What is Naturalistic Epistemology?

Three Questions?

1.) How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?

2.) How do we arrive at our beliefs?

3.) Are the processes by which we arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs?

The Traditional View

The Independence Thesis

#1 goes to philosophers, #2 to psychologists, and #3 will be answered jointly after #1 and #2. There will be no interaction because the normative questions philosophers ask are completely independent of the descriptive questions psychologists ask. One might call this the independence thesis.

The Naturalistic Approach

Kornblith claims that the naturalistic approach to epistemology denies

then independence thesis. That is, they claim that #1 and #2 cannot be answered independently.

The Replacement Thesis

One way that one might deny the independence thesis is to adopt the replacement thesis. As Kornblith portrays it, the replacement thesis claims that once one realizes that classic epistemology was based upon a mistake, then one realizes that all of the content of the remaining content of #1 is in #2. Kornblith portrays Quine as giving an argument for the replacement thesis along the following lines:

Quine's Argument

( Q1 ) Foundationalism is coextensive with classical epistemology.

( Q2 ) #1 has meaning independent of #2 only if classical epistemology is (potentially) successful.

( Q3 ) Foundationalism is a failure.

( Q4 ) Hence, classical epistemology is a failure.

( Q5 ) Hence, #1 has no meaning independent of #2.

I would suggest that there is an even stronger interpretation of the passage from Quine to which Kornblith refers. One might well read Quine as asserting that the failure of the epistemic project is due to the fact that #1 is not, and never was, a legitimate question at all. Indeed, asking, "How ought we to form our beliefs?" is like asking, "How ought a billiard ball really to travel when hit?" There is no such legitimate question, there are only the questions "How do we form our beliefs?" and "How do billiard balls travel when hit?"

Notice here that #3 is jettisoned as well.

Quine Meets Darwin

Kornblith suggests that Quine offers another, different argument for the replacement thesis. It essentually argues from an affirmative answer to #3 to the claim that one need only then answer #2. It goes something like what follows:

Once one realizes that the it was the rise of science (during the scientific revolution) that first led to questions as to the limits and possibilities of knowledge, then one sees that these questions arise from within science. Since these questions arise from within science, it is appropriate to seek their answers within science. Epistemology is continuous with the scientific enterprise, rather than external to it. And within science one finds encouragement from Darwin and evolution. Evolution suggests that creatures whose belief forming mechanisms did not tend to lead to true beliefs "have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind."

Kornblith suggest that the verdict of the Darwinian argument must be very strong, i.e., that evolution has so shaped us that we in fact form all our beliefs exactly as we ought. However, I would suggest that this line of argument will never support the replacement thesis as it presupposes and answer to #1 (and probably #2) with which it can then answer three. How else could we confidently assert that our belief forming processes form beliefs as they ought?!

The Rational Presumption Argument

Kornblith offers us one final argument for the replacement thesis which he attributes to Davidson, Dennett, Harman, and Quine. Again, the argument seems to go from answering #3 affirmatively to arguming that all one need answer is #2. The argument goes something like the following:

( RP1 ) We must assume that there are principles of rationality that apply to all normal human beings.

( RP2 ) If normal human beings form their beliefs in accordance with rational principles, then clearly they form their beliefs as they ought.

( RP3 ) Hence, we must presume that we form beliefs as we ought.

Where one might offer up the following justification for premise ( RP1 ):

( RPP1 ) We assume that we can make sense of the actions of normal human beings.

( RPP2 ) If normal human beings did not form beliefs in accordance with principles of rationality, i.e., they reasoned in a way fundamentally different from us, then they would be unintelligible to us.

( RPP3 ) Hence, they must form beliefs in accordance with principles of rationality.

As before, it seems impossible to try to argue from an answer to #3 to the need only to answer #2, since one needs to answer #1 and possibly #2 to answer #3. One might take this argument in the spirit of a Kantian claim about the necessary presuppositions of empiricial experience vis a vis other humans. However, like Kant's, this claim is false.

Strong vs Weak Replacement Thesis

Kornblith suggests that the later two arguments seem only to support a "weak" version of the replacement thesis. Whereas the strong version would assert that #1 should be replaced by #2, the weak version would holds that one could answer either #1 or #2. Kornblith claims that the weak version of the replacement thesis does not require one or the other discipline (philosophy or psychology) to close up shop. Rather, though each discipline would, in the full length of time, come up with the same answers, each discipline has its own way of formulating the important questions and its own methodology. As a result, each discipline can and should benifit from each other.

Psychologism

Kornblith defines psychologism as answering #3 affirmatively. However, he asserts that Psychologism is a weaker thesis than the weak replacement thesis because it could be true while the weak replacement theory is false and it is implied by the weak replacement theory. Kornblith 's reasoning is as follows, one might well hold that #3 is true, but hold that epistemology and psychology are asking questions a fundamentally different levels of generalization. Hence, one must answer both #1 and #2 to have the full picture of how we form our beliefs and why we do it as we ought.

However, Kornblith suggests that even if the weak replacement theory were false and Psychologism true, then each discipline would place constraints on each other and interaction would be mutually beneficial.

Ballpark Psychologism

Kornblith suggest that most philosophers, even traditional epistemologists, hold what he calls ballpark Psychologism. Ballpark Psychologism holds that how we form our beliefs is in fact roughly how we ought to form our beliefs. Thought his only a vague thesis, he holds that anyone who rejects external world scepticism must hold it. Moreover, he holds that even if one holds that epistemology is autonomous from psychology and that epistemic truths can be known a priori, one ought still to hold that philosophers and psychologists can interact to each other's benefit. Kornblith 's reasoning is that even if epistemic truths are knowable a priori, it does not follow that they are easily knowable a priori. Indeed, one might well benefit from occasionally checking one's theory against the world.

What is Naturalistic Epistemology?

Three Questions?

1.) How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?

2.) How do we arrive at our beliefs?

3.) Are the processes by which we arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs?

The Traditional View

The Independence Thesis

The Naturalistic Approach

The Replacement Thesis

Quine's Argument

( Q1 ) Foundationalism is coextensive with classical epistemology.

( Q2 ) #1 has meaning independent of #2 only if classical epistemology is (potentially) successful.

( Q3 ) Foundationalism is a failure.

( Q4 ) Hence, classical epistemology is a failure.

( Q5 ) Hence, #1 has no meaning independent of #2.

Quine Meets Darwin

The Rational Presumption Argument

( RP1 ) We must assume that there are principles of rationality that apply to all normal human beings.

( RP2 ) If normal human beings form their beliefs in accordance with rational principles, then clearly they form their beliefs as they ought.

( RP3 ) Hence, we must presume that we form beliefs as we ought.

Where one might offer up the following justification for premise ( RP1 ):

( RPP1 ) We assume that we can make sense of the actions of normal human beings.

( RPP2 ) If normal human beings did not form beliefs in accordance with principles of rationality, i.e., they reasoned in a way fundamentally different from us, then they would be unintelligible to us.

( RPP3 ) Hence, they must form beliefs in accordance with principles of rationality.

Strong vs Weak Replacement Thesis

Psychologism

Ballpark Psychologism