TORTURE AND TRUTH
IN NOVEMBER of 2003 in Iraq, I traveled to Falluja during the early days of what would become known as the "Ramadan Offensive"--when suicide bombers in the space of less than an hour destroyed the Red Cross headquarters and four police stations, and daily attacks by insurgents against US troops doubled, and the American adventure in Iraq entered a bleak tunnel from which it has yet to emerge. I inquired of a young man there why the people of that city were attacking Americans more frequently each day. How many of the attacks, I wanted to know, were carried out by foreign fighters? How many by local Islamists? And how many by what US officers called "FRLS"-�former regime loyalists?1 The young man--I'll call him Salih--listened, answered patiently in his limited but eloquent English, but soon became impatient with what he plainly saw as my American obsession with categories and particulars. Finally he, interrupted my litany of questions, pushed his face close to mine, and spoke to me slowly and emphatically:
p.2 He leaned back and looked at me, then tried one more time. "The Americans," he said, "provoke the people. They don't respect the people." I thought of Salih and his impatience as I paged through the reports of GeneraI Taguba and the Red Cross, * for they treat not just of "abuses" or "atrocities" but the entire American "liberation" of Iraq and how it has gone wrong; they are dispatches from the scene of a political disaster. Salih came strongly to mind as I read one of the less lurid sections of the Red Cross report, entitled "Treatment During Arrest," in which the anonymous authors tell how Iraqis they'd interviewed described "a fairly consistent pattern ... of brutality by members of the [Coalition Forces] arresting them":
Of course, this is war; those soldiers had intelligence to gather, insurgents to find, a rebellion to put down. However frightening such nighttime arrests might be, Iraqis could at least expect that these soldiers were accountable, that they had commanding officers and a clear chain of command, that there were bases to which one could go and complain. These were, after all, Americans. And yet:
We might pass over with a shiver the word "disappearance," with its unfortunate
p.3 associations, and say to ourselves, once again, that this was war: insurgents were busy killing American soldiers and had to be rooted out, even if it meant one or two innocent civilians were sucked up into the system. And then one comes upon this quiet little sentence:
In the fall of 2003 Abu Ghraib contained within its walls--as the war heated up and American soldiers, desperate for "actionable intelligence," spent many an autumn evening swooping down on Iraqi homes, kicking in doors, and carrying away hooded prisoners into the night--well over eight thousand Iraqis. Could it be that "between 70 percent and 90 percent" of them were "arrested by mistake"? And if so, which of the naked, twisted bodies that television viewers and newspaper readers around the world have been gazing at these last weeks were among them? Perhaps the seven bodies piled lip in that great coil, buttocks and genitals exposed to the camera? Or the bodies bound one against another on the cellblock floor? Or the body up against the bars, clenched before the teeth of barking police dogs? Consider the
naked body wearing only the black hood, hands clasped above its head:
Pfc. Lynndie p.4 As I write, we know nothing of what "American intelligence knew"-�apart from a hint here or there, this critical fact is wholly absent from both reports, as it has been from the public hearings of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other officials. General Taguba, following his orders, concentrates instead on the activities of the military police, hapless amateurs who were "tasked" to "set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses" and whose work, thanks to digital photography, has now been displayed so vividly to the citizens of the world. It is this photography that has let us visualize something of what happened to Mr. Abd one night in early November 2003, following a fight among prisoners, when he and six other men were brought to what was known as "the hard site" at Abu Ghraib, the wing for the most dangerous prisoners:
p.5
Such scenes, President Bush tells us, "do not represent America." But for Iraqis, what does? To Salih and other Iraqis they represent the logical extension of treatment they have seen every day under a military occupation that began harshly and has grown, under the stress of the insurgency, more brutal. As another young Iraqi man told me in November, The attacks on the soldiers have made the army close down. You go outside and there's a guy on a Humvee pointing a machine gun at you. You learn to raise your hands, to turn around. You come to hate the Americans. This of course is a prime goal of the insurgents; they cannot defeat the Americans militarily but they can defeat them politically. For the insurgents, the path to such victory lies in provoking the American occupiers to do their political work for them; the insurgents ambush American convoys with "improvised explosive devices" placed in city neighborhoods so the Americans will respond by wounding and killing civilians, or by imprisoning them ill places like Abu Ghraib.3 The insurgents want to place the outnumbered, (overworked American troops under constant fear and stress so they will mis�treat Iraqis on a broad scale and succeed in making themselves hated. In this project, as these reports make clear, the methods used at Abu Ghraib played a critical part. For if Americans are learning about these "abuses" for the first time, news about what has been happening at Abu Ghraib and other prisons has been spreading throughout Iraq for many months. And if the Iraq's, with their extensive experience of Abu Ghraib and the purposes it served in the national imagination, do not regard such methods as "abuses," neither do the investigators of the Red Cross:
p.6 What, according to the Red Cross, were these "methods of physical and psychological coercion"?
