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Philosophy�s Movement Toward Cognitive Science Philosophical
and scientific theories of the mind throughout history seek to understand
mental phenomena and the place of such phenomena in relationship to physical
phenomena.� A prerequisite for any
theorizing involves formulating and agreeing upon constraints in order to focus
investigation and frame theories.� For
instance, most people do not think that logically impossible situations can
serve as counterexamples to a theory.�
So, when told that circles consist of sets of
points equidistant from a center point on a Euclidean plane, it strikes people
as irrelevant to object, �But what if the circle is a square?� All of the
thinkers this text and in this course consider adopt one of the most basic
constraints on inquiry, what I�ll call an ontological
framework.�� An ontological
framework articulates a hypothesis regarding number and often the nature of the
fundamental categories for some domain.� Fundamental categories consist of the set of
categories considered essential and ineliminable in any adequate account of the
phenomena in some domain.� These
categories further constrain the sorts of attributions and dynamical
interactions theorists can utilize.� For
example, prior to general relativity physicists consider space and time to be
distinct elements of the universe.� After
general relativity, space and time become a single element space/time.� Similarly, the ontological framework of
modern physics includes the category of force.�
Thus, modern physicists claim that adequate theories of physical
phenomena must include forces. The category
of forces illustrates some important aspects of an ontological framework.�� First, some of the elements of an
ontological framework prove less central than, even dependent upon, other
elements.�� Indeed, modern physics
recognizes two general categories of forces.�
On the one hand, physicists appeal to �contact forces.�� Contact forces transfer
energy by direct mechanical contact.� For
example, friction is such a force.� On
the other hand, physicists also posit the category of �fundamental
forces.��� Fundamental
forces (sometimes called field forces or interactive forces) constitute
the current hypothesis as to the number and nature of essential and
ineliminable forces in modern physics.�
Thus, contact forces prove dependent upon fundamental forces in that all
contact forces ultimately result from fundamental forces acting on
objects.� For example, friction at the
pivot of a pendulum results from the surfaces dragging against one another
during the swing of the pendulum (see Diagram A below).� The swing itself as well as the contact
pressure that results in the drag (the frictional contact force) comes from
gravitation (a fundamental force). Currently
physicists recognize four fundamental forces;
gravitation,
electromagnetism,
strong
nuclear force, and
weak nuclear force.�
Fundamental forces illustrate a second important point regarding
ontological frameworks; the elements and properties of an ontological framework
can change as inquiry progresses.� In the
history of physics, the number and nature of fundamental forces can and has
increased and decreased over time.�
Indeed, prior to
James Clarke Maxwell�s publication of �On Physical Lines of Force,� on 1861 and
Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism in 1873.[1, 2] physicists treat electric force and magnetic force as
separate fundamental forces.� Today,
however, physicists no posit a single force, electromagnetic force.� Indeed, Maxwell�s book represents a synthesis
of work that begins around 1820 with the Danish chemist and physicist
Hans
Christian �rsted.� �rsted reports his discovery that an electric current can
deflect a compass needle in his Experimenta Circa Effectum Conflictus Electrici in Acum Magneticam� in
1820.[3]
Early General Metaphysical Speculation: Philosophical Materialisms and
Dualisms The
development of the notion of �the mind� arguably traces back to the development
of the Greek notion of the soul.� Two
features of the development of the soul figure prominently in this rather
superficial history.� First, the development of the Greek notion of the soul
represents a slow accumulation of properties and processes associated with
three different distinctions living vs non-living, animate vs inanimate, and
mental vs non-mental.� Second, thinkers from Thales through the British
Empiricists with the exception of Descartes tend to allow themselves a
considerable degree of ambiguity within their explanatory and theoretic
frameworks as regards the nature of the soul and its relationship to (place in)
their respective overarching ontological framework.� I refer to this ambiguity regarding the exact
position of the mind within the various ontological frameworks as tenuous dualism.�
The tenuous dualist seems to treat the mind (or soul) differently than
other elements of any of the categories in their ontological framework.� For instance, Aristotle seems to adopt a
monistic physicalist ontological framework in which physical objects are a
union of matter and form.� However, he
seems to violate that framework when discussing the soul (see below).� In addition,
two main ontological frameworks emerge early on in Greek thought; monistic
physicalism and what I call oppositional dualism.� Monistic physicalism holds
that all objects, properties, processes, etc., including those associated with
the mind and life, belong to a single kind of substance, physical
substance.� As a result, theories about
all phenomena should categorize their target phenomena using physicalistic
categories construct dynamic and attributional models from for phenomena from
those physicalistic categories.� For
instance, Thales proposes that water is the basic element and seeks to explain
how all other objects, properties, processes, etc. result from water and its
properties.� Dualism
(or more generically, pluralism) asserts that
there are two (or more) fundamental kinds of substance.� Each substance has its own characteristic
properties. For instance,
Anaxagoras (500 BC � 428 BC) of Clazomenae (an area in Turkey in Asia
Minor) appears as the ultimate pluralist, holding that all types of
materials�from milk to gold�constitute distinct eternally existing substances
with their respective characteristic. [7]�
Empedocles (490-430 BCE) of Agrigentum (now known as the city of
Agrigento in Sicily) appears likewise to have adopted a pluralism of the basic
four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) together with two forces, love for
combining and strife for separating these elements to create other materials. [7] Dualists assert the existence of only two
distinct kinds of substance.� Each kind
of substance has an ineliminable role in explaining some class or classes of objects,
properties, processes, etc..� I use the
term oppositional substance dualism to refer to
those dualisms that assign opposite or fundamentally different properties to
each kind of substance.� For instance,
the Greek philosopher Plato articulates an oppositional dualism of forms and
sensible objects.� Plato supposes that
forms do not change and admit of no parts.�
Sensible objects, in contrast, change and can have parts.� The most famous oppositional dualism, often
called substance dualism or mind-body dualism supposes that to understand and
explain minds, their properties, processes, etc. requires the supposition of a
mental substance having only mental properties.�
Likewise, that to understand and explain physical objects, properties,
processes, etc. requires the supposition of a physical substance having only
physical properties. Additionally, the development of the Greek notion of the soul illustrates a common dilemma that theorists have faced throughout the historical development of theories of mind: (D1) Monistic physicalist theories face the difficulty of formulating physical mechanisms that plausibly explain various mental properties and processes.� In contemporary times many researchers allege that, qualitative consciousness, viz., conscious experiences of red, represents such a mental process.� For instance, David Chalmers argues that qualitative conscious experiences resist explanation by known physical mechanisms. [8-10]� He tells readers that, [8]
The Greek Notion of the
Soul The outline
of the narrative regarding the Greek notion of the soul goes as follows:� The idea of a single unified thing�the
mind--emerges over time from the notion of the soul.� To have a notion of the mind theorists must
come to a general consensus regarding two issues: (1)
Theorists must come to suppose that the diverse set of phenomena scientists now
consider mental processes and properties form a common, interrelated set of
phenomena�a domain.�� Call this the domain hypothesis. �(2) Theorists
must come to suppose that those interrelated processes and properties have a
common locus�that there is a single thing that has mental properties and where
mental processes occur.� Call this
supposition the common locus hypothesis.� This chapter chronicles the evolution
of a consensus with regard to the domain and common locus hypotheses.�� People often express surprise upon
discovering the relative recency and lack of ubiquity of the notion of a single
entity responsible for all the phenomena we associate with mentality.� However, the mind is, in fact, a relatively
