Introduction to Ethics
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Practice Test #1 Study Questions
1.) How might one argue for Divine Command Theory? How might one argue against Divine Command Theory? (Present arguments discussed in class.)
Divine Command Theory asserts that actions are morally right or wrong because of God�s willing them to be so. Thus, the will of God is the genesis of the moral authority of ethical principles. One might argue in favor of Divine Command Theory in several ways. First, if one believes that one�s deity is omnipotent, one might argue that Divine Command Theory follows from the omnipotence of one�s deity. If one�s deity is omnipotent then, that deity has the power to do anything, including willing that acts have specific the moral properties. One might argue that Divine Command Theory is the only way to reconcile the goodness of one�s deity with seemingly morally questionable acts attributed to that deity. For instance, God ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son and tormented Job to test him. These don't seem initially to be moral acts. But they are morally right given Divine Command Theory.
One might offer the Platonic argument against Divine Command Theory. According to the Platonic argument, Divine Command Theory proves untenable in that it forces a dilemma upon its advocates. A dilemma is a forced choice between two undesirable consequences. The dilemma arises for DCT when one considers whether (1) a deity's will actually causes acts to become good or bad or (2) a deity wills that acts be considered good or bad because of the goodness or badness of the acts themselves. The Platonic argument goes on to draw out the dilemma by asserting that each of these options has undesirable consequences for the DCT theorist. Specifically, the Platonic argument tries to establish that the Divine Command Theorist must choose between denying the principle of sufficient reason by adopting (1). Adopting (1) is consistent with DCT, but makes goodness and badness seem like an arbitrary and subjective choice made by a deity. Conversely, the DCT theorist could accept the principle of sufficient reason by adopting (2), in which case a deity is acting on the basis of reasons, i.e., acting in accordance with some independent standard.
2.) What is psychological egoism. What are some of the reasons cited in class and/or the readings for believing psychological egoism? What two positions might one adopt based upon psychological egoism?
Psychological egoism is a theory about the range of possible motivations for human actions. Specifically, psychological egoism claims that self-interest motivates all of one's actions. One might argue for psychological egoism by claiming that it follows from the fact that only one's own motivations can motivate one's actions. Specifically, one would claim that if one can only be motivated by one�s own motivations, then one can only be motivated by self-interest. One might equate self-interest with pleasure and argue that since people feel pleasure when their goals and desires are satisfied, one can identify that pleasure (hence self-interest) as a person's sole motivation for their actions. Altruistic behavior seems to undermine psychological egoism since it seems to represent a motivation not obviously identifiable with self-interest. One might argue for psychological egoism by defusing these troublesome cases of altruism. For instance, one might claim that behavior which seems altruistic appears that way precisely because it is motivated by the self-interested desire to appear altruistic to other people. Finally, one might argue for psychological egoism by claiming that seemingly selfless behavior like morality, good manners, and decency are not innate (natural or inherent). One might claim that one can only teach and maintain standards of ethical behavior by linking those behaviors to rewards and punishments, i.e., by linking them to self-interest.
3.) Define Descriptive Moral Relativism, Metaethical Moral Relativism, and Normative Moral Relativism. How are they connected in our lectures?
Descriptive Moral Relativism is a thesis about the actual moral practices of societies throughout the world. It purports to describe actual moral practices of societies throughout the world on the basis of empirical observations of those practices. Descriptive Moral Relativism asserts that observation reveals significant moral disagreements across many cultures. It also claims that these moral disagreements prove neither trivial nor outnumbered by agreements between cultures. Metaethical Moral Relativists assert a claim about the nature of moral practices and rules as well as the source of the normative authority (i.e., why we ought to obey them) of those practices and rules. Metaethical Moral Relativists argue that moral judgments get their truth values and justification, not from universal features of the world or society, but from the traditions, convictions, or practices of specific groups of people. In short, Metaethical Moral Relativists claim that the truth and the moral authority of any moral practice or rule is based solely upon (is relative to) contingent features of a given society. Normative Moral Relativists support the prescriptive ethical theory that what one ought to do is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of the group or culture in which one finds oneself. Normative Moral Relativists, therefore, defend a view about what actions are moral and immoral for a given individual.
In our lecture and readings we discussed how theorists have used Descriptive Moral Relativism as a premise from which to argue for Metaethical Moral Relativism and ultimately Normative Moral Relativism. The argument infers Metaethical Moral Relativism from (1) Descriptive Moral Relativism, (2) the claim that differences in moral practices must indicate differences in moral values, (3) the claim that moral values are arational (are not adopted or abandoned for rational reasons), and (4) the claim that moral values alone make moral rules true or false. From Metaethical Moral Relativism the argument seeks to establish the truth of Normative Moral Relativism on the grounds that one ought to do what is morally right (i.e., follow true moral rules) and refrain from doing what is morally wrong (i.e., follow false moral rules).
