BonJour

Though Bonjour takes himself to offer arguments against reliabilism in general, he considers only cases of reliabilism as a theory of justification. BonJour sets-out to confront " externalist radicals" (Armstrong, more specifically), his only weapon, his ability to illustrate

the intuitive difficulty with externalism ...[that] on the externalist view, a person may be ever so irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation, and may still turn out to be epistemically justified,.... ( BonJour 1980, p.59)

The two salient phrases in the above quotation are "intuitive difficulty" and "subjective conception." Indeed, I think that BonJour 's examples convince only in the context of BonJour 's rhetoric-driven intuition pump. The order and description of BonJour 's examples play a large role in how compelling one finds BonJour 's suggested intuitions. In fact, BonJour 's examples all involve mischaracterizations or underdetermined characterizations of the task. Once one clears away the rhetoric and obscurants , BonJour 's examples fail, I suggest, to illicit any strong intuitions not had by the reader previous to the examples.

BonJour 's examples deal with cases of clairvoyance. As most adults exhibit a healthy scepticism concerning clairvoyance, I consider a generic process, P. Since I claim order plays an important role in pumping intuitions, I consider BonJour 's last example first: ( BonJour 1980, p.62)

NORM

Norm generates an output, Bp, using the perfectly reliable process, P. Norm has no other data either for or against Bp in either its long-term or short-term memory.

I take it to be contentious to claim either that Norm's tokening of Bp via P does or that it does not intuitively constitute his knowing that Bp. BonJour agrees, and immediately offers an argument that Norm does not know that Bp.6 BonJour asks the reader to consider two distinct, but similar cases. In the first case Norm, actually has a prior belief that P is a reliable process, and this belief plays a role in the generation of Bp. So far, I would suggest, any intuitions one might have would tend towards attributing knowledge to Norm. But, BonJour interjects, suppose that Norm's belief about P lacks justification?

Since justification plays no role in my approach, I suggest altering BonJour 's condition in a way consistent with his own take on knowledge. BonJour holds that knowledge is justified true belief: Suppose, then, that Norm's belief about P does not count as knowledge. According to my account, in this alternative Norm case, Norm's tokening of Bp does not count as knowledge, i.e., my approach requires that the data from which Norm generates his output count as knowledge. So, to generate a counterexample, BonJour must argue convincingly that in the case as it stands, Norm's tokening of Bp counts as knowledge. Unfortunately for BonJour , his intuitions side with my approach.

In the second case Norm ostensively has no beliefs about P. However, BonJour introduces an equivocation: Norm's having no beliefs about P turns into a case where from Norm's "...standpoint, there is apparently no way in which he could know the President's whereabouts." ( BonJour 1980, p.62) Somehow, though Norm has no beliefs concerning P, he cognitively registers that P could not be sufficient for him to know that Bp. How could Norm accomplish this feat without further reflection (i.e., using yet another process to evaluate P and/or Bp)? BonJour offers no explanation of how Norm could have such a standpoint given that he has no beliefs about P or Bp.7

MAUD

Maud generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Maud has a belief that P is reliable, and Maud's belief about P plays a role in her tokening Bp. However, Maud has no reason for her belief about P, and she maintains her belief about P despite massive counterevidence .

For BonJour , the key element of the Maud case lies in Maud's ignoring massive amounts of "cogent scientific evidence" against her belief that P is reliable.8 Interestingly, BonJour never mentions whether the process, call it Pm , that gives rise to her belief about P is reliable. One needs only minimal faith in science to claim that any process regularly generating outputs contradicting massive amounts of cogent scientific evidence is probably unreliable. After all, that is the whole point of BonJour 's specifying that the evidence is massive, cogent and scientific. If he said that Maud had generated her counterevidence by flipping a coin, the sting of the evidence would slacken considerably. Again, as with the second alterative Norm case, Maud's tokening of Bp fails to count as knowledge on my approach, as her belief about P (which fails to count as knowledge) plays a role in her generating Bp.

SAMANTHA

Sam generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Sam has a belief that P is reliable, though she lacks evidence either for or against her belief about P. Moreover, she is aware of massive cogent evidence against Bp.

Three versions of Sam's case are consistent with BonJour 's description. In the first version, Sam uses her belief about P to generate Bp. BonJour again omits the origins of Sam's belief about P. BonJour 's omission makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of Sam's belief about P upon Bp. However, as in the Maud case, the epistemically dubious origins of Sam's belief about the reliability of P casts doubt upon Bp's claim to knowledge.

In the second version, Sam uses P and only P to generate Bp. She then uses some other process, Pu, to evaluate Bp in light of the massive amount of cogent evidence against it.9 Again, it seems uncontroversial that any process like Pu, that ignores massive amounts of cogent evidence against a proposition (having no supporting evidence) in evaluating that proposition, would prove unreliable. So, Sam's continued belief in Bp after the operation of Pu does not count as knowledge in the second version of Sam's case.

