodic/semantic memory distinction proposed by Tulving (1972), and it is concluded that the findings areconsistent with the operation of independent memory systems

Author(s): Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. ; Pollard, Paul Affiliation: Polytechnic South West, Plymouth, England

Title: Belief bias and problem complexity in deductive reasoning.

Source: In: Caverni , Jean-Paul; Ed; Fabre , Jean-Marc; et al; Ed; Cognitive biases.; p. 131-154

Publisher: Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1990, 575

Abstract:

chapter: two experiments are reported in which subjects are asked to assess the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions vary in prior believability / both experiments demonstrate a "belief bias" effect, in which subjects tend to rate conclusions as more valid when they conform with prior beliefs / this finding is generalised over several procedural variations relative to previous research, including use of attitudinal rather than factual beliefs and between versus within subject design / the research also provides some new results of relevance to the interpretation of the belief bias effect /// in both experiments the logical complexity of the arguments was manipulated / each experiment also introduced belief neutral materials / findings

are discussed with reference to alternative theoretical models of belief bias

Author(s): Oskamp , Stuart

Title: Overconfidence in case-study judgments.

Source: Journal of Consulting Psychology 29(3), 1965, 261-265.

Abstract:

This study investigated whether psychologists' confidence in their clinical decisions is really justified. It was hypothesized that as psychologists study information about a case (a) their confidence about the case increases markedly and steadily but (b) the accuracy of their conclusions about the case quickly reaches a ceiling. 32 judges, including 8 clinical psychologists, read background information about a published case, divided into 4 sections. After reading each section of the case, judges answered a set of 25 questions involving personality judgments about the case. Results strongly supported the hypotheses. Accuracy did not increase significantly with increasing information, but confidence increased steadily and significantly. All judges except 2 became overconfident, most of them markedly so. Clearly, increasing feelings of confidence are not a sure sign of increasing predictive accuracy about a case.

Author(s): Koehler , Roger A.

Title: Overconfidence on probabilistic tests.

Source: Journal of Educational Measurement Vol 11(2), Sum 1974, 101-108.

Abstract:

Evaluated a potentially useful measure of overconfidence on confidence response multiple-choice tests. The measure of overconfidence is based on probabilistic responses to 7 nonsense items embedded in a 33-item vocabulary test. The test was administered under both confidence response and conventional choice response directions to 208 undergraduate educational psychology students. Measures of vocabulary knowledge based on confidence and choice responses, overconfidence, and risk-taking propensity were obtained. Overconfidence was significantly related in a negative direction to confidence response vocabulary scores and

essentially unrelated to choice response vocabulary scores. A moderate correlation was found between overconfidence and risk-taking propensity; however, the scatter plot for these measures showed that this relationship may have been spurious.

Author(s): Lichtenstein , Sarah ; Fischhoff , Baruch

Title: Do those who know more also know more about how much they know?

Source: Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes Vol 20(2), Dec 1977, 159-183.

Abstract:

The validity of a set of subjective probability judgments can be assessed by examining 2 components of performance, calibration and resolution. The perfectly calibrated judge assigns probabilities so that, for all propositions assigned the same probability, the true proportion is equal to the probability assigned. Resolution reflects the degree to which assessors can successfully discriminate among different degrees of certainty, independent of the numerical labels assigned. Five experiments were conducted with 295 paid volunteers and 50 graduate students. Overall results show that (a) although people are moderately well calibrated, their probability judgments are prone to systematic biases; the most common bias is overconfidence; (b) people are calibrated differently when dealing with items of varying degrees of difficulty; (c)calibration was unaffected by differences in intelligence, expertise, Ss' reliance on extreme probability responses, and at least some aspects of the context in which items were presented; and (d) resolution did not change as a function of difficulty, except for tasks about which Ss knew nothing. Implications of these results for decision makers are discussed.

Author(s): Bradley, James V.

Title: Overconfidence in ignorant experts.

Source: Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society Vol 17(2), Feb 1981, 82-84.

Abstract:

In 2 experiments with 328 undergraduates, when asked true-false questions that were too difficult to be answered correctly at better than a chance frequency, Ss often guessed in preference to admitting ignorance and often expressed certainty in the correctness of their answers. These tendencies were strongly correlated with the degree of expertise Ss believed themselves to have in the area in which the question was asked. Under certain presumably ego-threatening conditions, Ss contradicted by answering "false" appreciably more often than they agreed by answering "true," although half the questions were, in fact, true and half were false.

Author(s): Trope, Yaacov

Title: Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory.

Source: Journal of Personality & Social Psychology Vol 36(2), Feb 1978, 93-106.