recent invention.� For example, Fyodor
Dostoyevsky�s underground man gives a common alternative explanation for his
temperament�a mental property--in the opening passage of Notes From the Underground: �I AM A SICK MAN.... I am a spiteful
man. I am an unattractive man. I believe my liver is diseased.� [11]� The
underground man�s explanation of his spitefulness by reference to liver disease
was not uncommon at the time.� Likewise,
the early Greek philosophers often did not associate processes and properties
now commonly considered mental with the mind, nor did they offer particularly
mental explanations for these processes and properties. In short,
the soul does not begin in Greek thought as a single entity having mental
properties and where mental processes occur.�
The soul begins as the locus of the distinction between living and
non-living things.� Living things have a
soul, whereas non-living things are bereft of souls.� As Greek thinkers continue to reflect upon
the nature of the soul one sees these thinkers start to associate the soul with
the distinction between animate and inanimate things.� That is, possession of a soul comes to
differentiate those things capable of exhibiting self-generated movements from
those things incapable of such movements.�
Early Greeks distinguish animate from inanimate things in that animate
things generate movement whereas inanimate things move only as a result of the
transmission of motion, e.x., when a moving ball transmits its motion to
another ball with which it collides.�
Eventually, Greek thinkers come to envision the soul as the common locus
of mental processes and properties.� By
the time Plato and Aristotle pen their works, the core processes of the
contemporary notion of the mind�reasoning, sensation, perception, ambulance,
and emotion�all plausibly reside within the human soul.� However, the Platonic and Aristotelian souls
still form the basis for the distinctions between living and non-living as well
as the more basic Greek notion of animate and inanimate.� Thinkers in the Hellenistic period, like
Epicurus and the Stoics, move towards conceiving of the soul as the locus of
mentality, differentiating mentality from other aspects of life and alternative
causes of motion.� However, the
association between mentality and mortality�or often immortality�persists even
today.� Thus, the development of the
notion of a mind involves the association of various properties and processes
as having a common nature (the domain hypothesis)
as well as the association of those properties and processes with a single
entity (the common locus hypothesis).� Additionally, theorist must also disentangle
other properties and processes from that entity as well.� Call this the mental
distillation hypothesis. Perhaps the earliest mention of a soul in Greek literature occurs in the epic poems of the Greek poet Homer.[12, 13]� These poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey, exert a strong influence on early Greek culture.� Scholars commonly suppose that Homer lived and wrote in the 8th or 9th century BCE, though speculation has placed his life as far back as the 12th century BCE.� �In the Iliad and the Odyssey Homer refers to the soul as an entity unique to humans that gives life with its presence and death with its absence.�� The soul leaves the body at death, continuing to exist in the underworld as a shade or
image of
the person.� In fact, as late as the 5th
century BCE the most common Greek words for soul, thumos (θυμός) and
psyche (ψυχά) translate as alive, breath, and spirit.[12-15] No doubt,
many ordinary Greeks and religious thinkers of the time likely believe in
immortal souls, just as people today.� Indeed,
a 2009 Harris online poll found that 71% of the survey subjects indicate belief
in a soul that continues to exist after death.�
Only 10% profess disbelief in such a soul.� In contrast, only 45% express belief in
evolution.[16]� For the Greeks in Homer�s time the soul is a
uniquely human, quasi-physical entity the presence or absence of which marks
the distinction between life and death in humans.� During the centuries that follow Homer�s
writings, the Greek notion of the soul undergoes an expansion: both in terms of
the sorts of entities that can possess souls and in terms of the functions that
Greek�s attribute to the soul. Discussion
of the soul continues in early Greek philosophy, though few Greek philosophical
texts exist today.� Most of what contemporary
scholars know about the early Greek philosophers comes from surviving fragments
of their writings and reports of their views in the works of later writers. �For example, scholars often identify
Thales of Miletus (624-546 BC) as the first philosopher in the western
tradition, and Miletus (a city on the coast of present-day Turkey) as western
philosophy�s point of origin.� Scholarly
knowledge of Thales comes from doxographic evidence, i.e., discussions of his
views in other writers.� The primary
source of information about Thales comes from the Greek philosopher Aristotle.[7, 14, 17-19] Early Greek
philosophy tends not to distinguish strongly between different areas of
inquiry.� For instance, early Greek
philosophers do not distinguish philosophy from most of what one now thinks of
as science and mathematics.� Indeed, Thales'
thought seems to include aspects of observation-based astronomy as well as more
abstract �philosophical� theoretical speculation.� To wit, Thales reportedly predicts a solar
eclipse in 585BCE, an accomplishment that moves many researchers to identify
Thales�s work as marking the beginning of western science in addition to
philosophy.[14, 17] Thales, like
many of the earliest (Presocratic) Greek philosophers, adopts a monistic
physicalistic ontological framework.�
Thales provides a model for other early Greek philosophers in that he
articulates a general theoretic framework for understanding all phenomena
within monistic physicalism.�
Specifically, this early Greek theoretic framework seeks to understand
and explain all phenomena�objects, properties, processes, etc.�by positing one
or more basic elements and explaining all phenomena as manifestations of that
(those) element(s).� Thales forwards the
hypothesis that water is the basic element and seeks to explain how all other
objects, properties, processes, etc. result from water.� Thus, one can understand Thales and the other
early Greek philosophical thinkers as attempting to develop a general monistic
ontological framework for understanding the world.�� Thales and most of the early Greek philosophers
are physicalists (materialists), holding that all that exists is matter and the
void.� As a result, Presocratic theories
about the soul presuppose its physical nature.�
For
instance,
Aristotle reports in
De Anima that �Thales, too, to judge from
what is recorded about him, seems to have held soul to be a
motive force, since he said that the magnet has a soul in it because
it moves the iron.�(Book 1, Part 2, Paragraph 14)[20]� Thales thus expands the function of the soul
to include causing movement, specifically self-generated movement, as well as Similarly,
Heraclitus (535 to 475 BCE) of Ephesus proposes fire as the most
basic element, speculating that the soul consists of fire or air.� Heraclitus also suggests that control of
motor functions emanates from the soul and follows
Pythagoras (570 to 490 BCE) in linking wisdom to the soul.� Thus, for Heraclitus the fiery nature of the
soul means that mental and motor functions deteriorate if the soul becomes wet; �A dry soul is wisest and best. � A man when he
is drunk is led by an unfledged boy, stumbling and not knowing where he goes,
having his soul moist.� (Fragments 230 & 231, p.203)[21]�
Pythagoras (570 to 490 BCE)[21,
22],
Anaxagoras (500 to
428 BCE)[23, 24],
Empedocles (490 to 430 BCE)[25],
and
Democritus (460 to 370 BCE)[26, 27] all propose that plants and animals
have souls.� Thus, by the end of the 5th
century BCE the Greek notion of the soul consists in a physical, albeit rarified,
entity that serves to explain the difference between living and non-living
things.� The soul likewise causes
self-generated motion, emotional responses, and thought.� Specialized Greek
Philosophy Tracts Emerge and Dualism Becomes Less Tenuous
Around 400 BCE philosophers who have grown up within the general Presocratic monistic ontological framework for understanding the world, like Plato (427-347BCE) and Aristotle (400-320BCE), begin to write works covering more or less specific areas of inquiry.� They also spend significant time considering investigative methodology.� Both Plato and Aristotle contribute to the development of two general areas of inquiry that dominate thought about the mind for the next several centuries: Epistemology (the philosophic sub-discipline exploring the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge) and Philosophy of Mind (the philosophic sub-discipline exploring the nature of the mind).� Indeed, when Plato, writes the Meno [28] and later the Theatetus [29], both of which prove influential in epistemology, he alters the status quo by offering entire works on a single philosophical topic or sub-specialty.� Similarly, though the various lootings and burnings of the library of Athens result in the destruction of most of Aristotle's actual texts, Nicomachean Ethics, shows a similar topical focus.
