Introduction to Philosophy

Study Questions for test #3:

1.) Do Berkeley (Three Dialogues...) and Hume (Of Scepticism...) reject the possibility of knowledge of the external world for the same reasons? If yes, give a general outline of their reasons. If no, discuss the differences in their reasons.

2.) What is the basic picture of the mind and its workings offered by Descartes which gives rise to scepticism regarding the external world? Is this basic picture shared by Hume? What is Descartes' position with regard to external world scepticism? What is Hume's position?

3.) What is the problem of induction as explicated by Salmon? What is the solution proposed by Popper? What is wrong with that solution according to Salmon?

4.) What is the problem of induction as explicated by Salmon? What is Black's solution? What is the problem Salmon sees with Black's solution.

5.) What epistemological questions are addressed by the British Empiricists ? What is their shared methodology in addressing these questions?

6.) How does Berkeley/ Philonous argue that the notion of secondary properties existing in independently existing material objects is incoherent in the vessel of water argument?

7.) Explicate Locke's notion of primary and secondary properties. Does Berkeley believe this distinction corresponds to two distinct kinds of properties? Why or why not? Does Hume believe this distinction corresponds to two distinct kinds of properties? Why or why not?

8.) What do the laws of nature actually describe according to Berkeley? What do they describe according to Hume?

9.) What is Searle's Chinese Room argument? Describe it in detail. To what position is it supposed to provide a counterexample? What is the basic story of the argument? How does Searle think that it provides a counterexample?

10.) What is the Turing Test? Describe the Turing Test in detail. For what is it a test? How would something pass the test? How would something fail the test?

11.) What is Nagel's argument against reductionism? According to Nagel could a reductionist science of mind ever create an adequate theory of mentality? Why or why not?

1.) Do Berkeley (Three Dialogues...) and Hume (Of Scepticism...) reject the possibility of knowledge of the external world for the same reasons? If yes, give a general outline of their reasons. If no, discuss the differences in their reasons.

BR = You told me how Berkeley argues the corpuscularan notion of properties existing in externally existing objects leads to greater confusion and contradictions than does the theory that all that exists are ideas and minds. You might have given me the two general arguments that Berkeley uses to show how the corpuscularan view leads to contradictions etc..

HR= You told me that Hume considers "...whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence." (174) Hume concludes that the senses cannot give rise to our opinion of a distinct existence. He offers several lines of argument to that conclusion, you might have noted one. Hume likewise rejects reason for two reasons, which you might have noticed. Hence, Hume concludes that it is the imagination that gives rise to the opinion of distinct existence. You might have elaborated upon Hume's theory about how this happens.

CC = You made relevant comparisons and contrasts between the two approaches. For instance, Hume does not suppose that the supposition of external properties and objects leads to paradox and confusion.

2.) What is the basic picture of the mind and its workings offered by Descartes which gives rise to scepticism regarding the external world? Is this basic picture shared by Hume? What is Descartes' position with regard to external world scepticism? What is Hume's position?

DP = You outlined Descartes' picture of the mind as something distinct from the physical world, which has ideas that are modifications of his mind. He notices further that his ideas he formerly associated with the external world seem to come to him independent of his own will. You noted that Descartes realizes that he does not know either the source of these ideas (they might come from himself or something external). He also does not know if the source is external, whether these internal modifications of his thought are veridical, i.e., "...have a similarity or conformity to things outside me." (119) You expressed Descartes' characterization of the epistemological problem with regard to the external world in Mediation III as one of whether or not these internal modifications of his thought come from an external world and if so whether they provide him with any insight into the nature of this external source.

HP = You noted that Hume has a similar picture. Technically, for Hume "the mind" is only a series of impressions. However, he talks about initial impressions coming to him independent of his will with great vivacity. These impressions are copied by the mind. Some of the vivacity of impressions is lost in the copying process, and the result is an idea. This is sensation. The mind works by various operations on these ideas. There are the operations of reason, which acts to compare ideas to see their real relations. Then there are the operations of the imagination, the one's we studied closely. They are the processes of association based upon similarity, contiguity, and cause and effect.

DEP = You outlined Descartes' position that God's existence can be known and this allows us to know that our ideas give us knowledge of an external world and its general properties, with the possibility of knowing facts about particulars.

HEP = You discussed Hume's position that we can have no knowledge of an external world existing independent of our experiences, but that we operate in such a way that we can not help but form these opinions.

3.) What is the problem of induction as explicated by Salmon? What is the solution proposed by Popper? What is wrong with that solution according to Salmon?

PI = The problem of induction is, in Salmon's terms, the problem of how to get ampliative inferences that are justified. If we could know with certainty a principle of inference whereby we could make ampilative inferences with certainty, then we would have demonstrative ampilative inferences. Salmon thinks that Hume has shown conclusively that we cannot know such a principle with certainty. That leaves us with the possibility, which seems circular, that we could come up with a nondemonstrative inference that would justify a principle of nondemonstrative inference.

