Goldman's The Internalist Conception of Justification

Regulative vs Theoretical Notion of Justification

Regulative guides belief formation

Theoretical tells us why any given belief is justified

Theoretic Principles may not effectively guide action

Regulative principles may not provide insight into knowledge.

A Regulative Notion?

Doxastic Voluntarism : A cognizer can choose to believe a given proposition at a given time

DDPs : Preliminaries

Inputs conditions of the cognizer

Outputs prescriptions about the adoption/retention of doxastic attitudes.

Permissible Inputs

Inputs must be accessible/available to the agent at the time.

"'For any person S and time t, if S asks himself at t whether condition C obtains at the time in question, then S will believe that condition C obtains then if and only if it does obtain then." (p. 31)

Question: Could we ever know, given the above, that anything was a permissible input?

Logical rules cannot be part of the DDP since in general we don't know for any propositions P and Q, that P implies Q.

However, more specific formulation might hold, if anything does.

Can we have rules that referred to the justificational status of a belief Q as part of the reason would could be justified in believing P? Only in the recursive portion of the set of rules. So, Goldman says that ultimately it is the states that satisfy the base clauses that count as inputs. Inputs must be purely factual, non-epistemic conditions. Really this isn't right. He should conclude that ultimately there have to be some clauses that have purely factual non-epistemic states as inputs.

Preliminaries: What is the Right DDP ?

What is the goal of Cognition?

Some combination of true belief and error avoidance

Internalist : must be certifiable from within

The Central Theses

"...(A) there is no definite and acceptable set of conditions that articulate the vague idea of the internalist [as given in the preliminaries], or (B) although such a definite set of conditions can be specified, there is nothing--no DDP , or rule of justification--that meets these conditions." (p.33)

Candidate Rules

(1) DDP X is right if and only if: X is actually optimal. (p.33)

Violates discovery condition

(2) DDP X is right if and only if : we are justified in believing that X is optimal. (p. 34)

Circular

(3)...if we believe that X is optimal. (p. 34)

We may be wrong, frivilous , etc.

(4) ...(A) we believe that X is optimal, and (B) this belief was caused by reliable cognitive processes. (p. 34)

Violates the discovery condition

Relativizing

To avoid the problem that using "we" violates the discovery principle, and to avoid the possibility that there would be no consensus as to the optimal DDP , hence no DDP would be the right DDP , we might relativize the criterion to individuals and times:

(3*) DDP X is right for S at t if and only if: S believes at t that X is optimal.

(4*)...(A) S believes at t that X is optimal, and (B) this belief was caused by reliable cognitive processes.

The problem here is that most people probably won't believe any DDP is optimal. Hence, (3*) and (4*) won't pick out any DDP for most people. The internalist might, therefore, stop short of requiring actual belief, and change (3*) and (4*) to say something like "S would believe X optimal given X".

(5) ...if X is applied to S's relevant inputs at t, X prescribes belief in 'X is optimal'.

Fails to meet the discovery principle

Multiple conflicting DDPs can satisfy 5 at the same time

[Nothing about self-prescription guarantees any epistemic worth]

Evaluating Relativization

Subjective vs Objective Rightness

Subjective rightness being something like the subject is warranted in believing an action is right. Objective rightness is simply that the action is morally right.

Doxastic Subjective Rightness

Yields (3) or (3*)

Epistemic Subjective Rightness

Yields (2)

The difficulty seems to be that the ethicist can have access to epistemic status, while the epistemologist cannot.

The Prescientist

The idea is that we might well want to say of a prescientific person that they weren't objectively justified in their beliefs, but that (lacking the scientific method) they were subjectively justified. Alvin's response is simply to say that they are not necessarily blameworthy, not that they are justified. I think we can make a stronger argument by claiming that subjective justification has nothing to do with our stated epistemic goal.

The Obvious Choice

(6) ...X is the proper DDP to choose if one chooses a DDP from the internal standpoint. (p.38)

Choice of a DDP requires criterion of choice. This brings the threat of regress. A DDP is not a proposition, but a policy.

However, one seems to need doxastic attitudes to make such a choice.

Particularly beliefs in contingent propositions which are disallowed in the internal concepts sans DDP .

Examples:

Maximizing Expected Value: You need subjective probabilities.

Maximin (scepticism)

MaxiMax ( gullability )

Problems With Logical Principles

Principles like "if Q logically implies P and you believe Q believe P," generate two difficulties: the discovery constraint and Harman's worry.

In choosing a principle we must take into account our intuitive and computational abilities, and these are contingent facts.

Other Goals

Coherence: consistency too weak, no explanation of further pursuit of facts.

Explanatory Prowess: Only seems good because it promotes the truth

Fixation of belief: too easy, multiple DDPs

Relieving Agnosticism: implausible exclusive goal

Externalism as the Best Choice

Objection: violates the discovery principle

Nothing prevents us from getting the optimal DDP . We may also come close.

Objection: If we don't have the optimal DDP , then how is it possible that people regularly make epistemic appraisals?

These are beliefs about jusitifiedness , not necessarily facts. Furthermore, they can be negative or reflect a partial understanding of the total DDP .

The Positive View

Nativism and Doxastic Assent

Goldman's The Internalist Conception of Justification

Regulative vs Theoretical Notion of Justification

A Regulative Notion?

Doxastic Voluntarism

DDPs : Preliminaries

Inputs conditions of the cognizer

Outputs prescriptions about the adoption/retention of doxastic attitudes.

Permissible Inputs

Inputs must be accessible/available to the agent at the time.

"'For any person S and time t, if S asks himself at t whether condition C obtains at the time in question, then S will believe that condition C obtains then if and only if it does obtain then." (p. 31)

Logical rules cannot be part of the DDP

Inputs must be purely factual, non-epistemic conditions

Preliminaries: What is the Right DDP ?

What is the goal of Cognition?

Some combination of true belief and error avoidance

Internalist : must be certifiable from within

The Central Theses

"...(A) there is no definite and acceptable set of conditions that articulate the vague idea of the internalist [as given in the preliminaries], or (B) although such a definite set of conditions can be specified, there is nothing--no DDP , or rule of justification--that meets these conditions." (p.33)

Candidate Rules

(1) DDP X is right if and only if: X is actually optimal. (p.33)

(2) ...we are justified in believing that X is optimal. (p. 34)

(3)...if we believe that X is optimal. (p. 34)

(4) ...(A) we believe that X is optimal, and (B) this belief was caused by reliable cognitive processes. (p. 34)

Relativizing

(3*) DDP X is right for S at t if and only if: S believes at t that X is optimal.

(4*)...(A) S believes at t that X is optimal, and (B) this belief was caused by reliable cognitive processes.

(5) ...if X is applied to S's relevant inputs at t, X precribes belief in 'X is optimal'.

Evaluating Relativization

Subjective vs Objective Rightness

Doxastic Subjective Rightness

Yields (3) or (3*)

Epistemic Subjective Rightness

Yields (2)

The Prescientist

The Obvious Choice

(6) ...X is the proper DDP to choose if one chooses a DDP from the internal standpoint. (p.38)

Examples:

Maximizing Expected Value: You need subjective probabilities.

Maximin (scepticism)

MaxiMax ( gullability )

Problems With Logical Principles

"if Q logically implies P and you believe Q believe P"

Other Goals

Coherence

Explanatory Prowess

Fixation of belief

Relieving Agnosticism

Externalism as the Best Choice

Objection: violates the discovery principle

Objection: If we don't have the optimal DDP , then how is it possible that people regularly make epistemic appraisals?

The Positive View

Nativism and Doxastic Assent