Abstract:

Conducted 4 experiments with a total of 331 undergraduates to investigate inferences about another person's attributes (e.g., his or her political attitudes) on the basis of information (e.g., the person's voting behavior) retrieved by Ss from their own memory. The inference task required integration of 2 kinds of uncertainty: uncertainty generated by imperfect diagnosticity of the information regarding the attributes under consideration. Results show that Ss relied almost exclusively on the diagnosticity of the information retrieved. The reliability with which the information was retrieved had a small and inconsistent effect on judgment. As a result, the inferences were considerably more extreme than those justified by normative considerations. Findings are interpreted in terms of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky 's (see record 1974-02325-001) "representativeness heuristic," and implications of the results with regard to overconfidence in attributing personality traits are discussed. (19 ref)

Author(s): Fischhoff , Baruch ; Slovic , Paul ; Lichtenstein , Sarah

Title: Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence.

Source: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance Vol 3(4), Nov 1977,

552-564.

Author(s): Howell, William C.

Title: Uncertainty from internal and external sources: A clear case of overconfidence.

Source: Journal of Experimental Psychology Vol. 89(2), Aug 1971, 240-243.

Abstract:

Hypothesized that if, as earlier work suggests, people tend to be overconfident of uncertain outcomes which depend on their own performance, they should show a preference for situations in which the total uncertainty is more internal (I) or skill-based than external (E) or environment-based. The I-E composition of objectively equiprobable choice alternatives in a paired-comparisons paradigm was manipulated. Each alternative included a specified criterion on a dart-throwing task (I component) and a specified zone on a probability spinner. 15 undergraduates, trained to a stable dart-throwing level under 1 of 3 different set conditions, made

a series of choices at 3 overall uncertainty levels. Neither variable modified the chief result, which was a clear-cut verification of the hypothesis (87% of all choices were in the predicted direction). Scaled preference values for the various I-E mixtures were generally as expected, except that "psychological distances" were disproportionately large under the highest level of overall+ certainty.

Abstract:

Investigated how often people are wrong when they are certain that they know the answer to a question. Five studies with a total of 528 paid volunteers suggest that the answer is "too often." For a variety of general-knowledge questions, Ss first chose the most likely answer and then indicated their degree of certainty that the answer they had selected was, in fact, correct. Across several different question and response formats, Ss were consistently overconfident. They had sufficient faith in their confidence judgments to be willing to stake money on their validity. The psychological bases for unwarranted certainty are discussed in terms of the inferential processes whereby knowledge is constructed from perceptions and memories. (15 ref)

Title:

Overconfidence as dissonance reduction.

Author(s):

Blanton, Hart; Pelham, Brett W.; DeHar, Trac; Carvallo, Mauricio;

Affiliation:

U Albany, Dept of Psychology, Alban , NY, US

Source:

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Vol 37(5), Sep (2001). (pp. 373-385). US: Academic

Press. www.academicpress.com

ISSN /ISBN:

0022-1031

Language:

English

Abstract:

People are often more confident than accurate. Past accounts of this overconfidence effect have

focused on social-cognitive mechanisms, such as the biasing effects of judgmental heuristics and the

faulty integration of relevant information. The current studies tested the idea that overconfidence is

also a product of dissonance reduction. Specifically, the authors argue that overconfidence can result

from a desire to see the self as knowledgeable and competent. 141 students in a research methods

class participated in study 1. 194 students taking the 1st of 4 examinations in an introductory social

psychology class participated in study 2. In 2 studies, the motive to view the self as an accurate

perceiver elevated confidence, independent of its effect on accuracy. This effect was diminished by

manipulations derived from cognitive dissonance theory. In Study 1, confidence ratings were

debiased by an affirmation manipulation designed to boost feelings of self-worth. In Study 2,

confidence ratings were debiased by a manipulation designed to lower the aversive implications of

feeling uncertain. These findings argue for a motivational perspective on overconfidence.

Title:

No safety in numbers: Persistence of biases and their effects on team risk perception and team

decision making.

Author(s):

Houghton, Susan M.; Simon, Mark; Aquino, Karl; Goldberg, Caren B.;

Affiliation:

Georgia State U, Atlanta, GA, US

Source:

Group & Organization Management. Vol 25(4), Dec (2000). (pp. 325-353). US: Sage Publications

Inc. http://www.sagepub.com

ISSN/ISBN:

1059-6011

Language:

English

Abstract:

Notes that because individuals can have cognitive biases that lower their perceptions of decision

risk, some suggest that teams, not individuals, should make decisions. Prior research, however, has

not explored whether a team's risk perception is affected by information-processing biases that are

similar to the cognitive biases that individuals exhibit. This study examined whether 3 biases, the

law of small numbers bias, illusion of control, and overconfidence, influence perception of risk of

1st move at the team and individual levels. 154 business students (mean age 28 yrs) responded as

individuals, and then in their existing teams, to a survey based on a teaching case. The survey

measured biases, risk perception, and the decision to proceed with a 1st move. It was found that the

law of small numbers and illusion of control decreased the risk perception at both levels and that the

law of small numbers had a significantly greater effect on team risk perception than on individual

risk perception. In contrast, the effect of overconfidence was not significant at any level. Implications

of the finding are discussed and future research directions are offered. The survey items are

appended. ( PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2000 APA, all rights reserved)

Title:

Test prediction and performance in a classroom context.