The authors of the Red Cross report note that when they visited the "isolation section" of Abu Ghraib in mid-October 2003, they "directly witnessed and documented a variety of methods used to secure the cooperation" of prisoners, among them "the practice of keeping [prisoners] completely naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness .... " When the Red Cross delegates "requested an explanation from the authorities ... the military intel- p.7 gence officer in charge of the interrogation explained that this practice was 'part of the process.'''
This "process" is not new; indeed, like so many of the news stories presented as "revelation" during these last few months, it has appeared before in the American press. After the arrest in Pakistan more than a year ago of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the al-Qaeda operations chief, "senior American officials" told The New York Times that "physical torture would not be used against Mr. Mohammed":
In the same article, published more than a year before the Abu Ghraib photographs were made public, a number of American officials discussed the "methods and techniques" applied in interrogations at Afghanistan's Bagram Air Base, at Guant�namo, and at other secret prisons now holding the thousands who have been arrested and confined by American and allied forces since the attacks of September 11:
p.8
The "methods of physical and psychological coercion" that the Red Cross delegates witnessed at Abu Ghraib were indeed, as the "military intelligence officer in charge of the interrogation" told them frankly, "part of" a "process" that has been deployed by American interrogators in the various American-run secret prisons throughout the world since September 11. What separates Abu Ghraib from the rest is not the "methods of physical and psychological coercion used" but the fact that, under the increasing stress of the war, the pressing need for intelligence, and the shortage of available troops and other resources in Iraq, military policemen like Pfc. England, who had little or no training, were pressed into service to "soften up" the prisoners and, as the Taguba report puts it, set "the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees." And so when Specialist Sabrina Harman was asked about the prisoner who was placed on a box with electric wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, in an image now famous throughout the world, she replied that "her job was to keep detainees awake," that "MI [military intelligence] wanted to get them to talk," and that it was the job of her and her colleagues "to do things for MI and OGA [Other Government Agencies, a euphemism for the CIA] to get these people to talk." The military police, who, General Taguba notes, had "no training in interrogation," were told, in the words of Sergeant Javal S. Davis, to "loosen this guy up for us." "Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets the treatment." As for the unusual methods used--"breaking of chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees," "using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees," "beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair," "threatening male detainees with rape," "sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick," and the rest of the sad litany General Taguba patiently sets out--Sergeant Davis told intestigators p.9 that he "assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse." Many of the
young Americans smiling back at us in the photographs will soon be
on trial. It is unlikely that those who ran "the process"
and issued the orders will face the same tribunals. Iraqis will be
well aware of this, even if Americans are not. The question is
whether Americans have traveled far enough from the events of
September 11 to go beyond the photographs, which show nothing more
than the amateur stooges of "the process," and look
squarely at the process itself, the process that goes on daily at
Abu Ghraib, To date the true actors in those lurid scenes, who are professionals and no doubt embarrassed by the garish brutality of their apprentices in the military police, have remained offstage. None has testified. The question we must ask in coming days, as Specialist Jeremy Sivits and other young Americans face public courts-martial in Baghdad, is whether or not we as Americans can face a true revelation. We must look squarely at the photographs and ask: Is what has changed only what we know, or what we are willing to accept?
