Stroud 's Naturalized Epistemology

After some preliminary remarks about scepticism and Quine's position via Carnap , Stroud begins his account of Quine's argument and position in Epistemology Naturalized and other places. Stroud 's general thesis is that Quine, in fact, recognizes and allows the general distinctions necessary to generate scepticism regarding the physical world. The first distinction is the one between the "...everything we can get through the sense on the one hand and what is or is not true of the external world on the other." (p.216) According to Stroud , this makes Quine's project very much like the traditional project, it the project of trying to solve the problem of how we go from 'meager' data to 'our knowledge of the external world'.

So, Stroud sees Quine as trying to address the same problem that the traditional epistemologist addresses. But what about the role of science? What does one make of the claim that scepticism arises from science and should be addressed from within science?

Stroud interpretes this as follows: Science gives us evidence that our beliefs about the existence of the external world are underdetermined by the evidence. Hence, science itself provides us with the basis of the sceptical position. Quine's solution is to use science to tell us how we actually know about the external world. As Stroud says,

"...for Quine the problem arises because there are many possiblities compatible with everything the senses provide. Since we could adopt any one of several different theories based on the same 'data', the problem is to explain how we know that there are external objects, how we know that the 'physical object theory' is the right one. Quine says we arrive at that theory, or at any rate we continue to believe it, on the grounds analogous to those on which any scientist accepts a theory that goes beyond the evidence." (p.220)

Stroud then tells us that whatever it is Quine is doing at this point, however, it is not the traditional epistemic project and it's answer could not address the traditional epistemic problem. Why? Well, whatever the scientist does in accepting a theory, she or he do not justifiably eliminate the possibility that they are dreaming or that there is an evil demon. "The justified elimination of possibilities incompatible with knowledge of the physical world is precisely what was in question in the traditional problem" (p.221)

This required the traditional epistemologist to forsake appeal to the theories about the world that they had developed because their status had been jeopardized. Quine, in contrast, suggests that we use any such information available.

How, puzzles Stroud , is this possible? He focuses upon Quine's statements to the effect that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts. Surely, Stroud suggests, this means that science provides us with the premises of Cartesian doubt. And Quine's acknowledgment that the sceptic could be offering a reductio ad absurdum of science only reinforce the traditional understanding of the problem including its forsaking of our knowledge of the world in addressing the problem. Quine seems to criticize the sceptics point of view only as a form of extremism.

To what would this rejection of scepticism amount? Is Quine suggesting that the sceptic abandons science too easily at the first sign of possible error? This might well be Quine's point (p.232). But, this is not the form of the sceptical argument it does not say that we might be wrong about some things, so we should abandon everything. Rather, it notes we might be wrong about everything.

Stroud then argues that one could not engage in the Quinian epistemic project once one realizes that one has no knowledge of the world, that all of one's beliefs are mere torrents of output underdetermined by the 'meager' input, as it were, mere projections.

Second, Stroud considers yet another version of Quinian naturalized epistemology, .i.e., the study of the physical casues linking input and output. He argues that a physicalistic psychology, a theory about the causal origins of our beliefs, does not help us to bridge that gap between our data and our knowledge of the external world, precisely because it won't allow us to understand our belief forming processes as inferences. Causal determination, claims Stroud , does not bridge inferential underdetermination .

I would suggest that the many versions of Quine's project Stroud considers and the many sources he consults and quotes, surprisingly, bring him no closer to understanding naturalized epistemology. Though Stroud seems to consistently interpret Quine as holding what I've been calling ontological contextualism , he never really understands this position. He never really sees that the ontological contextualist rejects is irrelevant the way of understanding sceptical questions that holds knowledge hostage to the elimination of any possibility (possible ontology) incompatible with knowledge. Because he never understands this position, he never understands why or how one might engage in epistemic inquiry in any other way than trying to eliminate these possibilities on the basis of one's immediate experience. I further suggest that we can find a nice passage from one of Quine's articles often quoted by Stroud which illustrates this point of view nicely. In fact, Stroud quotes it incompletely.

"Epistemology is best looked upon, then, as an enterprise within natural science. Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin. Retaining our present beliefs about nature, we can still ask how we can have arrived at them. Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve and elaborate and useful science. How do we do this, and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions, and no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific questions about a species of primates, and they are open to investigation in natural science, the very science whose acquisition is being investigated." (p. 68)

In similar fashion, Quine articulates a statement as to the status of the results of such a project.

"We predict in the light of observed uniformities, and these are uniformities by our subjective standards.

I am not appealing to Darwinian biology to justify induction. This would be circular, since biological knowledge depends upon induction. Rather I am granting the efficacy of induction, and then observing that Darwinian biology, if true, helps to explain why induction is as efficacious as it is." (p.70)

Stroud 's Naturalized Epistemology

Quine, in fact, recognizes and allows the general distinctions necessary to generate scepticism regarding the physical world.

"...everything we can get through the sense on the one hand and what is or is not true of the external world on the other." (p.216)

What, then, of the role of science?

Scepticism arises from science and should be addressed by science

"...for Quine the problem arises because there are many possiblities compatible with everything the senses provide. Since we could adopt any one of several different theories based on the same 'data', the problem is to explain how we know that there are external objects, how we know that the 'physical object theory' is the right one. Quine says we arrive at that theory, or at any rate we continue to believe it, on the grounds analogous to those on which any scientist accepts a theory that goes beyond the evidence." (p.220)

What is Quine's Proposed Solution?

Not the Project

"The justified elimination of possibilities incompatible with knowledge of the physical world is precisely what was in question in the traditional problem" (p.221)

Not the Process

Scepticism as Reductio?

Sceptic as Chicken Little

Casual History as Sceptical Response

Ontological Contextualism

"Epistemology is best looked upon, then, as an enterprise within natural science. Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin. Retaining our present beliefs about nature, we can still ask how we can have arrived at them. Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve and elaborate and useful science. How do we do this, and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions, and no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific questions about a species of primates, and they are open to investigation in natural science, the very science whose acquisition is being investigated." (p. 68)

In similar fashion, Quine articulates a statement as to the status of the results of such a project.

"We predict in the light of observed uniformities, and these are uniformities by our subjective standards.

I am not appealing to Darwinian biology to justify induction. This would be circular, since biological knowledge depends upon induction. Rather I am granting the efficacy of induction, and then observing that Darwinian biology, if true, helps to explain why induction is as efficacious as it is." (p.70)