Epistemology Multiplies Ontology Epistemic
ruminations date back to the Presocratics and continue today. However, the
reflections of the Presocratics upon epistemology appear as part of more
general discussions.� With Plato one
starts to see texts with specific topical foci and the emergence of two general
types of epistemological questions: On the one hand, one can ask how one can
(or ought to) go about generating knowledge or evaluating knowledge claims
about some topic.� For instance, there
are two general epistemic questions in the philosophy of mind:� (A) How, and
to what extent, can one know about one�s own mentality?� Theorists often call this the problem of self-consciousness or the problem of self-knowledge.� (B) How, and
to what extent, can one know about the mentality of others?� Theorists often call this the problem of other minds.� For the purposes of this class one can think
of the first type of epistemic questions--questions regarding the sources of
various kinds of knowledge about the mind--as seeking to understand and/or
clarify how one might come to know of the existence and nature of mental functioning.� Answers to these questions provide a
framework through which theorists attempt to gather evidence in order to better
understand the nature of the mind and its functioning. On the other
hand, one can ask questions about the nature of knowledge and what
distinguishes knowing from other states.�
One can think of these questions as concerned primarily with the nature
and function of knowledge in cognition.� Plato
primarily seeks answers to the most central of this second class of epistemological
questions; �How can creatures come to know about the nature of the world?� �Indeed, all of his works are informed by
Plato�s answer to the above epistemic question: Plato supposes that creatures
come to know the nature of the world via knowledge of another kind of world�the
intelligible world.� For Plato, the
sensible world is inherently flawed insofar as the objects of the sensible
world appear to retain their identity despite changing their properties�even
admitting of contradictory properties�over time and in relation to one
another.� For instance, in the
Theaetetus Socrates suggests that the same wine
can seem sweet to a healthy sommelier
and bitter when that same sommelier
becomes sick.� Yet, the same entity
cannot be both bitter and sweet because sweetness and bitterness contradict
each other.� In order to make sense of
knowledge, Plato supposes that knowledge comes from recognizing the constancy
amidst the ever-changing, flux�the reality under the diverse and seemingly
inconsistent sensations. For Plato
constancy comes from the entities in the intelligible world, i.e., the
forms.� Unlike the changeable entities of
the sensible world, the changeless forms admit of no contradictions either over
time or in relation to one another.� Objects
of the sensible world remain constant insofar as they �partake� of the
forms.� Thus, the sensible wine partakes
of the form of wine and so remains constant as wine and the sommelier can know it as wine.� But the wine only �partakes� or
�participates� in the form of wine, making it imperfectly wine.� This imperfection allows the sensible wine to
seem both bitter and sweet to different people or to the same person at
different times. Beginning as
early as the
Phaedo [30], Plato outlines a theoretical framework
that construes the sensible world and the intelligible world as fundamentally
distinct.� He characterizes entities in
the former as perceptible, changeable, and destructible aggregates, while the entities of the latter realm prove
imperceptible, changeless, and indestructible unities. (�77-81)[30]��� Though Plato does not equate the soul with
the forms, he does tell readers that, ��the soul commands, the body serves: in
this respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal.� (�80) [30]� Thus, Plato�s dichotomy between the sensible
and the intelligible introduces a much more robust dualism than that of the
Presocratics�a dualism of ontological kinds sharing no essential properties�an oppositional dualism.�
Nevertheless, one still sees Plato exhibit a considerable laxness when
it comes to locating the soul within his dualist framework. Theoretical
Explanations of Mental Functions In
The
Republic [31], a work he devotes primarily to political
philosophy, Plato introduces yet another highly influential view--the tripartite division of the soul.� The doctrine of the tripartite division of
the soul builds upon the expansion of the soul�s functions in the works of the
Presocratics and informs a great deal of future thought regarding the nature of
the mind and its operations.� According
to Plato the soul has three parts; the appetitive soul,
the spirit or passionate soul, & the thinking or rational soul.� Each element of the soul has its own
characteristic desires.� The good for
humans consists in the subjugation of the appetitive soul to the passionate
soul, which is in turn subjugated to the rational soul. Thus, reason, emotion,
and appetite become separate in Plato.�
One might argue that this represents the first attempt to understand the
mind in terms of constitutive elements of the mind, the functions they perform,
and the relationships that emerge.�
Interestingly, this theory of the soul supposes that the soul has
properties that the forms cannot possess.�
Specifically, the forms are changeless and indivisible while Plato�s tripartite soul proves both changeable and
divisible.� Thus, Plato also exhibits a
version of tenuous dualism with regard to the
soul. Aristotle In De Anima [20], Aristotle considers not only human mentality, but nature of the souls of all living creatures. Indeed, De Anima includes discussions on methodology, the senses, as well as thought and reasoning.� Aristotle seems to return to the materialistic framework of the Presocratics in that he denies that the form of an object constitutes a distinct entity.� Rather the form �blends� with matter to create an individual entity having those characteristic properties and capacities resulting from the blending of form and matter.��� However, in De Anima Aristotle appears to make an exception for the soul within his overall theory of form and matter.[20]�
Euclid�s Axiomatic Treatment of
Geometry as a Model for Knowledge and Reason Euclid of
Alexandria (325-265 BCE) stands out as one of the most underappreciated figures
in shaping the western notions of mathematics, philosophy, science, rationality
and mentality. Euclid is a Greek mathematician, who likely receives his
training in geometry in Athens from students of Plato before moving to
Alexandria.� In
The Elements [32](approximately
300BCE), Euclid's best-known work, he systematically and rigorously
organizes geometrical knowledge in terms of indubitable axioms from which he
deduces all other truths by careful proof.�
The Elements also includes a treatment of basic number theory. �The Elements provides readers with a comprehensive
collection of geometrical theorems and proofs developed by earlier
mathematicians such as Thales, Pythagoras, Plato,
Eudoxus, Aristotle, and
Menaechmus.� Euclid's accomplishment in The Elements
is not its content, per se, but the organization and rigor of its
presentation. Indeed, academics use Euclid's book as a mathematics text
as late as the beginning of the 20th century. Euclid's rigorous
axiomatization creates a model for mathematics that remains influential
today. Moreover, its influence extends to other disciplines such as
philosophy and science, where it comes to serve as the dominant model for