-The NOTES 1. See
"Delusions in 2. See "Iraqi Recounts Hours of Abuse by US Troops," The New York Times, May 5, 2004, ", A1 . 3. See "Iraq: The New War," pp. 53-59. 4. See Don Van Natta Jr., "Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World," The New York Times, March 9, 2003. THE LOGIC OF TORTURE
WHAT IS DIFFICULT is separating what we now know from what we have long known but have mostly refused to admit. Though the events and disclosures of the last weeks have taken on the familiar clothing of a Washington scandal--complete with full-dress congressional hearings, daily leaks to reporters from victim and accused alike, and of course the garish, spectacular photographs and videos from Abu Ghraib-beyond that bright glare of revelation lies a dark area of unacknowledged clarity. Behind the exotic brutality so painstakingly recorded in Abu Ghraib, and the multiple tangled plotlines that will be teased out in the coming weeks and months about responsibility, knowledge, and culpability, lies a simple truth, well known but not yet publicly admitted in Washington: that since the attacks of Scptember 11, 2001, officials of the United States, at various locations around the world, from Bagram in Afghanistan to Guant�namo in Cuba 10 Abu Ghraib in Iraq, have been torturing prisoners. p.11 They did this, in the felicitous phrasing of General Taguba's report, in order to "exploit [them] for actionable intelligence" and they did it, insofar as this is possible, with the institutional approval of the United States government, complete with memoranda from the President's counsel and officially promulgated decisions, in the case of Afghanistan and Guant�namo, about the nonapplicability of the Geneva Conventions and, in the case of Iraq, about at least three different sets of interrogation policies, two of them modeled on earlier practice in Afghanistan and Cuba.1 They did it under the gaze of Red Cross investigators, whose confidential reports--which, after noting that "methods of physical and psychological coercion were used by the military intelligence in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract information," then set out these "methods" in stark and sickening detail--were handed over to American military and government authorities and then mysteriously "became lost in the Army's bureaucracy and weren't adequately addressed."2 Or so three of the highest-ranking military officers in the land blandly explained to senators on the Armed Services Committee on May 18, 2004. On that same day, as it happened, an unnamed "senior Army officer who served in Iraq" told reporters for The New York Times that in fact the Army had addressed the Red Cross report--"by trying to curtail the international organization's spot inspections of the prison":
Why had these "senior officers" treated the grave allegations of the Red Cross, now the subject of so much high-level attention, in "a light-hearted manner"? The most plausible answer is that they did so not because they were irresponsible or incompetent or evil but because they were well aware that this report--like the others that had been issued by the Red Cross, and by Amnesty International and Rights Watch and other well-known p.12 organizations-would have no bearing whatever on what the American military did or did not do in Iraq. The officers almost certainly knew that, whatever the investigators of the Red Cross observed and wrote, American policies in Abu Ghraib prison were governed by entirely different concerns, and were sanctioned, even as the insurgency in Iraq gained strength and the demand for "actionable intelligence" became more urgent, by their most senior commanders--among others, by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander in Iraq, who on October 12, 2003 (about the time Red Cross investigators were making their two unannounced inspections), signed a classified memorandum calling for interrogators at Abu Ghraib to work with military police guards to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses" and to assume control over the "lighting, heating ... food, clothing, and shelter" of those they were questioning.4 Six weeks later, Brigadier General Karpinski herself wrote to Red Cross officials to say that "military necessity" required the isolation of prisoners of "significant intelligence value" who were not, she asserted, entitled to "obtain full [Geneva Convention] protection," despite the Bush administration's stated position that the conventions would be "fully applicable" in Iraq.5 We now have a good deal of evidence about how military policemen at Abu Ghraib, who had been ordered (according to Sergeant Samuel Provance, one of the first soldiers in military intelligence to speak to reporters) to "strip down prisoners and embarrass them as a way to help 'break' them,"6 attempted, whether enthusiastically or reluctantly, to fulfill these orders. We can begin with the story of the as-yet-anonymous prisoner who on January 21, 2004, gave a sworn statement--obtained by The Washington Post --to the military's Criminal Investigation Division about his time in Abu Ghraib:
p.13
p. 14
What is one to make of this Dantesque nightmare journey? The very out�landishness of the brutality might lead one to think such acts, if not themselves fantasies, must be the product of a singularly sadistic mind--and that indeed, as the Army has maintained, we are dealing here with the abuses of a half-dozen or so unstable personalities, left unsupervised, their natures darkened and corrupted by the stresses of war and homesickness and by the virtually unlimited power that had been granted them. That the abuse reported by many other Abu Ghraib detainees in their affidavits, and depicted in the photographs, is very similar does not of course disprove the Army's "few bad apples" defense; on the contrary, perhaps these half-dozen or so miscreants simply terrorized their cellblock, inflicting similar abhorrent acts on anyone they pleased. But then we come upon the following report, written by the Reuters bureau chief in Baghdad and published in the magazine Editor and Publisher, about the treatment of three Iraqi employees of Reuters--two cameramen and a driver--who were filming near the site of the downing of a US helicopter near Falluja in early January when troops of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived:
p.15
p.16 Different soldiers, different unit, different base; and yet it is obvious that much of what might be called the "thematic content" of the abuse is very similar: the hooding, the loud noises, the "stress positions," the sexual humiliations, the threatened assaults, and the forced violations--all seem to emerge from the same script, a script so widely known that apparently even random soldiers the Reuters staffers encountered in moving about the Volturno base knew their parts and were able to play them. All of this, including the commonly recognized "badge," suggests a clear program that had been purposely devised and methodically distributed with the intention, in the words of General Sanchez's October 12 memorandum, of helping American troops "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses."
