What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?

Synopsis: Kim has both a positive and a negative thesis, though he offers only a schematic version of the positive thesis and only a schematic argument. In the negative, Kim wants to argue that the Quinian notion of Epistemology is, in fact, not epistemology in any interesting sense of the word and not internally consistent. He argues for the former by arguing that epistemology is fundamentally (essentially) a normative discipline whereas the Quinian project is fundamentally (essentially) anormative . He argues for latter by claiming that the psychology of science that Quine envisions is, in fact, normative in the sense that one cannot make sense of belief attribution without the corresponding normative notions of rationality and coherence. In the positive, Kim wants to argue that one has positive reason to suppose that the normative discipline of epistemology is possible field of human inquiry. He argues that we have a good reason to think that epistemology is a fruitful field of research because we believe that epistemic properties supervene.

Epistemology as Normative Inquiry

Here Kim summarizes his argument here admirably:

"...justification is a central concept of our epistemological tradition, that justification, as it is understood in this tradition, is a normative concept, and in consequence that epistemology itself is a normative inquiry whose principal aim is the systematic study of the conditions of justified belief."(p.35)

In support of his claim, Kim cites Descartes as the progenitor of epistemology. He notes that Descartes views epistemology as having two projects: ( P1 ) "...to identify the criteria by which we ought to regulate acceptance and rejection of beliefs, and ( P2 ) to determine what we may be said to know according to these criteria." (p.33) These projects have lead (together with the fact the justification is the only straightforwardly normative term in our definition of knowledge) to the domination of contemporary epistemology by the concept of justification, and the two foundational questions regarding justification: "( Q1 ) What conditions must a belief meet if we are justified in accepting it as true? ( Q2 ) and What beliefs are we in fact justified in accepting?" (p.33)

Kim adds that the answer to ( Q1 ) be stated without the use of any normative or evaluative terms using "descriptive or naturalistic terms" alone.

Kim's Argument That

Epistemology is Fundamentally a Normative Discipline

It remains unclear to me whether Kim's argument is best understood as a case of the fallacy of Argumentum ad Verecundiam (Appeal to Unqualified Authority) or Argumentum ad Populum (Appeal to the People, esp. Bandwagon), or some combination of both fallacies. What remains clear is that nothing about the history of epistemology from Descartes to present makes it more likely to be true that "...epistemology itself [not as historically practiced, but as a possible field of human inquiry] is a normative inquiry whose principle aim is a systematic study of the conditions of justified belief." Why not take our cue from Plato's Theaetetus and define epistemology as the disicpline that seeks to answer the question "...What, exactly, knowledge really is."

Kim on Quine's Argument and Position

Kim tells us that Quine argues from the seeming failure of the strict deductivist classical foundationalism to the abandonment of the normative conception of epistemology. Kim suggests that this is a fallacy of Argumentum ad Ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance) in that he suggests the dismissal of one possible way of carrying out classical epistemology dooms classical epistemology as a whole.

We might to defend Quine of this charge by pointing to his article's seeming intent of writing the post-script for logical positivism. But, I think that this only partially deflects the charge, as Quine seemed to view logical positivistic project as coextensive epistemology.

Kim then suggests that Quine also uses the failure of classical deductive foundationalism to argue for an anormative notion of epistemology which studies the "...patterns of lawlike dependencies characterizing the input-output relations for this particular organism and others of like physical structure." (p.41) Quine intends this notion of epistemology to succeed classical deductive foundationalism , Kim tells us, yet it's clear abandonment of the notion of justification together with the notion of knowledge render it not epistemology at all. Nor will it, Kim suggests, help us to understand the relation of evidence to theory (itself a normative, epistemic relation).

I think that we should be dubious of Kim's suggestions here. Quine's rhetorical flourishes are often quoted as a substitute for a careful of sympathetic analysis of his position. Though Quine tells us that we are to study the relation between the meager input and the torrential output, he never says that we are think of them only under a causal description. This, I would suggest, is projection on Kim's part. That we should, in effect, seal ourselves off from any understanding of this relation in terms of inference.