rational thought and knowledge for many, many thinkers. Indeed, Euclid's geometry proves so impactful that it influences great thinkers holding very different theories about the nature of the mind. For instance, Thomas Hobbes (1588�1679) advocates a hard-bitten mechanistic physicalism. Hobbes views all things, including politics and the mind, in terms of mechanistic operations upon physical matter. Hobbes speculates in his Elements of Philosophy [33] that
Thus, the impact
of Euclid consists in providing a paradigmatic instance of intellectual
synthesis and accomplishment.� Eucild�s
work serves as a model for the nature and structure of knowledge, for
reasoning, and for the nature and operations of the mind.� In this Euclidian-inspired vision of the mind
thought consists in deductive operations on statements.� Each statement traces its origin back either
to the certainty of immediate experience, to a set of statements held to be
certain and indubitable, or some combination of the two.� That is, one explains one�s beliefs in terms
of logical operations on truth-functional representations (i.e.,
representations that can be true or false).�
One cannot underestimate the impact of this conception of reason,
knowledge, and mentality upon our theoretical musings upon rational inquiry,
reason, and the mind.�
Descartes life
and work provide a microcosm of the changes and challenges wrought by the
important intellectual, social, and economic developments that characterize the
European Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution.� Scholars generally hold that the European Renaissance
began in the 14th century city state of Florence located in Tuscany, Italy. The
increase in commerce, artistic, and religious activity associated with the
period from the 14th to the 17th century also brought increased scientific
activity that eventually lead to what historians call the Scientific Revolution.
�Historians generally associate the
beginning of the scientific revolution with the publication of two important
works: Nicolaus Copernicus' (1474-1543) privately circulated manuscript called Commentariolus
(Little Commentary) is published in Germany under the title
De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium ��(On
the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, published in 1543 at Nuremberg,
Germany) after his death in 1543 [35].
The physician Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) publishes his seven volume text on
anatomy called
De Humani Corporis Fabrica (On the Fabric of the Human body)
in 1555 [36]. Both works challenge
traditional theories and figures in their respective areas. �Copernicus forwards the heliocentric
conception of the universe in contrast to Ptolemy. �Vesalius challenges many aspects of the
anatomical teachings of Galen. �These
works and many others serve to create a tradition of deterministic mechanism in
science. �This growing tradition of
mechanistic determinism increasingly moves scientists to seek to understand all
phenomena in terms of universal physical laws discovered through controlled
empirical experimentation--even those phenomena definitive of life and the
mind. The
tension between the religious or immaterial worldview and this hard-bitten
deterministic physicalism builds as the European Renaissance and Scientific
revolution gain momentum.� But, it is not
until one hundred years later that a scientist, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), publishes his
Meditations on First Philosophy (or Meditationes
de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et anim� immortalitas demonstratur)
[37] in
1641.� Descartes� work represents perhaps
the first and clearest systematic presentation of what we now understand as mind-body substance dualism.� Like all thinkers of the time, the French philosopher, physicist,
mathematician, and anatomist is a mind-body dualist.� Indeed, Descartes� mediations prove so
influential in philosophy in part because Descartes makes the tension between
the spiritual or immaterial world view and the mechanistic physical world view
explicit and stark. Descartes� Early Life Descartes
comes to science rather indirectly:� He
attends a Jesuit school located at La Fl�che, France called Coll�ge Royal
Henry-Le-Grand in 1607.� His graduation
from Henry-Le-Grand sees him earn his degree and license in Law at the
University of Poitiers in 1616.�
Descartes joins the army of the Dutch Republic for a brief time in 1618,
during which time he meets the Dutch philosopher and scientist Isaac Beeckman.� Beeckman reignites Descartes� interest in
physics and mathematics.� Descartes
claims to have had dreams shortly thereafter which he interprets as a divine
sign that he should found a unified science of nature based upon mathematics. The
Meditiations and Their Impact The Meditations on First Philosophy, proves
important in the development of the philosophy of mind for many reasons.� For instance, Descartes� view proves
important, in part, because it and Descartes himself become very influential in
the intellectual circles of Europe.� However,
the discussion in this chapter focuses upon two ideological reasons: First,
Descartes brings his scientific and mathematical interests to philosophical
speculation regarding the mind.� More
precisely, Descartes brings the goal of scientific explanation and an emphasis
on rigorous methodology to philosophical ruminations regarding the mind.� One ought not to suppose that these features
are exclusive to Descartes� works.�
Rather, he exemplifies a growing movement.� Importantly, his emphasis on rigorous
methodology in the development of theories and explanations leads Descartes to
seek an explanation for why only some kinds of physical entities appear to have
minds or the potential for mentality.�
Though a dualist, Descartes makes some of the first steps towards a
materialistic, scientific psychology and neuroscience.� Descartes maintains a very strong long-term
interest in the workings of the physical body, and spends a great deal of time
dissecting cadavers.�� In 1637 Descartes
publishes La Dioptrique as one of
three appendices to his Discourse on
Method .[38]� In each appendix, Descartes offers an example
illustrating the method he outlines for science in Discourse.� Dioptrique
is a treatise on optics.� Though not
particularly original in its results from optics, it articulates the corpuscular
theory of light and suggests for the first time that the retina projects
directly onto brain (in Descartes view, onto the walls of the ventricles).� Though Dioptrique
represents Descartes first publication on the topic of mind-body
interaction, Descartes� exposition in Dioptrique
reflects theoretical speculation from a work he began long before, Traite de l'homme [39] (Treatise on Man, published 1664, written
1637). Descartes
bases his theory of mind-body interaction upon his knowledge of gross
neuroanatomy.� Specifically, (A) Descartes posits the pineal gland as the �seat� of
mind-body interaction.� He hypothesizes,
contra Galen, that the pineal gland plays a role in sensation, imagination,
memory and the causation of bodily movements as early as his first work, Treatise of Man (written 1637, published
1662). [39]�� Thus, the pineal gland serves as the
principle organ for sensus communis--the
communication between the body and the soul.�
Both the soul and the body�s animal spirits can affect the pineal gland
by literally moving it, thereby allowing each to act on the other.� Additionally, (B) Descartes
adopts Galen�s hypothesis that the nerves are hollow tubes that contain ��a
certain very subtle wind, or rather a very lively and pure flame, which is
called �animal spirits�.� [39](p.19)�� Ironically, though Descartes advocates a
substance dualist, he actually furthers the mechanistic picture in that he
views the body as an elaborate machine.��
Moreover, he takes pride in his claim to have furthered mechanistic
explanation of human and animal behaviors.