What "sophisticated concept" does Senator Graham have in mind? How can what seems to be random and bizarre brutality possibly be described as "sophisticated"? Though we are limited here to what is publicly known, as Senator Graham with his security clearances is not, it is still possible to chart, in the history of "extreme interrogation" since the late Fifties, a general move toward more "scientific" and "touch-less" techniques, the lineaments of which are all too evident in the morbid accounts now coming out of Iraq. The most famous compilation of these techniques can be found in the CIA's KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, produced in 1963, and in particular its p.17 chapter "The Coercive Counterintelligence Interrogation of Resistant Sources," which includes the observation that
The intent of such "homeostatic derangement," according to the CIA manual, is to induce "the debility-dependence-dread state," causing the prisoner to experience the "emotional and motivational reactions of intense fear and anxiety."
Thus the hooding, the sleep deprivation, the irregular and insufficient meals, and the exposure to intense heat and cold. As a later version of the manual puts it, the "questioner"
Viewed in this light, the garish scenes of humiliation pouring out in the photographs and depositions from Abu Ghraib--the men paraded naked down the p.18 cellblock
with hoods on their heads, the forced masturbation, the forced
homosexual activity, and all the rest-begin to be comprehensible;
they are in fact staged operas of fabricated shame, intended to
"intensify" the prisoner's "guilt feelings, increase
his anxiety and his urge to cooperate." While many of the
elements of abuse seen in the reports from The American military, of course, is well aware of these cultural sensitivities; in fall 2003, for example, the Marine Corps offered to its troops, along with a weeklong course on Iraq's customs and history, a pamphlet which included these admonitions:
These precepts, intended to help Marines get along with the Iraqis they were occupying by avoiding doing anything, however unwittingly, that might offend them, are turned precisely on their heads by interrogators at Abu Ghraib and other American bases. Detainees are kept hooded and bound; made to crawl and grovel on the floor, often under the feet of the American soldiers; forced to put shoes in their mouths. And in all of this, as the Red Cross report noted, the public nature of the humiliation is absolutely critical; thus the parading of naked bodies, the forced masturbation in front of a female p.19 soldiers, the confrontation of one naked prisoner with one or more others, the forcing together of naked prisoners in "human pyramids." And all of this was made to take place in full view not only of foreigners, men and women, but also of that ultimate third party: the ubiquitous digital camera with its inescapable flash, there to let the detainee know that the humiliation would not stop when the act itself did but would be preserved into the future in a way that the detainee would not be able to control. Whatever those taking them intended to do with the photographs, for the prisoners the camera had the potential of exposing his humiliation to family and friends, and thus served as a "shame multiplier," putting enormous power in the hands of the interrogator. The prisoner must please his interrogator, else his shame would be unending. If, as the manuals suggest, the road to effective interrogation lay in "intensifying guilt feelings," and with them "the subject's anxiety and his urge to cooperate as a means of escape," then the bizarre epics of abuse coming out of Abu Ghraib begin to come into focus, slowly resolving from what seems a senseless litany of sadism and brutality to a series of actions that, however abhorrent, conceal within them a certain recognizable logic. Apart from the Reuters report, we don't know much about what went on in the interrogation rooms themselves; up to now, the professionals working within those rooms have mostly refused to talk.12 We do know, from the statements of several of the military policemen, that the interrogators gave them specific instructions:
p.20 As a lawyer for another of the accused, Staff Sergeant Ivan Fredericks, told reporters:
These statements were made by accused soldiers who have an obvious motive to shift the blame. Though few in military intelligence have spoken, and three have reportedly claimed the equivalent of Fifth Amendment protection,14 one who has talked to journalists, Sergeant Samuel Provance, confirmed Sergeant Davis's assertion that the policemen were following orders:
One needn't depend on the assertions of those accused to accept that what happened in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq was not the random brutality of "a few bad apples" (which, not surprisingly, happens to be the classic defense governments use in torture cases). One needn't depend on the wealth of external evidence, including the fall 2003 visit to Abu Ghraib by Major General Geoffrey Miller, then the commander of Guant�namo (and now commander of Abu Ghraib), in which, according to the Taguba report, he reviewed "current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence"16; or Lieutenant General Sanchez's October 12 memorandum, issued after General Miller's visit, instructing intelligence officers to work more closely with military policemen to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses"; or statements from Thomas M. Pappas, the colonel in charge of intelligence, that he felt "enormous pressure," as the insurgency increased in intensity, to "extract more information from prisoners." 17 The internal evidence--the awful details of the abuse itself and the clear logical p.21 narrative they take on when set against what we know of the interrogation methods of the American military and intelligence agencies--is quite enough to show that what happened at Abu Ghraib, whatever it was, did not depend on the sadistic ingenuity of a few bad apples. This is what we know. The real question now, as so often, is not what we know but what we are prepared to do.
