What Epistemology Inherits From Descartes

In general, contemporary ( internalist ) epistemology inherits three things from Descartes:

-The epistemic picture: Contemporary internalist epistemologists follow Descartes in conceiving of the original epistemic position of humanity (all sentient creatures) as one where they have only the modifications of their own minds as data from which to create knowledge.

-The central problem: Like Descartes contemporary internalist epistemologists hold that the central problem to be overcome in epistemology (save perhaps Gettier cases) is external world scepticism.

-Finally, though perhaps only a correlate from the first point, the solution to external world scepticism, and generally, the foundation of all epistemology must come from some feature of our subjective experience.

Contemporary Foundationalism

Contemporary foundationalism inherits more from Descartes. They inherit a general view of how one's knowledge is, in principle, organized.

Specifically, contemporary foundationalists argue that the justificational status of our beliefs has a foundational structure. They would divide all beliefs into two groups foundational or basic beliefs and nonfoundational or nonbasic beliefs. Foundational beliefs are most often thought of as very basic perceptual beliefs about how things appear to us. An oft quoted example would be the belief that "I am appeared to redly, now." However, many contemporary foundationalists , like Descartes, allow a wider range of beliefs to count as foundational. Foundationalist hold that basic beliefs are self- justifying (usually because they are undoubtable/self-evident/in some way justified without reference to other beliefs [ noninferential ]). Many do not see higher order beliefs as being justified solely by reference to foundational beliefs, and most do not hold the belief that basic beliefs are incorrigible. Finally, the chain of evidence must exist and (in some sense) be in principle discoverable by the knower , but it need not be recreated by the knower , nor need the knower have been aware of the connections. In this sense the justificational relationship is counterfactual (modal). Like Descartes, the foundamental problem for the foundationalist is the problem of ascent, i.e., of getting from basic beliefs to the sorts of robust belief systems we have.

The Regress Argument

Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists argue for the foundational view of the structure of justificational dependence, and hence, knowledge. The primary argument offered for the foundationalist position is the regress argument. The regress argument can be formulated as follows:

( R1 ) Suppose that you know something.

( R2 ) Either you know it because its justified by reference to another justified belief, or it's self-justified.

( R3 ) If it were true that your belief was justified by reference to another belief, then that belief is either justified by reference to another justified belief or it is self-justified.

( R4 ) It can be seen from ( R1 )-( R3 ) that either (exclusive) there are self- justified beliefs exist at the end of such belief chains or one of the following possibilities holds:

( P1 ) The chain is circular, eventually going back to an earlier link

or links and ending there.

( P2 ) The chain never ends, going on infinitely.

( P3 ) The chain terminates in an unjustified belief.

( P4 ) The chain terminates in a self-justified belief.

( R5 ) The only option consistent with your knowing the original belief is ( P4 ).

( P1 ) is not consistent with your being justified and hence knowing because it is consistent with the possibility that your circle of beliefs are coherent but false.

( P2 ) is psychologically false and provides you with no unqualified

justification.

( P3 ) precludes your being justified and hence knowing.

( R6 ) Hence, if one has knowledge one has some sort of basic beliefs.

Cartoon Coherentism

Coherentism is often portrayed as accepting the first of the possibilities in the regress argument and thus the picture of coherentism is often painted as below where the descent towards foundations begins as always, only to curve in on itself. This sort of linear model is probably not accurate of any worthwhile version of coherentism , but it serves to make the circularity point vivid.

Coherentism

A more realistic picture of the other contemporary internalist position in epistemology would look more as follows. Coherentism rejects the foundationalist notion of basic beliefs, holding that all beliefs have roughly the same status. The justification any given belief in a system of beliefs is a function of how well that belief coheres with the rest of the system. The problem is still addressing scepticism, but now one does so by trying to give a concrete formulation of the coherence relation. The classic objections to coherentism , i.e., it is that the theory lacks a clear notion of coherence and that coherence does nothing to guarantee truth (there may be multiple, inconsistent coherent systems), still seem to apply.

Contemporary Coherentism

More contemporary coherentism allows there to be more incorrigible parts of our belief system. Revisions on this view are easiest/most likely at the outside fringes. The more core beliefs are revisable. Hence, the core beliefs are somewhat like basic beliefs. It is at this point that contemporary foundationalist and coherentist theories become undifferentiable .

What Epistemology Inherits From Descartes

In general, contemporary ( internalist ) epistemology inherits three things from Descartes:

-The Epistemic Picture

-The Central Problem

-A commitment to the internalist perspective

Contemporary Foundationalism

Contemporary foundationalism inherits more from Descartes. They inherit a general view of how one's knowledge is, in principle, organized.

-Knowledge has a foundational structure as regards justification

-Foundational Beliefs

- Nonfoundational Beliefs

-The fundamental problem in epistemology is the problem of ascent.

They also differ from Descartes:

-Other sources of justification

-Foundational beliefs need not be incorrigible

-Justification is counterfactually modally defined

The Regress Argument

( R1 ) Suppose that you know something.

( R2 ) Either you know it because its justified by reference to another justified belief, or it's self-justified.

( R3 ) If it were true that your belief was justified by reference to another belief, then that belief is either justified by reference to another justified belief or it is self-justified.

( R4 ) It can be seen from ( R1 )-( R3 ) that either (exclusive) there are self- justified beliefs exist at the end of such belief chains or one of the following possibilities holds:

( P1 ) The chain is circular, eventually going back to an earlier link

or links and ending there.

( P2 ) The chain never ends, going on infinitely.

( P3 ) The chain terminates in an unjustified belief.

( P4 ) The chain terminates in a self-justified belief.

( R5 ) The only option consistent with your knowing the original belief is ( P4 ).

( P1 ) is not consistent with your being justified and hence knowing because it is consistent with the possibility that your circle of beliefs are coherent but false.

( P2 ) is psychologically false and provides you with no unqualified

justification.

( P3 ) precludes your being justified and hence knowing.

( R6 ) Hence, if one has knowledge one has some sort of basic beliefs.