So, Descartes� Mediations proves influential in that it brings his scientific and
mathematical interests to philosophical speculation regarding the mind.� �Ironically, the second reason for the
influence of Descartes� Mediations
lies in its failure to offer an adequate scientific explanation of the
relationship between the mind and the body.�
Descartes oppositional substance dualism paints mental and physical
substance as so unlike one another that it illustrates the daunting challenges
of trying to understand how these two opposite ontological kinds could possibly
interact in the seemingly fluid and highly integrated way one observes in one�s
everyday life.� Thus, because of his
dualist conception of the mind, and because of his scientific slant on
philosophy, the Meditations together
with �his Les Passions De L'ame (Passions of the Soul) [40] and Traite
de l'homme (Treatise on Man) [39] lay
the groundwork for a switch in emphasis in the philosophy of mind.� Whereas philosophic speculation regarding the
mind has a strong epistemic and functional emphasis before Descartes, the emphasis
turns somewhat away from epistemology and towards ontology.� That is, philosophers become increasing
interested one of two theoretic projects: (1)
Some thinkers seek to understand if/how the mind could be physical in nature
and explained through science.� (2) Other thinkers seek to explain the apparent
seamless integration of the mental and the physical within an oppositional
dualist framework.� These interests, at
least the former, continue today and leads to the explicit formulation of a
variety of theories regarding the nature of the mind and its relationship to
the physical world. Science, Representations, and Ideas Ironically, it is
the emphasis on science, observation, and physicalism that inspires still
another tenuous dualistic posit�the idea. �John Locke (1632-1704) writes his
An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding [41](1690)
to flush out the corpuscularian philosophy (essentially the hypothesis that the
physical world is composed of atoms and �the void� which he learns from the
great chemist Robert Boyle) with regard to the mind. �Like all British
Empiricists, Locke seeks to understand the mind in order to more
accurately understand and theorize about the nature, limits, and sources of
knowledge. operations on those representations. �Unlike Hobbes--but like Descartes--Locke's and Hume's model for ideas, the medium of mental representations, is pictures. �Locke and Hume both seek to explain the functioning of mental processes underlying thought and reasoning in terms of ideas and operations upon ideas. �Of particular significance, Hume views human reasoning about experience as resulting from operations of association rather than by deduction. ��Hume proposes that cause and effect reasoning results from habitual associations between ideas because of their constant conjunction in experience. �In the In the An Abstract of a Book lately Published: Entitled A Treatise of Human Nature etc. [44] tells readers that,
The third famous
British Empiricist George Berkeley (1685-1753), differs from Locke and Hume in
that his work emphasizes ontological issues.�
Indeed, in his works,
A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I (1710)
�[45]
and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
(1713) [46], Berkeley argues against
materialism in favor of a view called idealism,
in which nothing exists but minds and their ideas. Thus, with
Berkeley one sees the three major classes of theories regarding the ontological
nature of the mind and body. First, materialism
(reductive materialism or monistic physicalism)
posits only one type of substance, material substance. The mind and all mental
properties result from modifications of the same substance--physical substance,
i.e., the mind = the body. Second, dualism (substance dualism or mind-body dualism) posits two distinct
kinds of substance, mental substance and physical substance. The mental
substance underlies minds and mental properties, while physical substance
underlies all physical objects and physical properties.� Finally, idealism
(monistic mentalism) posits
only one kind of substance, mental substance.�
All seemingly physical objects and physical properties actually consist
of ideas and their properties.� These
basic positions have many permutations. Similarly, the
line of development outlined in this text does not exhaust the rich theoretic
permutations in the historical record. For instance, Thomas Reid (1710-1796)
rigorously rejects the notion of a representational mind at about the same time
that people are reading Hume and Locke.�
Another sort of objection, this time to the idea of a scientific
psychology comes from Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). �Kant, a physicist and philosopher, adopts the
same general project of understanding the nature of the mind in order to
further epistemological theorizing as Hume. However, in his book,
The Critique of
Pure Reason [47](Kemp
Smith's English translation 1929), Kant wants to counter Hume�s skeptical
conclusions. Kant argues that much of our knowledge flows from the innate
presuppositions necessary for experience itself.� Interestingly, though Kant develops and draws
heavily upon a theory of the mind in his work, he argues that a science of the
mind is impossible because the field cannot be mathematicized. Substance Dualism in the Twentieth
Century Despite Kant's
skepticism, scientific psychology eventually begins to develop. By 20th century
concerns over how best to understand and explain the mind�s physical origins
drives philosophical speculation regarding the mind, supplanting the emphasis
on epistemology. Additionally, concerns arising from philosophical interests in
language and mathematics begin to pervade the philosophy of mind. �Particularly in the second half of the
twentieth century, philosophers expand upon the basic theories of mind just
discussed. �It is, therefore, convenient
to use this section to outline the standard positions in the philosophy of
mind, including those that developed during this period.� As noted above, each view--materialism, dualism,
and idealism constitute classes of ontological
frameworks in which multiple theoretical permutations exist. �For instance, in the case of dualism
philosophers commonly note three distinct positions: Descartes holds the most
common position--interactive dualism. �Interactive dualism holds that mental
substance and physical substance causally interact with one another.
Interactive dualism might seem like the only possibility. However, two other
possibilities emerge if one denies that mental and physical substances
interact. Such a denial might seem ridiculous given the apparent connection
between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. For instance, if someone steps
on your foot (a physical phenomenon) you will likely experience a feeling of
discomfort in your foot (a mental phenomenon). However, Descartes' clarity and
rigor in differentiating mental and physical substance, ironically, raises a
significant challenge to interactionism. Recall that
mental substance is essentially non-spatial, lacking all physical properties.