When, as a young intelligence officer, the late General Paul Aussaresses arrived in war-torn Algeria a half-century ago and encountered his first captured insurgent, he discovered that methods of interrogation were widely known and fairly simple:
Aussaresses remarks that "almost all the French soldiers who served in Algeria knew more or less that torture was being used but didn't question the methods because they didn't have to face the problem directly." When as a responsible officer he gives a full report to his commander on his methods--which are yielding, as he notes, "very detailed explanations and other names, allowing me to make further arrests"--he encounters an interesting response: p.22
Aussaresses's logic is that of a practical soldier: a traditional army can defeat a determined guerrilla foe only through superior intelligence; superior intelligence can be wrested from hardened insurgents in time to make it "actionable" only through the use of "extreme interrogation"--torture; therefore, to have a chance of prevailing in Algeria the French army must torture. He has nothing but contempt for superior officers, like his colonel, who quail at the notion of "getting their hands dirty"--to say nothing of the politicians who, at the least sign of controversy over the methods he is obliged to employ, would think nothing of abandoning him as "a rotten apple." It has long since become clear that President Bush and his highest officials, as they confronted the world on September 11, 2001, and in the days after, made a series of decisions about methods of warfare and interrogation that General Aussaresses, the practical soldier, would have well understood. The effect of those decisions--among them, the decision to imprison indefinitely those seized in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the war on terror, the decision to designate those prisoners as "unlawful combatants" and to withhold from them the protections of the Geneva Convention, and finally the decision to employ "high pressure methods" to extract "actionable intelligence" from them --was officially to transform the United States from a nation that did not torture to one that did. And the decisions were not, at least in their broad outlines, kept secret. They were known to officials of the other branches of the government and, eventually, to the public. The direct consequences of those decisions, including details of the methods of interrogation applied in Guant�namo and at Bagram Air Base, began to emerge more than a year ago. It took the Abu Ghraib photographs, however, set against the violence and chaos of an increasingly unpopular war in p.23 Iraq, to bring Americans' torture of prisoners up for public discussion. And just as General Aussaresses would recognize some of the methods Americans are employing in their secret interrogation rooms--notably, the practice of "water-boarding," strapping prisoners down and submerging them until they are on the point of drowning, long a favorite not only of the French in Algeria but of the Argentines, Uruguayans, and others in Latin America19--the general would smile disdainfully at the contradictions and hypocrisies of America's current scandal over Abu Ghraib: the "disgust" expressed by high officials over what the Abu Ghraib photographs reveal, the senior American officers in their ribbons prevaricating before the senators, and the continuing insistence that what went on in Abu Ghraib was only, as President Bush told the nation, "disgraceful conduct by a few American troops, who dishonored our country and disregarded our values." General Aussaresses argued frankly for the necessity of torture but did not reckon on its political cost to what was, in the end, a political war. The general justified torture, as so many do, on the "ticking bomb" theory, as a means to protect lives immediately at risk; but in Algeria, as now in Iraq, torture, once sanctioned, is inevitably used much more broadly; and finally it becomes impossible to weigh what the practice gains militarily in "actionable intelligence" against what it loses politically, in an increasingly estranged population and an outraged world. Then as now, this was a political judgment, not a military one; and those who made it helped lose the generals' war. A half-century later, the United States is engaged in another political war: not only the struggle against the insurgency in Iraq but the broader effort, if you credit the administration's words, to "transform the Middle East" so that "it will no longer produce ideologies of hatred that lead men to fly airplanes into buildings in New York and Washington." We can't know the value of the intelligence the torturers managed to extract, though top commanders admitted to The New York Times on May 27, 2004, that they learned "little about the insurgency" from the interrogations. What is clear is that the Abu Ghraib photographs and the terrible story they tell have done great damage to what was left of America's moral power in the world, and thus its power to inspire hope rather than hatred among Muslims. The photographs "do not represent America," or so the President asserts, and we nod 0111' heads and agree. But what exactly does this mean? As so often, it took a comic, Rob Corddry of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, to point out the grim contradiction in this: p.24