Author(s):

Hacker, Douglas J.; Bol, Linda; Horgan , Dianne D.; Rakow , Ernest A.;

Affiliation:

U Utah, Dept of Educational Studies, Salt Lake City, UT, US

Source:

Journal of Educational Psychology. Vol 92(1), Mar (2000). (pp. 160-170). US: American

Psychological Assn. http :// www.apa.org

ISSN /ISBN:

0022-0663

Digital Object Identifier:

10.1037//0022-0663.92.1.160

Language:

English

Abstract:

(journal abstract) This study focused on students' ability to predict and postdict test

performance in a classroom context. Ninety-nine undergraduate students participated during a

semester-length course in which the relation between self-assessment and performance was

stressed. Research questions were (a) Can students accurately predict test performance? (b)

Does accuracy vary with performance? (c) Does prediction accuracy increase over multiple

tests? and (d) Do prior performance and predictions of performance influence subsequent

predictions? High-performing students were accurate, with accuracy improving over multiple

exams. Low-performing students showed moderate prediction accuracy but good postdiction

accuracy. Lowest performing students showed gross overconfidence in predictions and

postdictions . Judgments of performance were influenced by prior judgments and not prior

performance. Performance and judgments of performance had little influence on subsequent test

preparation behavior. ( PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2000 APA, all rights reserved)

Title:

Overconfidence: It depends on how, what, and whom you ask.

Author(s):

Klayman , Joshua; Soll , Jack B.; Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia; Barlas , Sema ;

Affiliation:

U Chicago, Graduate School Of Business, Chicago, IL, US

Source:

Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes. Vol 79(3), Sep (1999). (pp. 216-247). US:

Academic Press Inc. www.academicpress.com

ISSN /ISBN:

0749-5978

Language:

English

Abstract:

Tested the hypothesis that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and

that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. This study presents 3 experiments using

new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. 118 college students

participated in these studies, however, none of them participated in more than 1 study.

Overconfidence and miscalibration , variations in overconfidence from domain to domain as a

function of difficulty and individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments were all

examined in each study. Systematic differences between confidence and accuracy were found,

including an overall bias toward overconfidence. However, these effects vary greatly with the type

of judgment. There is little general overconfidence with 2-choice questions and pronounced

overconfidence with subjective confidence intervals. Over- and underconfidence also vary

systematically with the domain of questions asked, but not as a function of difficulty. Stable

individual differences were also found. Determining why some people, some domains, and some

types of judgements are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how

confidence judgements are made.

Title:

Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination.

Author(s):

Baranski, Joseph V.; Petrusic, William M.;

Affiliation:

Defence & Civil Inst of Environmental Medicine, Information Processing Sector, Toronto, ON,

Canada

Source:

Perception & Psychophysics. Vol 61(7), Oct (1999). (pp. 1369-1383). US: Psychonomic Society,

Inc.. www.psychonomic.org

ISSN /ISBN:

0031-5117

Language:

English

Abstract:

Investigated a common and general basis for confidence in human judgment. Recently, the authors

found that the properties of confidence judgments in the sensory domain mirror those previously

established in the cognitive domain; they found underconfidence on easy sensory judgments and

overconfidence on hard sensory judgments. In contrast, data from the Uppsala laboratory in Sweden

suggest that sensory judgments are unique; a pervasive underconfidence bias was found, with

overconfidence being evident only on very hard sensory judgments. H. Olsson and A. Winman (1996)

attempted to resolve the debate on the basis of methodological issues related to features of the

stimulus display in a visual discrimination task. A reanalysis of the data reported in J. V. Baranski

and W. M. Petrusic (1994), together with the findings of a new experiment (15 Ss, mean age 31 yrs)

that controlled stimulus display characteristics, supports the position that the difference between the

Canadian and the Swedish data is real and, thus, may reflect cross-national differences in confidence

in sensory discrimination.

Title:

"I know I know it, I know I saw it": The stability of the confidence-accuracy relationship across

domains.