Likewise, physical substance is essentially spatial, lacking all mental
properties. If the mind and the body are fundamentally different sorts of
stuff, one must ask, "How could these two substances possibly causally
interact with one another?" For that matter, given that the mind is
non-spatial, where could they possibly causally interact? �Experience renders mind-body interaction
indubitable, so interactive dualism must explain how such causal interaction
could possibly occur. Philosophers articulate many difficulties with
interactive dualism, but most agree that the difficulties with causal
interaction rank very high. In addition to difficulties with the very idea of
inter-substance causation, another serious difficulty emerges almost
immediately from dualistic interactionism.�
In a mechanistic, deterministic physical science, all changes in the
physical world should be explicable (at least in principle) by universally
applicable purely mechanistic, deterministic physical laws.� But, if mental substances and causal
substances causally interact, mental causation renders universal purely mechanistic,
deterministic physical laws impossible. Mental to physical causation will
always fall outside of these purely physical laws�violating them. One possible
solution to this last worry involves denying causal interactionism--at least in
one direction. Epiphenomenalism asserts that changes
in physical substances can cause changes in mental substances and properties,
but that changes in mental substances cannot cause changes in physical
substances or their properties. Thus, one still retains causal connections
between the mental and the physical, without mental causation violating
universally applicable purely mechanistic, deterministic physical laws. While
epiphenomenalism might allow for deterministic physical laws, it implies that
mental phenomena never cause physical phenomena--violating the seeming obvious
nature of mind-body interactions. Worse still, it must explain why causation
only runs from the physical to the mental, and not vice versa.� The
Each of the
modern substance dualist positions illustrates the tensions inherent in the
position.� Recall that early in the
chapter I noted that the development of the Greek notion of the soul also
illustrates a common dilemma that theorists have faced throughout the
historical development of theories of mind: (D1)
Physicalist theories face the difficulty of formulating physical mechanisms that
plausibly explain various mental functions.�
In contrast, (D2) Dualist oppositional
theories face the difficulty of formulating accounts of how two fundamentally
different types of objects could possibly interact in such a seemingly
continuous and seamless fashion.� Dualist
theories generally face difficulties in explaining mental functioning in that,
by their very nature, mental substances do not obvious have any mechanistic or
causal elements. Arguments for Mind-Body
Dualism At the beginning
of the chapter and at various points throughout I suggest motivations and
challenges for the various ontological frameworks.� For oppositional dualists--dualists who
assert a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between the kinds posited in
their ontological frameworks (e.x., mental and physical substance) the most
salient challenge lies in explaining (or explaining away) the seeming seamless
and perpetual integration of mind and body.�
Thus, one might well ask, �Why would someone advocate dualism?�� Descartes and other theorists have presented
three mainlines of argumentation for their ontological framework; (1) Arguments based upon the apparent inimical differences between mental and
physical phenomena, (2) Arguments based upon
knowledge claims linked to mentality, and (3) Arguments
alleging the physicalist cannot explain various mental phenomena. The Argument From Leibniz's Law/Identity of
Indiscernibles (Descartes) Descartes gives readers a version of the first kind of argument in the Mediations VI:[37]
Modern Argument From Leibniz's Law/Identity of
Indiscernibles (Descartes)
Argument from Introspection In the case of arguments from introspection, the arguer infers the differences between mental and physical substance on the basis of differences between their sensory experiences of their body and their introspective perceptions of their mental states and processes.� One can also find something like an argument from introspection in Descartes� Mediation VI: [37]
The contemporary Argument from Introspection
The Argument From Special Abilities/Inabilities
(Descartes): Logicians often
refer to form of this last class of argument as appeals to ignorance in that they
argue from a lack of current ability and or knowledge to an in principle claim
that such abilities can never exist or that their underlying principles can
never be known. These arguments also rely upon our tendency to see mental
creatures as fundamentally different from other entities.�� Specifically these arguments focus upon the
limited extent of mental properties in the world.� Not everything acts in a manner people
recognize as, for example, intelligent.�
Arguments from special abilities infer from the fact that theorists do
not fully understand some mental property or ability to the claim that such a
property or ability can never be fully understood or realized in purely
physical entities.� Such arguments lose
their efficacy insofar as viable physicalist explanations emerge for various
aspects of mentality.� For instance, in
part five of his Discourse on Method
Descartes suggests such and argument from disability:
The Contemporary Schema of the Argument From Special Abilities/Inabilities
Arguments Against Dualism Most theorists
rely upon two kinds of arguments against an oppositional mind-body dualistic
framework.� On the one hand, theorists
note that dualism by its very nature posits entities and properties that
provide no obvious means of causal interaction.�
How does the pin-prick you get (a physical event caused by physical
entities and processes), cause the pain that you feel (a mental event
supposedly caused by mental entities and processes)?� How does something with no location in space
provide one with a perspective from a location in space?� Such problems regarding the interaction of
mental and physical substances seem insurmountable to most theorists.� This line of argumentation usually goes under
the moniker of the problem of interaction. More recently Paul
Churchland [48, 64] argues that
oppositional mind-body dualistic frameworks do not actually provide plausible
explanations for seemingly mental phenomena.�
For instance, why do humans sleep?�
Why do humans dream when they sleep?�
Why do humans develop mental disorders like schizophrenia?� Substance dualism tends merely to posit a
substance together with a set of properties corresponding to mental attributes
such as fear, belief, desire, etc..�
However, the nothing about such entities or their proposed properties
provides one with any dynamical mechanisms to explain how mental phenomena
occur or lead one to the next.� For this
reason, substance dualisms seem to suffer from the same difficulties faced by
physicalistic theories.� As noted in the
beginning of this chapter, (D1) Physicalist
theories face the difficulty of formulating physical mechanisms that plausibly
explain various mental functions and properties.� Churchland argues forcefully that substance
dualisms face the same difficulties in explaining various mental functions and
properties.� Thus, in contemporary times
many researchers allege that, qualitative consciousness, viz., conscious
experiences of red, represent a mental function that seems to resist explanation
by known physical mechanisms.�
Churchland suggests that dualist theories likewise face the difficulty
of formulating dualistic mechanisms that plausibly explain various mental
functions like sleep, dreaming, etc..� The 20th
Century and the Semantic Twist Logical
Behaviorism If mind-body
oppositional dualists have problems both in explaining the seeming interaction
between the mental and the physical and in positing explanatory mechanisms even
for mental phenomena, how do monistic physicalists fair?� Physicalist theories face the difficulty of
formulating physical mechanisms that plausibly explain various mental
functions.� However, with the rise of
scientific psychology and later cognitive science, philosophers spend less time
formulating and defending theories of mind and more time trying to understand
the relationship between scientific theories of the mind and ordinary
conceptions of the mind. ��It is during
the early 20th century that the emphasis in philosophy of
mind�though still focused almost exclusively upon ontological issues�turns
towards the developments in science for inspiration.� Within philosophy itself a number of scientifically
inspired general strategies emerge in the 20th century for trying to
flesh-out a monistic physicalist framework.�
This movement towards closer integration between philosophy and science
also marks a shift in methodological emphasis.�
During this period philosophers begin increasingly to think of theories