Part of the problem here, I would suggest, is that these comparisons between Ethics and Epistemology all have the implicit claim that normative recommendations are in some way strongly divorced from empirical considerations and part of some special province accessible only to philosophers and/or philosophical method. In fact, most of the normative context in which we engage are in fact strongly motivated by empirical considerations and relatively aphilosophical . Consider how research into materials shows us how to build a better computer chip. Research into biochemistry and practical experience have married to create norms regarding wine making, and so on.

Beliefs, Rationality, and Epistemology

To further strengthen his argument that Quine's epistemology is not an adequate, much less a better kind of epistemology, Kim argues that Quine's attempt to divorce itself from norms precludes it from having beliefs, or even representations, as its subject matter. Kim's argument goes essentially as follows: Attributing content requires radical interpretation. Radical interpretation requires that we understand the system of beliefs and other propositional attitudes as rational and coherent. The rationality requirement, at least, is a normative requirement. Hence, Quine's project cannot engage in content attribution since it forbids normative notions.

Kim than suggests more than argues that without appeals to (at least indirect appeals to) the notion of belief there is no way to tie Quine's project to theory and evidence.

Quine and Naturalized Epistemology

Kim moves on to assess whether self-proclaimed naturalizers of epistemology are really engaged in the Quinian project, and if not what they are doing. Kim concludes that a "...salient charactersitic of the naturalistic approach... [asserts that] ...justification is to be characterized in terms of causal or nomological connections involving beliefs as psychological states or processes, and not in terms of the logical properties of relations pertaining to the contents of these beliefs.

Where Kim suggests that the project of characterization is one where one provides conditions or criteria for justification in descriptive or naturalistic terms. (As opposed to defining justification using only descriptive or naturalistic terms.)

Because the naturalistic approach as, Quine outlines it, eschews all normative language, this naturalistic approach is not the same as naturalized epistemology. These naturalistic epistemologists differ from their nonnaturalist counterparts in their emphasis on causal and not logical properties when talking about justification.

Why Normative Epistemology is Possible

Here Kim argues that if we believe, as we do, that all valuational and normative properties like (justification) supervene on naturalistic properties, then we believe that the fact that some belief is justified cannot be a brute fact about it unrelated to the sort of belief it is. Two ideas underlie these convictions, first that values are consistent with facts (i.e., objects indiscernible in facts must be indiscernible in values) , second, that there must be generalizable , nonvaluational grounds for that (i.e., norms or rules).

What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?

Synopsis

Epistemology as Normative Inquiry

"...justification is a central concept of our epistemological tradition, that justification, as it is understood in this tradition, is a normative concept, and in consequence that epistemology itself is a normative inquiry whose principal aim is the systematic study of the conditions of justified belief."(p.35)

Two Projects:

( P1 ) "...to identify the criteria by which we ought to regulate acceptance and rejection of beliefs, and

( P2 ) to determine what we may be said to know according to these criteria." (p.33)

Two Foundational Questions:

"( Q1 ) What conditions must a belief meet if we are justified in accepting it as true?

(Q2) and What beliefs are we in fact justified in accepting?" (p.33)

Kim's Argument That

Epistemology is Fundamentally a Normative Discipline

Argumentum ad Verecundiam or Argumentum ad Populum

Kim on Quine's Argument and Position

The Argument

Argumentum ad Ignorantiam ?

The position

Beliefs, Rationality, and Epistemology

Quine and Naturalized Epistemology

a "...salient charactersitic of the naturalistic approach... [asserts that] ...justification is to be characterized in terms of causal or nomological connections involving beliefs as psychological states or processes, and not in terms of the logical properties of relations pertaining to the contents of these beliefs. descriptive or naturalistic terms.)

Why Normative Epistemology is Possible

Valuational and Normative Properties Supervene

Two ideas:

Values are Consistent With Facts

There must be generalizable , nonvaluational grounds for the first fact.