PS = You related Popper's "solution" to the problem of induction as the claim that we don't use induction. We don't establish the truth of scientific hypotheses. Rather, we try to falsify them. Hypotheses, then, are either known to be falsified or known to be as of now unfalsified, not true or known. Since falsification is thoroughly deductive process, we can definitely know if a hypothesis is falsified in any particular case.

SC = You delineated Salmon's criticism that Popper requires a notion of corroboration in order to pick out which hypotheses are worth bothering to try and falsify and in order to use hypotheses in predictions/explanations. This notion of corroboration, notes Salmon, is a notion of nondemonstrative ampliative inference since "...it is a way of providing for the acceptance of hypotheses even though the content of these hypotheses goes beyond the content of the basic statements." (240)

4.) What is the problem of inducition as explicated by Salmon? What is Black's solution? What is the problem Salmon sees with Black's solution.

PI = The problem of induction is, in Salmon's terms, the problem of how to get ampliative inferences that are justified. If we could know with certainty a principle of inference whereby we could make ampliative inferences with certainty, then we would have demonstrative ampliative inferences. Salmon thinks that Hume has shown conclusively that we cannot know such a principle with certainty. That leaves us with the possibility, which seems circular, that we could come up with a nondemonstrative inference that would justify a principle of nondemonstrative inference.

BS = You discuss Black's solution. As portrayed by Salmon, Black suggests that the claimed problem with nondemonstrative ampliative justifications of nondemonstrative ampliative principles of inference is that they are circular in the bad sense on assuming in a premise what they derive in the conclusion. Black argues that arguments for the nondemonstrative ampliative principles are not, in fact, circular in this sense.

SC= You told me that Salmon argues that Black's nondemonstrative ampliative arguments are circular in a different sense. Namely, they use the principle in the conclusion as a rule of inference in arguing for the conclusion. Salmon notes that this sort circular inference can establish any principle of nondemonstrative ampliative inference and hence is useless.

5.) What epistemological questions are addressed by the British Empiricists? What is their shared methodology in addressing these questions?

EQ = You explained to me that the British Empiricists can be seen as asking three questions about human knowledge: What is human knowledge? How do humans get knowledge? What are the limitations of human knowledge given our answers to the first two questions?

That is, are there legitimate grounds for scepticism?

M = You outlined the methodology for answering the above questions as one of finding answers to the nature and operation of the mind. What are the basic constituents of thought and how do they relate thinkers to the world about which they think? What are the basic processes of thought? What can be known about ourselves and the world given our answers

to the first two questions?

E = You further noted that the BE's limit themselves to what they can observe empirically and what reason can legitimately infer from that in answering the questions in M.

6.) How does Berkeley/Philonous argue that the notion of secondary properties existing in independently existing material objects is incoherent in the vessel of water argument? Could this type of argument be used to argue that Berkeley's notion of idea is incoherent?

VA= You gave me a reconstruction of the vessel of water argument. "Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?" Ans. Yes (147) "Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?" (147) "Consequently, the principles [of materialism] themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity." (147)

GF = You discussed the general form of the argument as being (1) Associate properties of the object with perceived properties. (2) Show how the object can give rise to contrary perceived properties. (3) Conclude that matter cannot have both of those properties, by Leibniz's law. You then discussed how any means of attributing contrary properties to ideas could be used to argue that they don't exist either.

7.) In what ways do Locke's Berkeley's and Hume's theories of the mind's operations differ? Note that to answer this question you must summarize each person's theory.

LT = You discussed how Locke views the minds as a tabula rosa. Perception introduces ideas into the mind when particles are cause by objects to cause the particles of our sense organs to vibrate and eventually to travel to the brain. Such perception is passive on our part. The then mind operates upon these ideas to break them down into their simple parts, create new complex ideas, abstracting, comparing.

BT = You told me that Berkeley holds this view that the mind is like the Cartesian soul in that it is nonspatial. It somehow perceives ideas, that is, they are "imprinted on the senses," or perceived by attending the passions and operations of the mind, or created with the help of the memory and imagination by compounding, dividing, or barely representing the originally perceived idea. Finally, constant conjunction of ideas leads us to mark them with a name and to think of them as one thing.

HT = You noted that Hume has a similar picture. Technically, for Hume "the mind" is only a series of impressions. However, he talks about initial impressions coming to him independent of his will with great vivacity. These impressions are copied by the mind. Some of the vivacity of impressions is lost in the copying process, and the result is an idea. This is sensation. The mind works by various operations on these ideas. There are the operations of reason, which acts to compare ideas to see their real relations. Then there are the operations of the imagination, the one's we studied closely. They are the processes of association based upon similarity, contiguity, and cause and effect.

D = You noted similarities and differences between Hume and Berkeley. For example, Hume has no presupposition that the mind is nonspatial or that it does not have ideas as opposed to perceiving them.