not simply in terms of theoretical posits, but in terms of the relationships
between the terms and categories of scientific theories and those of ordinary
language.� As a result, during this time
philosophical theorists become increasingly interested in semantic
reduction.� For instance, whereas earlier
philosophers focus upon ontological frameworks, most 20th century
strategies for offering monistic physicalist explanations involve directly
identifying mental terms with physical terms.�
The underlying inference driving such identifications lies in the notion
that by directly equating mental and physical terms one indirectly identifies the
referents of those terms--mental phenomena and physical phenomena.� In other words, 20th century
philosophers locate the explanatory problem for the monistic physicalist in an
inability to recognize or gather sufficient evidence for the co-referential
nature of mental and physical terms.�
Thus, two general strategies emerge within philosophy during the first
half of the 20th century.� On
the one hand, theorists try to identify the meaning of mental terms with sets
of behaviors definitive of those terms.�
On the other hand, theorists seek to identify the reference of mental
properties, processes, and entities with the reference of physical properties,
processes, and entities through something akin to analytical reduction. Theorists call the first systematic attempt to flush-out this strategy for asserting that mental properties are just physical properties logical behaviorism. �Logical behaviorism (also called analytical behaviorism and philosophic behaviorism) represents the first attempt to systematically address the difficulties for physicalism within the scientific framework of the time. �It is important to note that philosophers of starkly different methodological orientations follow this line of theoretical speculation.� Indeed, historians identify Gilbert Ryle and Carl Hempel as the two most prominent figures in logical and/or analytic behaviorism. Ryle is a philosopher or language, particularly of ordinary language.� Ryle holds that researchers can dissolve many philosophical problems through the correct analysis of the ordinary language terms that theorists employ the formulation of those problems.� In his classic book, The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues extensively that mind-body oppositional dualism results from a category mistake�an incorrect use of language:[65]
Most historians
cite Gilbert Ryle's book, The Concept of Mind (1949)[65] as the first tract in logical behaviorism
and assign Hempel's "The Logical
Analysis of Psychology" (1935,1949) [66] to the second position.�
However, Hempel published his article, though in French, over 14 years
earlier than Ryle�s book. �Both works have
historical significance because they share a common shift of emphasis that
continues to shape thinking about the mind in philosophy. �Both Ryle and Hempel seek to defuse the
seeming difficulties in understanding how mental properties arise from or are
identical to physical properties by arguing that the meanings of mental terms
are exhausted by behavioral terms. In other words, establishing monistic
physicalism involves escaping referential opacity.� Hempel tells readers,[66]
While Hempel aims
primarily to address scientific and ontological issues, Ryle sees his work in a
different light. Ryle tries to provide an analysis of the concepts of ordinary
language. Both philosophers, however, trace the seeming difficulties associated
with the equation of mental processes and properties with physical properties and
processes to an improper understanding of the true meanings of mental terms.
Ryle asserts that,[65]
Additionally,
Ryle's emphasis on intelligent behavior marks a differentiation between mental
properties and non-mental properties which has come to serve as an important
standard in the philosophy of mind, and which latter allows for the initial
explanatory focus of cognitive science on cognition. �Specifically, philosophers differentiate
between mental properties and states that are strongly (or even definitively)
phenomenal in nature, called qualia or qualitative
mental states, and mental properties or states that are primarily (or
even definitively) intentional, called intentional
states or propositional attitudes. Examples of the former (qualia)
include pains, itches, seeing red, anger etc.. �Examples of the latter (intentional states)
include beliefs and desires. Intentional states may have some phenomenal
aspects, but intentional states are importantly, even fundamentally
representational.� That is, intentional states
represent objects, properties, relations and/or events in the world. Logical
behaviorists like Hempel who embrace logical empiricism seek to build upon real
progress by experimentalists like Pavlov, Watson, Tolman, and Skinner as well
as by scientists across a wide swath of the sciences. �They view the explosion of scientific progress
from the beginnings of the scientific revolution to the middle twentieth
century as deriving primarily from tying theories and theoretical terms to
rigorous empirical measurement and experimentation. �The overall picture many logical empiricists
embrace, at least early on, portrays science as a hierarchical set of axiomatic
systems.� Specifically, as a set of
universal, exceptionless laws together with operational or bridge laws that
serve to tie theoretic terms to the particular domain (see illustrative
diagrams below).� Logical empiricists
ultimately hold that the sciences are unified, and that higher, less basic
sciences like psychology or sociology will ultimately be reduced to lower level
sciences and finally to the laws of physics.�
The theoretical terms of physics will ultimately find their meaning
through bridge laws that link the theoretical terms of physics to the
experimental operations used to detect and/or measure the presence or amount of
the referents of those terms.� As a
result, experimental operations thereby define the referents of the theoretical
terms of physics an ontologically neutral observation language. Logical
empiricists refer to this conception of the nature of scientific theories and
their interrelationships as the unity of science.[67]� The logical
empiricists, especially those in Vienna, are deeply influenced by Ernst Mach as
well as by the works of Max Planck.�
Indeed, the Vienna philosophers originally call their group Verein Ernst
Mach (the Ernst Mach Society) in 1928.�
The group publish their manifesto, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. �Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific
Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle) in 1929.[68]� A kindred school with
common members exists in Berlin.� This
group includes such luminaries as Paul Oppenheim and Hans Reichenbach.[69]�
Both groups are strongly influenced by their common belief that human
knowledge and especially science are part of a long evolutionary process
creating a hierarchical set of sciences all of which ultimately reduce to
physics.� For instance, Rudolph Carnap�s
classic work, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy),[70]
provides readers with the most sophisticated and systematic attempt to
reconstruct science as a series of hierarchical axiom systems that reduce to
one another and ultimately to observations framed in an ontologically neutral
observation language.�� Similarly, Otto
Neurath edits multiple volumes of Foundations of the Unity of Sciences[71] and
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science[72].� The goal of these works is the
organization� and presentation of science
as a unified body of knowledge. An integral part of their reductionist program in science and their
rejection of metaphysical speculation is their doctrine regarding the meaning
of theoretic terms.� The earliest version
of the positivist doctrine of meaning is now called the verifiability theory of meaning or the verificationist
theory of meaning.� This doctrine
holds that the meaning of a proposition or theoretic term consists solely in the
method of its verification.� This
doctrine along with the moniker of positivism traces back to
Auguste Comte (1798-1857).� The doctrine
strikes out against metaphysical speculation in that it implies that all
seeming statements that one cannot cash-out in terms of their conditions of
verification are meaningless.� The early
positivist writings often invoke this principle to critique philosophic
problems as pseudo-problems. The logical
empiricists share a common disdain for metaphysical speculation and a desire to
further human understanding through rigorous epistemological doctrines
addressing methodological issues and minimizing ontological issues.� In many ways they turn the focus of philosophy
of mind towards philosophy of science and issues of scientific
methodology.� Likewise, they follow the
methodological lead of behaviorists in reexamining the proper understanding of
mental properties and processes. Thus, one can see
that logical behaviorists�both the ordinary language variety and the logical