Author(s):

Bornstein , Brian H.; Zickafoose , Douglas J.;

Affiliation:

Louisiana State U, Dept of Psychology, Baton Rouge, LA, US

Source:

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. Vol 5(1), Mar (1999). (pp. 76-88). US:

American Psychological Assn.

ISSN /ISBN:

1076 -898X

Digital Object Identifier:

10.1037//1076 -898X .5.1.76

Language:

English

Abstract:

(journal abstract) If the relationship between confidence and accuracy extended across domains,

then one could assess performance in a known domain and use it to estimate performance in

another domain. The stability of the confidence-accuracy relationship across the domains of

eyewitness memory and general knowledge was investigated. The major findings of Experiment

1 were that in both domains participants were overconfident, yet more confident on correct than

on incorrect responses, and that the degrees of overconfidence, calibration, and resolution in the

2 domains were positively correlated. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and showed that

feedback about overconfidence reduced overall confidence levels but did not improve

calibration or resolution. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of

metamemory and individual differences.

Title:

Assessing our own competence: Heuristics and illusions.

Author(s):

Bjork , Robert A.;

Affiliation:

U California, Dept of Psychology, Los Angeles, CA, US

Source:

Gopher, Daniel (Ed), Koriat , Asher (Ed). (1999). Attention and performance XVII: Cognitive

regulation of performance: Interaction of theory and application. Attention and performance. (pp.

435-459). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. xiii, 814 pp.

ISSN /ISBN:

0-262-09033-3 (hardcover)

Language:

English

Abstract:

(chapter) The reading we take of our own competence is arguably as important in many real-world

contexts as is our actual competence. For example, in settings where on-the-job learning can be

disastrous from a personal or societal standpoint, such as air traffic control or nuclear plant

operations, it can be imperative that we possess the skills and knowledge we think we possess.

Individuals who overestimate their own current level of skill and knowledge pose a unique hazard to

themselves and others. More broadly, the reading we take of our current level of learning and

knowledge is a given domain determines such important matters as how we allocate our time, whether

we seek further study or practice, whether we volunteer for or avoid certain assignments, and whether

we instill confidence in others. Recent findings demonstrate, however, that humans frequently

misassess their own competence, and that such misassessments typically take the form of

overconfidence. At the root of such overconfidence, it is argued, is a misinterpretation of the meaning

and predictive value of certain indices of current performance. The authors' goal is to summarize the

types of illusions of comprehension and competence that have been identified and to outline the

implications for real-world instruction.

Title:

Cross-cultural variations in probability judgment accuracy: Beyond general knowledge

overconfidence?

Author(s):

Yates , J. Frank; Lee, Ju - Whei ; Shinotsuka , Hiromi ; Patalano , Andrea L.; Sieck , Winston R.;

Affiliation:

U Michigan, Dept of Psychology, Judgment & Decision Lab, Ann Arbor, MI, US

Source:

Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes. Vol 74(2), May (1998). (pp. 89-117). US:

Academic Press Inc. www.academicpress.com

ISSN /ISBN:

0749-5978

Language:

English

Abstract:

Previous studies have revealed surprising and persistent cross-cultural variations in overconfidence,

whereby respondents in some Asian cultures (e.g., Chinese) exhibit markedly higher degrees of

overconfidence than respondents in other cultures (e.g., the US and Japan). Most of those

demonstrations have entailed general knowledge tasks (e.g., answering questions such as whether

Europe is larger than Australia). The present studies sought to determine whether such cross-cultural

variations extend to judgments about the kinds of events that bear upon more common practical

decisions and to aspects of accuracy other than overconfidence. Ss in Taiwan, Japan, and the US

made probabilistic differential diagnoses of fictional diseases in a stochastic artificial ecology.

Results revealed that previously observed cross-cultural variations do indeed generalize. The data

were also informative about several potential accounts for such variations, but consistent with the

influences of culture-specific cognitive customs, including responsiveness to explicitly displayed

information, regardless of its presumed validity.

Title:

How real is overconfidence?

Author(s):

Ayton , Peter; McClelland, Alastair G. R.;

Affiliation:

City U, Dept of Psychology, London, England

Source:

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. Vol 10(3), Sep (1997). Special Issue: Stochastic and

cognitive models of confidence. (pp. 279-285). US: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Abstract:

Discusses the overconfidence phenomenon, which has been explained as a characteristic of human

information processing and comments on papers from this special issue on stochastic and cognitive

models of confidence. The papers presented here reflect 3 different general theoretical perspectives

that can be labelled as Brunswikian , Thurstonian , and cognitive bias accounts, respectively. Other

issues addressed include the existence of underconfidence ; internal probabilities, error and

overconfidence; confidence in actors and observers; judgments of inclusion and elimination; and the

combining subjective probabilities.