Question #1

#1.) You gave me an account of Salmon's characterization of induction as nondemonstrative ampliative inference. ( Nondemonstrative inferences are inferences in which the truth of the conclusion is not necessitated by the truth of the premises. Ampliative inferences are inferences where the content of the conclusion is not contained in the content of the premises.) You then told me that the problem of induction according to Salmon is establishing that we are justified in accepting any such inductive principle.

#2.) You discussed Black's solution: Black notes that the standard criticism of justifications of the principle of the uniformity of nature are circular in that they assume as a premise the uniformity of nature. The problem with circular arguments is that they assume the conclusion in the premises and hence can be used to prove anything. However, Black notes that an argument for a principle governing induction need not assume the principle in the premises; it can use it as a principle of inference.

#3.)You outlined Salmon's criticism: The argument operates with the principle of the uniformity of nature as an inference rule, and an argument is only as good as its premises and its inference rules. In other words, an argument for the principle of uniformity that uses the principle of uniformity does not justify that principle on independent grounds as required.

Question #2

#1.) You should have told me a little about Berkeley's idealism. You told me that Berkeley holds that the laws of nature are merely the rules to which God chooses to conform in presenting us with ideas. They represent stable patterns in our experiences.

#2.) You noted that Hume holds that the ultimate springs of nature are forever shut up from human curiosity. What we call laws of nature or scientific laws are merely customs or habits of thought created by the mind as a result of association between ideas that are similar as well as spatially and temporally contiguous.