8.) Explicate Locke's notion of primary and secondary properties. Does Berkeley believe this distinction corresponds to two distinct kinds of properties? Why or why not? Does Hume believe this distinction corresponds to two distinct kinds of properties? Why or why not?

LP = You explicated Locke's notion of a primary (original) quality as having the following properties: They are possessed by bodies independent of perception. They are bulk, figure, number, situation. Our ideas of primary qualities reflect the reality of the body. Primary qualities are those qualities that are immediately perceived because our ideas have the same qualities as the object.

LS = You related how for Locke, secondary (sensory) qualities are dependent upon primary qualities not perceived. They produce ideas in us ideas which do not reflect the real nature of the body. They are such things as colors, sounds, smells, tastes. They are mediately perceived in that we are aware of them not because our ideas resemble the qualities in the object, but because we can infer the qualities in the object based upon our ideas.

B = You discussed how Berkeley holds that it is false and absurd to suppose that there are such properties existing in objects that continue to exist when not perceived. All qualities are perceived qualities. Still, there is a distinction to be made between qualities that remain constant across different experiences and lead us to group those experiences together under a single name and qualities that do not.

H = You outlined Hume's position that we cannot know that there are qualities/properties in externally existing objects at all, so for Hume we cannot know that there are such properties. Further, we cannot know any relationship holds between one or the other type of idea and externally existing objects. Further, there is no distinction in experience between these types of qualities, i.e., salty is as vivacious as round. However, we are lead by the imagination to believe in the existence of external bodies and to believe that they have some of these properties and not others.

9.) What do the laws of nature actually describe according to Berkeley? What do they describe according to Hume?

BL = You discussed how Berkeley holds that it is false to suppose that there are these material objects that exist independent of our experiencing them. Hence, the objects of science cannot be these objects. However, we have these experiences and they come in certain roughly uniform ways, as dictated by God. The laws of nature are just our attempts to understand the patterns of uniformity present in God's choice of what ideas to send to us.

HL = Your answer detailed how Hume holds that, not only are we unable to have knowledge of independently existing material objects, but that we cannot have knowledge of the relations between our ideas, since that presupposes that the past relations will continue into the future. Hence, for Hume the imagination work to create in us an opinion that there are objects that exist independent of our experiences. At that point, custom or habit act to create and reinforce association made by the imagination so that we come to expect that causes similar to causes we have experienced in the past will be followed by effects similar to effects that followed the similar causes in the past. These habits of mind are what we refer to when we discuss natural laws.

10.) What is the psychological theory Hume offers for why we believe in the existence of independently existing objects?

HT = You presented Hume's theory: Since our impressions are internal and fleeting, there must be some quality of them that combines with a quality of the imagination to produce the opinion. Hume notes that "...All those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy, which distinguishes them from the impressions, whose existence depends upon our perception. ... This constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to of very considerable exceptions. ... But here ' tis observable that even in these changes they preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continu'd existence." (177) Hume then notes that these qualities give rise to the opinion of distinct existence because "there is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not occasion to suppose the continu'd existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception." (178) To this hume adds that this habit should not exceed the degree of regularity that has been given in experience. Hume supposes that the idea of identity comes from the "invariableness" and " uninteruptedness " of any set of impressions [he says object"] through some variation of time. Hume tells us that "The smooth passage of the imagination along ideas of the resemblance of perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity [see above]. The interrupted manner of their appearances makes us consider them as so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence,..." (255) Hume tells us that nothing makes us more uneasy than contradiction. When we face the identity/distinct verdicts of the two operations of the mind, we of course, seek to rid ourselves of the contradiction by rejecting one of the verdicts. Since we have already gotten the identity from past experience, we reject the nonidentity of current experience and create the fiction of unity under identity. Hume then notes that the mind transfers the vivacity of an impression to the related ideas. The vivacity of identity is transferred from the impression to the idea of a single object once that idea is forwarded exclusively.

11.) How, according to Locke, do our ideas of the primary properties of objects allow us to know about those primary properties in the object? What is Berkeley's alternative account as given in the Bust argument?

LP = You explicated Locke's notion of a primary (original) quality as having the following properties: They are possessed by bodies independent of perception. They are bulk, figure, number, situation. Our ideas of primary qualities reflect the reality of the body. Primary qualities are those qualities of the object that are immediately perceived because our ideas have the same qualities as the object.

LT = You discussed how Locke views the minds as a tabula rosa. Perception introduces ideas into the mind when particles are cause by objects to cause the particles of our sense organs to vibrate and eventually to travel to the brain. Such perception is passive on our part. The then mind operates upon these ideas to break them down into their simple parts, create new complex ideas, abstracting, comparing.

B = You discussed how Berkeley claims that when one perceives the bust of Caesar we come to what ideas of Caesar would because we associate the bust of Caesar with our other ideas of Caesar and the bust resembles the ideas of Caesar, where we to have them. In general, the mind groups ideas together under words and to associate and idea with those under the word is to perceive the idea as the "object."