Over the next weeks and months, Americans will decide how to confront what their fellow citizens did at Abu Ghraib, and what they go on doing at Bagram and Guant�namo and other secret prisons. By their actions they will decide whether they will begin to close the growing difference between what Americans say they are and what they actually do. Iraqis and others around the world will be watching to see whether all the torture will be stopped and whether those truly responsible for it, military and civilian, will be punished. This is, after all, as our President never tires of saying, a war of ideas. Now, as the photographs of Abu Ghraib make clear, it has also become a struggle over what, if anything, really does represent America. -The
NOTES 1. "In Abu Ghraib prison alone, senior officials have testified that no less than three sets of interrogation policies were put in play at different times--those cited in Army field manuals, those used by interrogators who previously worked in Afghanistan and a third set created by Iraq's commanding general after policies used at Guant�namo Bay." From Craig Gordon, "High�Pressure Tactics: Critics Say Bush Policies--Post 9/11--Gave Interrogators Leeway to Push Beyond Normal Limits," Newsday, May 23, 2004. 2. See Edward Epstein, "Red Cross Reports Lost, Generals Say: 'The System Is Broken,' Army Commander Tells Senate Panel about Abu Ghraib Warnings," San Francisco Chronicle, May 20, 2004. 3.
See Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, "Officer Says Army Tried to
Curb Red Cross Visits to Prison
in 4. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "Memo Gave Intelligence Bigger Role: Increased Pressure Sought on Prisoners," The Washington Post, May 21, 2004. 5. See Douglas Jehl and Neil A. Lewis, "US Disputed Protected Status of Iraqi Inmates," The New York Times, May 23, 2004. 6. See Josh White and Scott Higham, "Sergeant Say Intelligence directed Abuse," The Washington Post, May 20, 2004. p.25 7. See "Translation of Sworn Statement Provided by__________, Detainee # ______ , 1430/21 Jan 04," available along with thirteen other affidavits from Iraqis, at "Sworn Statements by Abu Ghraib Detainees," www.washingtonpost.com, and reproduced on pp. 247-248. The name was wilhheld by The Washington Post because the witness "was an alleged victim of sexual assault." 8. See Greg Mitchell, "Exclusive: Shocking Details on Abuse of Reuters Staffers in Iraq," Editor and Publisher, May 19,2004, which includes excerpts from the Baghdad bureau chief's report. 9. See KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation--July I963, archived at "Prisoner Abuse: Patterns from the Past," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 122, p. 83; www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA-EBBI22. "KUBARK" is a CIA codename. 10. See Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual--I983, National Security Archive 1'1"':1 ronic Briefing Book No. 122, "Non-coercive Techniques"; www.gwu.edu /-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122. I I. See "Semper Sensitive: From a Handout That Accompanies a Weeklong Course on Iraq's Customs and History," Marine Division School, Harper's, June 2004, p. 26. I 2. Though we do know something of what has gone on at other American interrogation centers, for example, the American air base at Bagram, Afghanistan. See Don Van Natta Jr., "QuestioningTerror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World," The New York Times, March 9, 2003. 13. See Scott Higham and Joe Stephens, "Punishment and Amusement," The Washington Post, May 22, 2004. 14. See Richard A. Serrano, "Three Witnesses in Abuse Case Aren't Talking: Higher-ups and Contractor Out to Avoid Self-incrimination," San Francisco Chronicle, May 19, 2004. 15. See White and Higham, "Intelligence Officers Tied to Abuses in Iraq." 16. See General Antonio M. Taguba, "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade," (The Taguba Report), reproduced on page 283. 17. See Douglas Jehl, "Officers Say US Colonel at Abu Ghraib Prison Felt Intense Pressure to Get Inmates to Talk," The New York Times, May 18, 2004. 18. See Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-I957, translated by Robert L. Miller (Enigma, 2002). 19. See James Risen, David Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis, "Harsh CIA Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations," The New York Times, May 13, 2004. 20. Rob Corddry, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Comedy Central, May 6, 2004. |