In the third version, Sam's process for belief revision, call it Pi, necessarily accords the status of irrefutable or nearly irrefutable to beliefs generated by P. Such an additional stipulation, of course, undermines the intuition that BonJour wants to cultivate. If Sam's psychology is such that she must consider Bp irrefutable, it is difficult to accuse Sam of being "...irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of [her] own subjective conception of the situation,...." ( BonJour 1980, p.59) Sam's continued belief might seem irrational or irresponsible from our perspective. However, I suggest that one is hard pressed to assert Sam's irrationality upon discovering that P is perfectly reliable and Pi necessitates her continuing to hold that Bp. Why declare anyone irrational who must hold true beliefs to be true? Why not consider Sam fortunate to have P and Pi? Why not consider ourselves irrational to doubt Sam once we know the truth about P and Pi?

Consider a concrete case: Most people find many of the verdicts of the probability calculus unintuitive . For instance, people often judge the conjunction of two events to be more probable than either event. The probability calculus, of course, instructs one that the probability of two events occurring together can be no more probable than either of the events occurring in isolation. Surely, one is hard pressed to argue that someone who naturally reasons according to the probability calculus is irrational. They might seem to err in their judgements given one's own intuitions. However, any appearance of error on the observer's part is mistaken.

BonJour makes such a mistake in a second argument that Norm's tokening Bp in the original Norm case (where Norm generates Bp using only P) does not count as knowledge. BonJour asks the reader to consider a case where Norm also has a belief, Ba, for which he has large amounts of empirical evidence. Norm must choose between the beliefs based upon what he perceives to be their epistemic merit, knowing that a wrong choice means death. In this case, as with Sam, one can flush-out the case in two ways: In the first case, Norm uses Pu--the process that selects beliefs by ignoring massive amounts of cogent evidence--and chooses Bp. In such a case Norm looks very irrational. However, Pu looks very unreliable. So, BonJour 's intuitions side with my account.

In the second case, Norm uses Pi, a process that necessarily selects Bp because P generated Bp. In this second case, Norm does not look irrational, as his psychology is such that he must consider Bp to have the greatest epistemic merit. Norm's choice might seem irrational from our perspective, but we would be mistaken to assert Norm's irrationality upon discovering that P is perfectly reliable and Pi necessitates Norm's choice of Bp.

BonJour

Confronting " externalist radicals" (Armstrong)

"The intuitive difficulty with externalism ...[that] on the externalist view, a person may be ever so irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation, and may still turn out to be epistemically justified,...." ( BonJour 1980, p.59)

"intuitive difficulty"

"subjective conception"

Samantha

Sam generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Sam has a belief that P is reliable, though she lacks evidence either for or against her belief about P. Moreover, she is aware of massive cogent evidence against Bp.

Casper

Same as Samantha, but he has massive counter evidence that he has P.

Maud

Maud generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Maud has a belief that P is reliable, and Maud's belief about P plays a role in her tokening Bp. However, Maud has no reason for her belief about P, and she maintains her belief about P despite massive counterevidence .

NORM

Norm generates an output, Bp, using the perfectly reliable process, P. Norm has no other data either for or against Bp in either its long-term or short-term memory.

Case 1: Prior Unjustified Belief

Case 2: No Beliefs

from Norm's "...standpoint, there is apparently no way in which he could know the President's whereabouts." ( BonJour 1980, p.62)

The Second Argument

BonJour

Confronting " externalist radicals" (Armstrong)

"The intuitive difficulty with externalism ...[that] on the externalist view, a person may be ever so irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation, and may still turn out to be epistemically justified,...." ( BonJour 1980, p.59)

"intuitive difficulty"

"subjective conception"

NORM

Norm generates an output, Bp, using the perfectly reliable process, P. Norm has no other data either for or against Bp in either its long-term or short-term memory.

Case 1: Prior Unjustified Belief

Case 2: No Beliefs

from Norm's "...standpoint, there is apparently no way in which he could know the President's whereabouts." ( BonJour 1980, p.62)

The Second Argument (later)

MAUD

Maud generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Maud has a belief that P is reliable, and Maud's belief about P plays a role in her tokening Bp. However, Maud has no reason for her belief about P, and she maintains her belief about P despite massive counterevidence .

Interestingly, BonJour never mentions whether the process, call it Pm , that gives rise to her belief about P is reliable.

SAMANTHA

Sam generates Bp using P, and Bp is veridical. P is reliable. Sam has a belief that P is reliable, though she lacks evidence either for or against her belief about P. Moreover, she is aware of massive cogent evidence against Bp.

Case 1: Sam uses her belief about P to generate Bp.

Case 2: Sam uses P and only P to generate Bp. She then uses some other process, Pu, to evaluate Bp in light of the massive amount of cogent evidence against it.9

Case 3: Sam's process for belief revision, call it Pi, necessarily accords the status of irrefutable or nearly irrefutable to beliefs generated by P.

Is Sam Irrational?

Probability Calculus

Norm Again

The Second Argument that Norm's tokening Bp in the original Norm case (where Norm generates Bp using only P) does not count as knowledge.

Case 1: Norm uses Pu--the process that selects beliefs by ignoring massive amounts of cogent evidence--and chooses Bp.

Case 2: Norm uses Pi, a process that necessarily selects Bp because P generated Bp.

Problem

Utility needn't correlate completely with knowledge.

The Moral Analogy

Assumes Kantian Perspective

Doesn't recognize the distinction between act and rule utlitiarianism

It is a bad analogy because of the above.