empiricist variety--as seeking to understand the meaning and hence the
reference of psychological terms like belief and desire in terms of the
behaviors of intelligent creatures.�
Nevertheless, philosophers often misrepresent logical behaviorism as a
unitary movement with a strongly shared set of background theoretical
commitments.� Logical behaviorists do
share a commitment to science, and specifically to the promise of behaviorism
in psychology.� They also share a desire
to capture the meanings of mental terms in behavioristic terms thereby
identifying the referents of mental terms with the referents of physical terms. However, logical
behaviorism marks a significant point of divergence in the philosophy of
mind.� On the one hand, the logical
empiricists give rise to an orientation in the philosophy of mind that seeks to
understand the new and rapidly advancing sciences in terms of the theoretic
posits, explanatory schemas, and methodological practices of those sciences.� These theorists likely now identify
themselves as philosophers of psychology or cognitive science.� On the other hand, Ryle and other
philosophers of language devote their efforts primarily to understanding the
ascription conditions of ordinary language terms describing the mind, mental
properties, and mental processes.� These
theorists, like Ryle himself, seek to understand the world by clarifying the
ontological posits and theories implicit in ordinary language as used in everyday
life.� Ryle describes himself, for
example, as philosophical cartographer.[73, 74]� Ryle likewise begins his discussion in The Concept of Mind by telling his
readers that, �The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are
intended not to increase what we know about minds but to rectify the logical
geography of the knowledge we already possess.�(p.1) [65] No matter what
motivations lead logical behaviorists to advocate their doctrine, logical behaviorism
faces three significant difficulties. �First, the meanings of many mental terms seem
essentially or importantly tied to qualitative subjective experience as opposed
to overt behaviors. �Thus, many people
find the awfulness of pain essential to being in pain, but few find verbal
demonstrations essential to being in pain. �A person paralyzed by curare will not exhibit
the normal behavioral effects of pain when stabbed in the arm. �However, it seems improbable to suppose that
such a person feels no pain. �Likewise,
actors really do suffer for their art according to logical behaviorists in that
these actors actually suffer when overtly behaving as if they were suffering. �Second, many
mental properties such as aibohphobia (a fear of palindromes), ankylophobia
(fear of stiff or immobile joints) and malaise (a vague feeling of discomfort,
one cannot precisely identify, but which is often described as a sense that
things are "just not right.") seem to lack any definitive set of
behavioral effects. �These terms do not
seem meaningless or less meaningful than other mental terms, yet they do not
exhibit a small group of overt behaviors that one might consider criterial of
the state.� Third,
mental terms do not operate, for the most part, in isolation from one another. �Rather, the connections between the typical
behavioral causes and typical behavioral effects--even for those mental terms
that appear to have more or less criterial overt behavioral causes and
effects--are mediated by the interactions mental states with other mental
states. ��This last point finds emphasis
in the work of Roderick Chisholm and Hilary Putnam.[75-80]� For instance, one
cannot determine the causes and effects of your belief that this text is
remarkably dry in isolation from your interest in the subject, your desire to
do well in the class, etc.. If you love dry and boring texts, you may read all
night. If you are hungry, your belief may result in your getting a chocolate
bar.� The seeming interconnection between
mental terms leads Putnam and others to formulate a new approach to theorizing
called functionalism discussed later in this chapter.� As Chisholm tells his readers:[77]
Theorists often
call the successor to logical behaviorism type-type
reductionism or type-type identity theory.� Type-type reductionism proposes to identify
types of mental entities, mental properties, and mental processes, e.x., pain,
with specific types of physical entities, physical properties, and physical
processes, e.x., stimulated c-fibers.� Historians
generally credit the British philosopher and psychologist U.T. Place
(1924-2000) and the Austrian philosopher Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) as the
source of the modern identity version of type-type physicalism. �Place's colleague, J.J.C. Smart (1920- ) also
adopts this position. The identity theorists' motivations stem in large part
from (and build upon) the difficulties with logical behaviorism. For instance,
Place tells readers,[81]
The synthetic nature of the discovery that brain states and processes prove identical to mental states and processes allows type-type theorists to side-step many of the objections raised by dualists.� Place tells readers,
Identity Theories: Token-Token Identity In 1970, Donald Davidson (1917-2003) proposes a new version of identity physicalism.� Davidson starts his chapter, "Mental Events,"[83, 84] by stating his motivation for the view,
The anomalousness of the mental presents a problem for
Davidson because he accepts both the monistic physicalistic framework and the
basic logical empiricist picture of laws and reduction in science.� That is, Davidson holds that the dramatic
success of sciences like physics proves the mechanistic and deterministic nature
of the physical world as one describes it using the physical conceptual scheme.� Specifically, scientists formulate laws using
exclusively physicalistic descriptions.�
These physicalistic descriptions represent a conceptual scheme for
describing the world.� This conceptual
scheme has proven itself capable of describing the world so that the sciences
produce finite, exceptionless universal laws.�
Indeed, the collection of such laws forms a closed, complete deductive
system.� �That is, given a complete physicalistic
description of some state of the world, called a physical event, scientists
can, at least in principle, deduce how the world will unfold by deducing the
resulting physical event, i.e., the exclusively physicalistic description of
the world resulting from the prior event. This view of physical laws looks like the bottom of
the diagram (below, left) for the reductionist view of science.�� However, what happens to the picture if the
mental has exceptions to its laws?� If
one supposes that physical laws and bridge laws between the mental terms and
the physical terms are exceptionless and universal, then an exception to a
psychological law between S1 and S2 is an exception to
the physical law between P1 and P2.� That is, all members of S1 are members of P1 and all
members of S2 are members of P2.� Thus, the exception to the
psychological law between a token (member) of S1 and
token (member) of S2 is also an exception to the physical law.� The exceptionless bridge laws mean that the
token (member) of S1 is also a token (member) of P1 and
token (member) of S2 is also a token member of P2.� Thus, P1 and P2 violate
the physical law just as S1 and S2 violate the
psychological law. But how can one avoid the seeming dire consequences of an anomalous mental realm?� Specifically, Davidson wants to preserve three principles:[83]
What about the
causation between the mental and the physical (principle 1) and the strict
deterministic nature of all such causation (principle 2)?� Easy, says Davidson; mental events are just
descriptions of the world using the mental conceptual scheme.� Every mental event is just an event described
using mental terms.� But one can also
describe that event using physical terms from the physical conceptual
scheme.� Thus, every token of a mental
event is also a token of a physical event.�
The physical and mental descriptions might only hold for that token
event, or the descriptions may prove more general.� However, mental types do not reduce to
physical types.� So, some tokens of a
particular type of mental event, call it M1, will have token
physical descriptions from different physical types than other tokens of mental
events from that type, .i.e. M1.�
Thus, despite the lack of mental-type to physical-type reduction, one
can understand how token mental events are identical to token physical
events�they are just different descriptions of the same event. Moreover,
since every token of a mental event has a physical event description, token
mental events can causally interact with token physical events in a strict
deterministic manner�the manner dictated by the strict deterministic law
relating their physical event descriptions.�
Since physical event descriptions yield finite, exceptionless universal
laws that combine to form a closed deductive system, all tokens of mental
causal interaction with the physical fall under strict deterministic laws�just
not laws using mental terms.
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